Sections 446 to 452 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — previously Sections 406 to 412 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — collect the entire transfer architecture of the criminal process. The chapter answers a single question: when may a case or appeal be moved from the court that would otherwise hear it, and on whose application? The architecture is hierarchical: the Supreme Court can transfer between High Courts and across High Court territories; the High Court can transfer within its supervisory area; the Sessions Judge can transfer within his sessions division; and the Magistrate can make over cases between subordinate courts. The unifying doctrine is the maxim that justice should not only be done but be seen to be done — transfer is the procedural answer to a reasonable apprehension that an impartial trial cannot be had at the original forum.

The BNSS retains the substantive structure and changes only the financial caps — the costs ceiling under Section 446 (previously Section 406) is now uncapped where it was “not exceeding one thousand rupees”; under Section 448 (previously Section 408), the “one thousand rupees” ceiling is replaced with “sum” and the surety-bond limit is raised to “ten thousand rupees”; under Section 447 (previously Section 407), “or bail bond” is added in sub-section (4) and the costs cap removed. The substantive doctrine — reasonable apprehension as the objective test, the “Sessions Judge first” rule for same-division transfers, the suo motu power, and the supplementary jurisdiction under Article 227 — carries forward without alteration.

Statutory anchor and scheme

The chapter has seven sections, organised by transferring authority.

  1. Section 446 BNSS (previously Section 406 CrPC) — Supreme Court’s power to transfer cases and appeals between High Courts or between criminal courts subordinate to different High Courts.
  2. Section 447 BNSS (previously Section 407 CrPC) — High Court’s power to transfer within its supervisory area; the most-litigated section, with three statutory grounds and four operative remedies.
  3. Section 448 BNSS (previously Section 408 CrPC) — Sessions Judge’s power to transfer cases within his sessions division.
  4. Section 449 BNSS (previously Section 409 CrPC) — withdrawal of cases and appeals by Sessions Judge.
  5. Section 450 BNSS (previously Section 410 CrPC) — withdrawal of cases by Judicial Magistrate.
  6. Section 451 BNSS (previously Section 411 CrPC) — making over and withdrawal of cases by Executive Magistrates.
  7. Section 452 BNSS (previously Section 412 CrPC) — reasons to be recorded for any transfer or withdrawal.

The chapter operates alongside the supervisory architecture treated in the reference and revisional jurisdiction and the residual constitutional jurisdiction treated in the inherent powers of the High Court chapter. The full procedural map is in the Code of Criminal Procedure and BNSS notes.

Section 446 BNSS — Supreme Court’s power to transfer

Section 446 BNSS (previously Section 406 CrPC) gives the Supreme Court the widest transfer power in the chapter. Whenever it is made to appear to the Supreme Court that an order is expedient for the ends of justice, it may direct that any particular case or appeal be transferred (a) from one High Court to another High Court, or (b) from a criminal court subordinate to one High Court to another criminal court of equal or superior jurisdiction subordinate to another High Court. The transferring power covers cases at every level — from the original Magistrate’s court to the High Court’s appellate forum.

The application is made by motion. Except where the applicant is the Attorney-General of India or the Advocate-General of the State, the motion must be supported by affidavit or affirmation. Sub-section (3) lets the Supreme Court order compensation up to one thousand rupees against an applicant whose application is found frivolous or vexatious. The procedural cap on compensation has been retained in the BNSS.

The grounds on which the Supreme Court has, in practice, exercised the power span four broad categories.

  1. Local atmosphere not conducive to fair trial. Where communal tension between the parties is acute (G.X. Francis v. Banke Bihari Singh, AIR 1958 SC 309), or where the case arose out of an arrest of a member of the local Bar that triggered Bar agitation (Hari v. State of U.P., (1968) SC 23 January 1968), transfer has been ordered.
  2. Reasonable apprehension of bias. Where serious malice has been alleged against the Chief Minister of the State and circumstances support the allegation (Hazara Singh Gill v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 720), or where the trying Magistrate has filed an affidavit before the Supreme Court opposing the transfer application — thereby assuming a partisan posture (Kaushalya v. Mool Ray, (1963) 2 SCWR 377). The Supreme Court in Jayendra Saraswati Swamigal v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2005) 8 SCC 771 transferred a murder case from Tamil Nadu to Pondicherry on findings of attempted intimidation of senior counsel and selective filing of cases against persons supporting the accused. K. Anbazhaghan v. Superintendent of Police, AIR 2004 SC 524 transferred a case to M.P. where a politically influential accused had allegedly contributed to witness intimidation, including the killing of a witness who had deposed against him.
  3. Convenience of parties. Where three of four similar cases against the same accused are being tried by a Magistrate in one State and the fourth is in another State, the fourth may be transferred for convenience (A.K.K. Nambiar v. Desraj, AIR 1973 SC 203). Where there are cross-cases between husband and wife in two States, and the wife’s safety would be endangered by visiting the husband’s State, transfer of the husband’s case to the wife’s State has been ordered (Sesamma Phillip v. P. Phillip, AIR 1973 SC 875). The convenience principle is also the basis for clubbing of multiple cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act for a single trial (Vikram Tractors v. Escorts Ltd., (2005) 10 SCC 80; Global Infrastructure v. G.K. Builders, (2005) 12 SCC 427).
  4. Apprehension of danger to life. Where the accused fears for his life from a rival gang at the trial venue (Ravi Godbole v. State of M.P., (2006) 9 SCC 786), or where the accused apprehends danger if the case is tried in a particular State (Fajlor Rahaman v. State of Punjab, (2006) 9 SCC 714), transfer has been ordered.

The standard for transfer is objective, not subjective. The Supreme Court in Gurcharan Dass Chadha v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC 1418 held that the test of reasonable apprehension is what a reasonable person, placed in the applicant’s position, would apprehend on the materials. Mere allegation does not suffice; nor does the applicant have to demonstrate that justice will inevitably fail. The applicant must show circumstances from which the court can infer that the apprehension is reasonable. Vague hostility or general dislike of the trying judge is not enough (Ashish Chadha v. Asha Kumari, AIR 2012 SC 431); fanciful apprehensions are deprecated (Amudha v. Inspector of Police, 1994 CrLJ 404 Mad).

Section 447 BNSS — High Court’s power to transfer

Section 447 BNSS (previously Section 407 CrPC) is the most-used transfer provision. The High Court may, whenever made to appear to it on three statutory grounds, transfer cases or appeals within its supervisory area. The grounds under sub-section (1) are:

  1. That a fair and impartial inquiry or trial cannot be had in any criminal court subordinate to it.
  2. That some question of law of unusual difficulty is likely to arise.
  3. That an order is required by any provision of the Code, or will tend to the general convenience of parties or witnesses, or is expedient for the ends of justice.

The operative remedies under sub-section (1) are four:

  1. Order that any offence be inquired into or tried by a court not qualified under the territorial-jurisdiction provisions of Sections 197 to 205 BNSS but otherwise competent.
  2. Transfer any case or appeal from a subordinate criminal court to another such court of equal or superior jurisdiction.
  3. Commit any case for trial to a Court of Session.
  4. Transfer any case or appeal to and try it before itself.

The High Court may act on the report of the lower court, on the application of a party interested, or on its own initiative. The proviso under sub-section (2) is the structural safeguard: no application shall lie to the High Court for transferring a case from one criminal court to another in the same sessions division unless an application for such transfer has been made to the Sessions Judge and rejected by him. The Sessions Judge is therefore the forum of first instance for intra-divisional transfers; the High Court’s power kicks in only on rejection.

Sub-section (3) requires the application to be made by motion supported by affidavit or affirmation, except for the Advocate-General. Sub-section (4) lets the High Court direct the accused-applicant to execute a bond for any compensation later awarded under sub-section (7) for frivolous applications. Sub-section (5) requires twenty-four hours’ notice in writing to the Public Prosecutor before the application is heard on merits, with a copy of the grounds. Sub-section (6) lets the High Court stay proceedings in the subordinate court pending disposal of the transfer application, subject to the proviso that the stay shall not affect the subordinate court’s power of remand under Section 346 BNSS (previously Section 309 CrPC).

Sub-section (8) preserves the procedure-of-the-original-court rule: when the High Court orders a case transferred to itself for trial, it observes the same procedure that the original court would have observed, had the case not been transferred. Sub-section (9) saves Government’s power under Section 218 BNSS (previously Section 197 CrPC) to grant or refuse sanction for prosecution of public servants; the transfer power under Section 447 does not affect that constitutional architecture.

The reasonable-apprehension doctrine — the controlling principle

The leading principle for transfer under Section 447(1)(a) is that justice should not only be done, but seen to be done (R. v. Sussex Justices, (1924) 1 KB 256). The Supreme Court in G.X. Francis v. Banke Bihari Singh, AIR 1958 SC 309 imported the maxim into Indian criminal procedure and made it the operative test. What matters is not whether a fair trial is in fact impossible — that is a counsel of perfection — but whether there is a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the party that an impartial trial cannot be had.

The court must place itself in the position of the applicant and look at the matter as it would appear to a reasonable person so situated (Bose v. Probodh, AIR 1955 Assam 116; Annubeg v. Emp., AIR 1944 Nag 320). Even where the trying Magistrate has no real bias, circumstances calculated to create a reasonable apprehension justify transfer (Usman v. Emp., AIR 1947 Bom 409; Dupeyron v. Driver, (1896) 23 Cal 495). The reasonableness is the apprehension’s threshold; vague allegations or generalised distrust do not satisfy the test (Aziz v. State of Maharashtra, (1975) CrLJ 1023 Bom; Ram v. State of U.P., (1990) CrLJ 677).

The grounds on which transfer has been allowed include: communal tension or atmosphere unfavourable to the accused (Bhagat v. State, AIR 1952 Punj 53); demonstrable threats by local agitators preventing the accused from engaging counsel of choice, in violation of the Article 22 right (Rajendra v. State of Maharashtra, (1989) CrLJ 1073); cancellation of bail bonds because the accused refused to subscribe to a public fund the trying Magistrate was promoting (Thakur v. Ishwar, (1942) 44 CrLJ 420); the trying Magistrate being a neighbour of the accused with knowledge of family affairs (Shivasaran v. State of Mysore, AIR 1968 Mys 119); the trial Magistrate making derogatory remarks about a witness during cross-examination indicating the court would not believe him (Harbans v. Daroga, AIR 1957 Pat 661); previous conviction of the accused by the same judge in a related case relying on prosecution witnesses to be examined again (Ram v. State, (1976) CrLJ 1799 All); and the Magistrate cross-examining the accused under Section 351 BNSS (previously Section 313 CrPC) at the prosecution’s instance to fill prosecution gaps (Yasin v. State, (1954) CrLJ 1437 Pat DB).

The grounds on which transfer has been refused include: prior acquittal by the same Magistrate of the same complainant in a related case — not a sufficient ground for apprehension of bias (G.X. Francis v. Banke Bihari Singh, AIR 1958 SC 309); refusal of an adjournment to suit defence counsel’s convenience (Daljit v. Hari, AIR 1969 Del 263); successive adjournments to the other party on proper grounds (Ram v. State of U.P., (1990) CrLJ 677); cancellation of an exemption from personal appearance (Hira v. State, (1954) CrLJ 492 All); excessive cross-examination of prosecution witnesses under Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act / Section 168 BSA (Lulli, AIR 1966 Mys 231).

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Section 447 and Article 227 — the constitutional supplement

Section 447 BNSS does not exhaust the High Court’s transfer power. The Supreme Court in Ranbir Yadav v. State of Bihar, AIR 1995 SC 1219 held that Article 227 of the Constitution confers an independent power of superintendence on the High Court over all subordinate courts and tribunals within its territorial jurisdiction; this includes the power to transfer cases for ends of justice, even where Section 447 might not strictly apply. The constitutional power is broader and supplements the statutory power; the two run in parallel without conflict.

Section 447 is also not controlled by the territorial-jurisdiction provisions of Section 197 to 205 BNSS (previously Sections 177 to 185 CrPC). Even after Government has, under Section 206 BNSS (previously Section 185 CrPC), ordered a transfer between sessions divisions, the High Court can still transfer the case under Section 447 to any other court (P.P. v. Venkataranga, (1976) CrLJ 1252 AP).

Section 448 BNSS — Sessions Judge’s power to transfer

Section 448 BNSS (previously Section 408 CrPC) is the intra-divisional transfer power. Whenever it is made to appear to the Sessions Judge that an order is expedient for the ends of justice, he may order that any particular case be transferred from one criminal court to another in his sessions division. The Sessions Judge may act on the report of the lower court, on the application of a party interested, or on his own initiative.

The BNSS textually upgrades the financial caps. Where the CrPC required compensation for frivolous applications “not exceeding one thousand rupees”, the BNSS replaces the cap with “sum” — effectively uncapped, leaving the Sessions Judge to fix the amount on facts. Where the CrPC capped the surety-bond amount at “two hundred and fifty rupees”, the BNSS raises it to “a sum not exceeding ten thousand rupees”. The change reflects a long-overdue inflation correction.

The Sessions Judge’s power is the essential filter for the proviso to Section 447(2): a party seeking inter-court transfer within the same sessions division must first move the Sessions Judge under Section 448; only on rejection does the matter go to the High Court. The two-tier architecture preserves judicial economy — intra-divisional transfers do not flood the High Court.

Sections 449 and 450 BNSS — withdrawal of cases

Section 449 BNSS (previously Section 409 CrPC) lets the Sessions Judge withdraw any case or appeal from any Assistant Sessions Judge or Chief Judicial Magistrate subordinate to him — with the BNSS removing the “Assistant Sessions Judge” reference, the power now runs primarily over the Chief Judicial Magistrate. The Sessions Judge may, after withdrawal, try the case himself, refer it to another court for trial, or send it back to the original court.

Section 450 BNSS (previously Section 410 CrPC) lets the Chief Judicial Magistrate withdraw any case from any Magistrate subordinate to him, or recall any case withdrawn or transferred to another court, and try it himself or refer it to another competent court. The Magistrate’s withdrawal power supplements the Sessions Judge’s under Section 449 and the High Court’s under Section 447, completing the hierarchical machinery.

Section 451 BNSS (previously Section 411 CrPC) extends the same principle to Executive Magistrates, who may make over or recall cases between subordinate Executive Magistrates within their respective areas. The Executive Magistrate’s transfer power runs alongside the executive functions explained in the maintenance of public order chapter and the security for keeping the peace chapter, where Executive Magistrates exercise quasi-judicial functions. Cases that the Magistrate may make over span the trial regimes treated in the warrant trial by Magistrate chapter, the summons trial chapter, and the summary trials chapter, as well as proceedings under the maintenance regime.

Section 452 BNSS — reasons to be recorded

Section 452 BNSS (previously Section 412 CrPC) is the procedural safeguard that runs through every transfer or withdrawal in the chapter. A Sessions Judge or Magistrate making an order under Sections 448, 449, 450, or 451 shall record his reasons for so doing. The reasoning requirement makes the transfer order amenable to supervisory review — an unreasoned transfer order is liable to be set aside on revision, just as an unreasoned appellate order would be.

Apprehension of danger to life and convenience — the modern grounds

Two modern grounds for transfer have emerged in recent decisions. First, apprehension of danger to life: where the accused or the witness reasonably apprehends physical harm at the trial venue, transfer is granted (Fajlor Rahaman v. State of Punjab, (2006) 9 SCC 714; Ravi Godbole v. State of M.P., (2006) 9 SCC 786). The apprehension must be substantiated by concrete circumstances — abstract fear is not enough.

Second, convenience-driven transfer in matrimonial-cum-criminal cases. Where a wife has filed cross-cases in her State of residence and the husband has filed a parallel proceeding elsewhere, the Supreme Court has frequently transferred the husband’s case to the wife’s State on the ground that requiring her to travel for the husband’s case would expose her to risk and inconvenience (Sachin Dubey v. Suresh Kumar, (2005) 11 SCC 178; Ramesh v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2005 SC 1989; Neeraj Kumar v. Sonu, (2005) 12 SCC 345). The principle has been extended to cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, where multiple complaints in different forums against the same accused are clubbed for trial at a common place (Videocon International v. Sujana Corporation, (2005) 13 SCC 125; A. Naveen v. C.B.I., Karnataka, (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 416). The Supreme Court has, however, drawn a line at clubbing-versus-common-place: cases may be transferred to one place but cannot be ordered to be heard together — that is for the trial court to decide.

Limits on transfer — what does not justify it

Three categories have been judicially marked off as not sufficient grounds for transfer. First, mere financial hardship of the accused, without more, does not justify transfer. The Supreme Court in Abhiram v. NER Agricultural Marketing Corporation Ltd., (2000) 10 SCC 433 declined to transfer multiple Section 138 NI Act cases from Gauhati on hardship grounds — the accused was given liberty to apply for exemption from personal appearance instead. Hardship of older accused with serious health problems is, however, a recognised ground (Harbans Lal & Sons v. Ranison Cycles (P) Ltd., (2009) 4 SCC 16; Venu Menon v. Hathway Investment, (2005) 13 SCC 761).

Second, the personal interest of a judge in unrelated past matters is not a ground. A judge who practised as an advocate may have participated in many cases without acquiring personal interest or bias in those matters or persons (R. Balakrishnan Pillai v. State of Kerala, AIR 2000 SC 2778). Even the issuing of a bailable warrant against an absent accused-appellant whose advocate had withdrawn does not establish bias justifying transfer (Balakrishnan Pillai again).

Third, non-availability of defence counsel is not a transfer ground if local counsel is available. Where the District Bar Association assures the court that defence counsel will be available, a transfer prayer based on counsel-unavailability fails (Vishwanath Gupta v. State of U.P., (2007) 11 SCC 640). Similarly, where charges have been framed and trial has progressed, late transfer applications based on territorial-jurisdiction grounds are declined (V.K. Puri v. CBI, (2007) 6 SCC 91).

Special situations — chief ministers, contempt, investigation

The transfer jurisprudence has produced specific rules for three sensitive situations.

Cases against Chief Ministers and other politically powerful persons. A transfer petition for a criminal case against the Chief Minister cannot be rejected on the ground that the case was filed out of political vendetta — the petitioner is entitled to demonstrate genuine reasonable apprehension of likelihood of bias in the dispensation of criminal justice (K. Anbazhaghan v. Superintendent of Police, AIR 2004 SC 524). Imaginary or fanciful apprehensions, however, are deprecated (Amarinder Singh v. Parkash Singh Badal, (2009) 6 SCC 260, refusing transfer of cases against the former Chief Minister and Deputy Minister of Punjab).

Contempt proceedings. The High Court’s contempt jurisdiction under Article 215 is constitutional. A contempt proceeding cannot be transferred from one High Court to another or from one judge to another judge of the same High Court — the constitutional jurisdiction is incident to the institution and not transferable. The transfer chapter does not reach contempt.

Police investigation. The Supreme Court in Ram Chander Singh Sagar v. State of T.N., AIR 1978 SC 475 held that a police investigation cannot be transferred from one police station to another simply because an FIR or remand report has been filed before a court. The remedy for an accused directed to appear in a far-off court is to move that court for absolution from appearance, not to seek transfer of the investigation. Investigation is governed by the regime in the police investigation powers chapter and the FIR and Zero FIR chapter, not by the transfer chapter.

BNSS comparison — what changed

The architecture is unchanged. The textual changes are limited:

  1. Section 446 BNSS (previously Section 406 CrPC) — “not exceeding one thousand rupees” excluded; the compensation for frivolous applications is now uncapped.
  2. Section 447 BNSS (previously Section 407 CrPC) — “or bail bond” added in sub-section (4); “with or without sureties” excluded; “not exceeding one thousand rupees” excluded from sub-section (7).
  3. Section 448 BNSS (previously Section 408 CrPC) — “one thousand rupees” replaced with “sum”; “two hundred and fifty rupees” replaced with “sum not exceeding ten thousand rupees”.
  4. Section 449 BNSS (previously Section 409 CrPC) — “any Assistant Sessions Judge or” excluded from sub-section (1).
  5. Sections 450, 451, 452 — no change.

The case law on Sections 406 to 412 CrPC carries forward without amendment to Sections 446 to 452 BNSS. G.X. Francis, Hazara Singh Gill, Gurcharan Dass Chadha, A.K.K. Nambiar, Sesamma Phillip, Jayendra Saraswati, Ashish Chadha, K. Anbazhaghan, Ranbir Yadav, Ram Chander Singh Sagar, R. Balakrishnan Pillai, Abhiram — all good law.

Exam-angle takeaways

Five points exam-setters use without fail.

  1. Hierarchical transfer architecture. Supreme Court (Section 446) for inter-High-Court transfers; High Court (Section 447) for intra-area transfers; Sessions Judge (Section 448) for intra-divisional transfers; CJM (Section 450) and Executive Magistrate (Section 451) for intra-Magistracy transfers.
  2. Sessions-Judge-first rule for same-division transfers. The proviso to Section 447(2) BNSS requires that an application for transfer within the same sessions division must first be made to the Sessions Judge and rejected before the High Court can be moved.
  3. Reasonable-apprehension test is objective. The G.X. Francis / Gurcharan Dass Chadha standard: what would a reasonable person, placed in the applicant’s position, apprehend on the materials? Mere allegation insufficient; vague hostility insufficient; demonstrated circumstances are sufficient.
  4. Article 227 supplements Section 447. The High Court’s constitutional power of superintendence runs in parallel with the statutory transfer power (Ranbir Yadav); contempt proceedings, however, cannot be transferred (Article 215 jurisdiction is institutional).
  5. Investigations cannot be transferred. Section 446 / 447 do not reach police investigations; the remedy for an accused is to move the receiving court for relief from personal appearance, not to seek investigation transfer (Ram Chander Singh Sagar).

The transfer chapter is the procedural answer to the maxim that justice must be seen to be done. A long-form mains answer should walk through the hierarchical architecture, state the reasonable-apprehension test, illustrate the categories of grounds (atmosphere, bias, convenience, danger to life), discuss the proviso to Section 447(2), and finish with the Article 227 supplement and the bar on transfer of contempt and investigation. A prelims MCQ will pivot on the Sessions-Judge-first rule, the four operative remedies under Section 447(1), the “reasons to be recorded” requirement of Section 452, the BNSS upgrade of financial caps under Section 448, or the constitutional supplement under Article 227. The companion chapters — the reference and revision regime that runs alongside the transfer power, the Section 528 BNSS inherent jurisdiction that supplies the residual remedy, and the appeal forum architecture that may itself be invoked by transfer — complete the supervisory map of the criminal process.

Frequently asked questions

Can a party directly approach the High Court for an intra-divisional transfer?

No. The proviso to Section 447(2) BNSS (previously the proviso to Section 407(2) CrPC) declares that no application shall lie to the High Court for transferring a case from one criminal court to another in the same sessions division unless an application for such transfer has been made to the Sessions Judge under Section 448 BNSS and rejected by him. The Sessions Judge is therefore the forum of first instance for intra-divisional transfers; the High Court’s Section 447 jurisdiction kicks in only on rejection by the Sessions Judge. The two-tier architecture preserves judicial economy. The proviso, however, does not apply where the transfer is between courts in different sessions divisions, where the High Court’s territorial jurisdiction is engaged at the first instance, or where the application is on the High Court’s own initiative or on the report of a lower court.

What is the test for ‘reasonable apprehension’ under Section 447 BNSS?

The Supreme Court in Gurcharan Dass Chadha v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC 1418 framed the test as objective. The question is what a reasonable person, placed in the applicant’s position, would apprehend on the materials produced; not what the applicant subjectively fears. Mere allegation of hostility does not suffice; nor must the applicant demonstrate that justice will inevitably fail. The applicant is entitled to transfer if he can show circumstances from which the court can infer that the apprehension is reasonable. G.X. Francis v. Banke Bihari Singh, AIR 1958 SC 309 added the maxim from R. v. Sussex Justices: “Justice should not only be done, but be seen to be done”. The court asks whether the circumstances are calculated to create in the mind of the litigant a reasonable apprehension that the trial will not be fair, even where the trying judge has no actual bias (Annubeg v. Emp., AIR 1944 Nag 320; Usman v. Emp., AIR 1947 Bom 409).

Can the Supreme Court transfer a case from one High Court to another?

Yes. Section 446(1) BNSS (previously Section 406(1) CrPC) gives the Supreme Court the express power to direct that any particular case or appeal be transferred from one High Court to another High Court, or from a criminal court subordinate to one High Court to another criminal court of equal or superior jurisdiction subordinate to another High Court. The transferring power covers all levels — from the original Magistrate’s court to the High Court’s appellate forum. The application must be made by motion supported by affidavit (except where the applicant is the Attorney-General of India or the Advocate-General of the State). The Supreme Court has used the power in cases of communal tension (G.X. Francis), reasonable apprehension of bias (Hazara Singh Gill; Jayendra Saraswati), convenience of parties in cross-cases (Sesamma Phillip; A.K.K. Nambiar), apprehension of danger to life (Fajlor Rahaman; Ravi Godbole), and witness intimidation by politically powerful accused (K. Anbazhaghan v. Superintendent of Police, AIR 2004 SC 524).

Can a police investigation be transferred under Sections 446 to 452 BNSS?

No. The Supreme Court in Ram Chander Singh Sagar v. State of T.N., AIR 1978 SC 475 held that a police investigation cannot be transferred from one police station to another simply because an FIR or remand report has been filed before a court. The transfer chapter (Sections 446 to 452 BNSS) reaches cases and appeals before criminal courts; it does not reach investigations conducted by the police. Where the accused is directed to appear in a far-off court during investigation, the remedy is to move that court for absolution from personal appearance — not to seek a transfer of the investigation. Police investigation is governed by the powers under Sections 154 to 176 CrPC (now Sections 173 to 195 BNSS). A separate constitutional remedy under Article 226 may be available for direction to a different investigating agency in proper cases — but that is not Section 446 / 447 BNSS jurisdiction.

Does Section 447 BNSS exhaust the High Court’s power to transfer cases?

No. The Supreme Court in Ranbir Yadav v. State of Bihar, AIR 1995 SC 1219 held that Article 227 of the Constitution confers an independent power of superintendence on the High Court over all subordinate courts and tribunals within its territorial jurisdiction; this includes the power to transfer cases for the ends of justice, even where the strict letter of Section 447 might not apply. The constitutional power supplements the statutory power; the two run in parallel. Section 447 is also not controlled by the territorial-jurisdiction provisions of Sections 197 to 205 BNSS (previously Sections 177 to 185 CrPC) — even after the State Government has ordered transfer between sessions divisions under Section 206 BNSS (previously Section 185 CrPC), the High Court can still transfer the case under Section 447 (P.P. v. Venkataranga, (1976) CrLJ 1252 AP). Contempt proceedings, however, cannot be transferred — the High Court’s contempt jurisdiction under Article 215 is institutional and not amenable to transfer.