Inherent Powers of High Court (Section 482 CrPC / Section 528 BNSS)

Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — re-enacting Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) word-for-word — is the most invoked single section of the Code. It is the High Court's safety valve. The text saves the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court, or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It does not create the power; it preserves it. The Court already had it. The provision exists to forestall any argument that the express provisions of the Code were exhaustive of the High Court's authority over criminal proceedings before it.

The architecture is compact but the case law is vast. Section 528 BNSS opens with the words 'Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect' — a non-obstante phrase that places the inherent power above ordinary statutory bars. The provision applies only to the High Court. It rests on three statutory grounds and operates within four working limits. The Supreme Court's seven-category guidance in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604, is the most-quoted single passage in this corner of the Code of Criminal Procedure and BNSS. The exam asks the student to know the text, the three grounds, the seven categories, and the four limits — and to know when not to invoke the section.

Origins and the BNSS continuity

Section 482 CrPC was inserted in 1923 as Section 561A of the 1898 Code, after the Privy Council in Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, AIR 1945 PC 18, articulated the limits of the High Court's pre-existing inherent jurisdiction. The 1973 Code restated the provision verbatim. The BNSS does the same in Section 528. There is no substantive change. The Supreme Court in Ratilal Bhanji Mithani v. Asstt. Collector of Customs, AIR 1967 SC 1639, held that the section is declaratory in nature — it preserves what the Court already possesses and does not enlarge those powers. The pairing with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is exact in design. Both rest on the principle that no procedural code can anticipate every fact-pattern, and that a superior court must retain a residuary authority to act in accordance with justice when the express provisions are silent (Pampathy v. State of Mysore, AIR 1967 SC 286).

The three statutory grounds

Section 528 BNSS authorises the High Court to act on three — and only three — grounds. The three are independent: any one of them, on the facts, is sufficient.

1. To give effect to any order under the Code. Where the trial court or another superior court has passed an order under the Code, but a working detail has been left unattended, the High Court may step in. Shersingh v. State of M.P., (1989) CrLJ 632, applied this ground where the trial court had imposed a sentence on an accused already undergoing another sentence but had omitted to direct whether the two would run consecutively or concurrently. The High Court's inherent power filled the gap.
2. To prevent abuse of the process of any court. The phrase is wide. State of Karnataka v. Muniswamy, AIR 1977 SC 1489, made the working point: a court proceeding ought not to be allowed to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. Where the criminal proceeding is malicious, vexatious, frivolous, retaliatory, or barred at the threshold by a fundamental legal defect — the inherent power lies.
3. Otherwise to secure the ends of justice. This is the residuary ground. Raghubir Saran v. State of Bihar, AIR 1964 SC 1, refused to put the phrase in a strait-jacket — the considerations vary case to case. The Court added an important rider: the ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law, but justice has to be administered according to law. The inherent power does not authorise the High Court to ignore the statute; it authorises the Court to fill gaps the statute has left.

Conditions on the exercise of inherent power

The Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 SC 47, set the four working conditions that have governed Section 482 CrPC ever since. Section 528 BNSS imports them unchanged.

1. The Code makes no specific provision for dealing with the matter. Where the Code provides a remedy, the inherent power is not the route. State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Agarwala, AIR 1979 SC 87, refused to use the section to override Section 362 CrPC (now Section 403 BNSS), which bars review of a judgment.
2. The exercise of the power is not inconsistent with any express or specific provision of the Code. Pampathy (above) made the point clearly — Section 528 BNSS cannot be used to do something the Code expressly prohibits. The High Court cannot, for example, grant bail in circumstances not contemplated by Chapter XXXV of the BNSS, because that chapter is exhaustive of bail jurisdiction (Talab Haji Hussain v. Madhukar Purushottam Mondkar, AIR 1958 SC 376).
3. The Court is satisfied that there is an abuse of its process or that the order is necessary to give effect to another order or to secure the ends of justice. The threshold is high — the Supreme Court in State v. Bhajan Lal (above) and State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo, (2005) 13 SCC 540, repeatedly held that the power is to be used sparingly, with circumspection, and in the rarest of rare cases. The phrase 'rarest of rare' is not used here in the death-penalty sense; it signals the high threshold for interference.
4. The application must be made by an aggrieved party (or, suo motu, where the Court's own process has been abused). The Court does not act on a mere busy-body application. Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, (1992) 4 SCC 305, refused to permit a public-interest petition to quash an FIR that did not concern the petitioner's interest at all.

The Bhajan Lal seven categories

State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604, gave the most useful working catalogue of cases where the High Court may exercise its inherent power to quash an FIR or first-information record. The Court was careful to call the catalogue illustrative, not exhaustive.

1. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint, even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
2. Where the allegations in the FIR and other materials, if any, do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) CrPC (now Section 175(1) BNSS) except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2).
3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
4. Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2).
5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party — and where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing a finality to the proceedings.
7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

The seven-category guidance has been refined in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866, and reaffirmed in Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd., AIR 2006 SC 2780, and State of Maharashtra v. Salman Salim Khan, AIR 2004 SC 1189. The High Court does not enter into a merits assessment of the evidence; it only checks whether, on the assumption that the allegations are true, an offence is made out.

Quashing of FIR, chargesheet and proceedings — and when not

The line between when the High Court can quash and when it cannot has been drawn carefully.

Quashing is permissible

The Court may quash where the FIR or complaint, taken at its highest, discloses no offence — State of Punjab v. Dharam, (1987) Supp SCC 39. It may quash where successive complaints have been filed without any intent to prosecute (Bir Singh v. State, AIR 1952 All 610). It may quash where the proceeding has been instituted for what is essentially a civil wrong dressed up as a criminal offence — for example, a breach of contract that does not amount to cheating (Hari Prasad Chamaria v. Bishun Kumar Surekha, AIR 1974 SC 301). It may quash where prosecution proceeds without a sanction that the law requires (R.P. Kapur, above). And it may quash where allegations of sustained delay show that the trial has been kept alive only as harassment — though delay alone, in serious or economic offences, is not enough (State of A.P. v. P.V. Pavithran, AIR 1990 SC 1266). The remedy is independent of the parallel revisional jurisdiction and operates on wider grounds.

Quashing is not permissible

The Supreme Court has equally clearly drawn limits. Where the FIR discloses cognizable offences and prima facie evidence supports the allegations, the High Court cannot weigh the evidence under Section 528 BNSS (State of Maharashtra v. Salman Salim Khan, above). Where investigation by the police is pending, the High Court should not act as a parallel investigating agency and quash the FIR (State of Punjab v. Subhash, (2004) 13 SCC 437). Where a chargesheet has been filed and charges framed, the High Court cannot weigh the sufficiency of evidence — that is the function of the trial court (State of M.P. v. Rakesh, (2004) 13 SCC 523). Where allegations of mala fide are merely against the informant, that alone is no ground to quash (State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo, above). And where the Code provides a specific remedy — for example, revision under Sections 397–401 CrPC (now Sections 438–442 BNSS) — the inherent power is not the route.

The four working limits

Four limits have hardened in the case law. They are the most reliable MCQ trap in this chapter.

1. No power to review the High Court's own judgment

The Code does not authorise the High Court to review its own judgment passed in original, appellate or revisional jurisdiction. State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Agarwala (above) held that Section 482 CrPC cannot be invoked under the cloak of inherent power to override Section 362 CrPC, which expressly bars review. Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa, AIR 2001 SC 43, restated the rule. The narrow exceptions are recognised: where the original order was a nullity for want of jurisdiction; where it was passed without hearing the affected party in violation of natural justice; where the facts have changed since the earlier order so that the second application is genuinely a fresh application, not a review (Superintendent v. Mohan Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1002).

2. No power to grant bail outside Chapter XXXV BNSS

Section 528 BNSS cannot be used to grant bail in circumstances that the bail and bonds chapter does not contemplate. Talab Haji Hussain (above) settled the rule under Section 561A of the 1898 Code, and the rule survives. The bail provisions are exhaustive. The High Court can, however, alter the terms and conditions of an order granting bail (Hazari Lal Gupta v. Rameshwar Prasad, (1972) 1 SCC 452), and can cancel bail granted by a subordinate court on irrelevant grounds (Puran v. Rambilas, AIR 2001 SC 2023).

3. No power to interfere with police investigation

The High Court cannot, in the exercise of inherent power, interfere with an ongoing police investigation under Section 175 BNSS — that is the working principle from Khwaja Nazir Ahmad (above) and State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal. The Court's function begins when the police file a report under Section 193 BNSS (previously Section 173 CrPC) — not before. The exception is narrow: where the FIR, taken at face value, discloses no cognizable offence, the High Court may quash the investigation. A direction to the police on how to investigate, what evidence to collect, or which angle to pursue is overstepping (Venkatasubramaniam v. M.K. Mohan Krishnamachari, (2009) 10 SCC 488). The companion remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution may be invoked where the seizure or arrest itself is illegal — but that is constitutional, not inherent. The same discipline runs alongside the chapter on the power of police to investigate.

4. No power to act contrary to the Code

The High Court cannot use Section 528 BNSS to do what the Code expressly forbids. It cannot review where review is barred. It cannot interfere with an interlocutory order where Section 397(2) CrPC bars revision — except where Madhu Limaye-type abuse of process or threatened miscarriage of justice is shown. Mosst. Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee, AIR 1990 SC 1605, restated the principle: where a matter is covered by the express letter of the law, the Court cannot evolve a new provision in the garb of inherent jurisdiction. The provision is residuary, not supplemental.

Power to expunge objectionable remarks

One specific use of Section 528 BNSS deserves separate attention. The High Court has inherent power to expunge objectionable remarks from a subordinate court's judgment — even where no appeal or revision has been filed. State of U.P. v. Mohammad Naim, AIR 1964 SC 703, set the working test: the remark must be (a) not necessary for the decision of the case; (b) not justified by the evidence; (c) capable of causing serious harm to the person referred to; and (d) severable from the rest of the judgment. The Supreme Court in Niranjan Patnaik v. Sashibhusan Kar, AIR 1986 SC 819, applied the test where remarks were made against a stranger who had not been heard. The Court has used the same power against intemperate remarks by single judges of the High Court itself (State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand, AIR 1998 SC 1344). The discipline is one of judicial restraint — bold comments on evidence are permitted; sweeping generalisations and damaging remarks against persons not before the court are not.

Inherent power and revision — the overlap and the difference

Section 528 BNSS sits next to the High Court's revisional jurisdiction, but the two are not the same. The Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, AIR 1983 SC 67, drew the difference. Revision examines whether there is any error, illegality or impropriety in the order of the inferior court; the High Court works on the materials before that court. Section 528 BNSS is wider — it operates on the grounds of ends of justice and prevention of abuse of process, and the High Court may take into consideration additional relevant materials. But the inherent power is also more constrained — it is to be exercised only where no other provision in the Code is available to remedy grave and substantial injustice. Madhu Limaye (above) added the rider that, notwithstanding the express bar in Section 397(2) CrPC against revision of an interlocutory order, the High Court can still interfere under Section 528 BNSS where abuse of process or threatened miscarriage of justice is shown — the non-obstante phrase 'Nothing in this Code' covers the case.

The relationship with Articles 226 and 227

Even where the conditions of Section 528 BNSS are not met, or where the Code expressly bars the inherent remedy, the High Court's constitutional powers under Articles 226 and 227 remain available. Chandrasekhar Singh v. Siva Ram Singh, AIR 1979 SC 1, held that Article 227 cannot be curtailed by anything in the Code, provided the conditions for the constitutional remedy exist — that the inferior court has exceeded the limits of its authority, or that there is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. But the constitutional remedy cannot correct mere errors of fact or law that an appellate forum could correct. Article 226 is also available, but normally not against an ongoing investigation, except in exceptional cases where the FIR allegations, even if true, disclose no offence (State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha, AIR 1982 SC 949). The remedy under Section 528 BNSS, where it lies, will normally be preferred — it is statutory, well-charted, and carries the weight of Bhajan Lal behind it.

BNSS innovation — none in the text, much in the architecture

Section 528 BNSS reproduces Section 482 CrPC verbatim. The BNSS table records this as 'Ditto — no change'. But the architecture around the section has shifted. Several BNSS innovations sit alongside Section 528 and alter the kinds of cases that come up before the High Court under it.

1. BNSS time-bound procedure. The new investigation timeline of 90 days for the chargesheet in serious offences (Section 193(3) BNSS) means that delay-based quashing under Section 528 BNSS may now arise earlier and more sharply — the standard set in P.V. Pavithran will be tested against tighter statutory deadlines.
2. The Witness Protection Scheme. Section 398 BNSS — the new statutory witness protection scheme — supplies a new ground on which Section 528 BNSS petitions may be moved or resisted: ineffective protection that endangers witness life or that vitiates the trial.
3. Section 530 BNSS — electronic mode. Trial in electronic mode is now statutorily authorised; Section 528 BNSS petitions challenging the propriety of electronic examination of witnesses on contested fact-issues will become a familiar pattern.
4. BNSS proceeds-of-crime regime. The attachment-and-forfeiture provisions in Sections 107–110 BNSS sit alongside the property-disposal regime. Inherent-power petitions may be moved where the attachment is procedurally infirm or substantively without basis.

Comparative table — CrPC ↔ BNSS

Subject	CrPC, 1973	BNSS, 2023	Change
Saving of inherent powers of High Court	Section 482	Section 528	No change — text reproduced verbatim
Bar on revision of interlocutory orders	Section 397(2)	Section 438(2)	No change — Madhu Limaye exception preserved
Bar on review of judgment	Section 362	Section 403	No change — Section 528 cannot override
Power of Court of Session in revision	Sections 397–401	Sections 438–442	No change — alternative remedy that excludes Section 528 unless abuse of process is shown

Exam-pointer pitfalls

Six recurring distinctions drive the MCQ design in this chapter every year. Each one has tripped up candidates in past judiciary papers.

1. Section 528 BNSS does not create power. It declares and preserves what the High Court already has. Ratilal Bhanji Mithani is the locus classicus.
2. Three grounds, not seven. The seven categories in Bhajan Lal are illustrative cases for quashing FIRs — they are not the statutory grounds. The grounds are three: give effect to an order under the Code, prevent abuse of process, or secure the ends of justice.
3. Investigation vs. chargesheet. The Court's inherent power begins when the police file a report under Section 193 BNSS. Before that, it can interfere only where the FIR, taken at face value, discloses no cognizable offence. The companion section to remember here is the conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings.
4. Bail under Section 528 BNSS — generally barred. The bail chapter is exhaustive. Talab Haji Hussain is the rule; Hazari Lal Gupta permits alteration of bail conditions; Puran v. Rambilas permits cancellation where the subordinate court's grant was on irrelevant grounds.
5. Review of own judgment — generally barred. Ram Chander Agarwala and Hari Singh Mann set the rule. The narrow exception is where the order was a nullity, was passed in violation of natural justice, or where facts have genuinely changed.
6. Limitation and the inherent power. The High Court can quash a cognizance taken in breach of the limitation chapter or in breach of the irregular-proceedings chapter, but not on the mere ground of delay where the limitation regime has not been violated. Surinder Mohan Vikal v. Ascharj Lal Chopra, AIR 1978 SC 986, is the locus classicus on quashing for breach of limitation.

Section 528 BNSS is the High Court's most flexible tool and its most disciplined one. It is wide enough to fill any genuine gap in the Code; it is narrow enough that the Supreme Court has spent five decades drawing the lines on what it cannot reach. The exam asks the student to know the text, the three grounds, the four limits, and the seven Bhajan Lal categories. The court asks the High Court itself to use the section sparingly, in the rarest of rare cases, and never to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The discipline is severe — and that is precisely why the section has held up unchanged through two Codes.

Frequently asked questions

Does Section 528 BNSS create the inherent powers of the High Court?

No. Section 528 BNSS, like Section 482 CrPC before it, only declares and preserves the inherent powers that the High Court already possesses by reason of being a superior court of record. The Supreme Court in Ratilal Bhanji Mithani v. Asstt. Collector of Customs, AIR 1967 SC 1639, held that the section is declaratory in nature. It does not enlarge the powers of the High Court; it forestalls any argument that the express provisions of the Code are exhaustive of those powers. The opening words 'Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect' confirm this.

What are the three grounds for invoking Section 528 BNSS?

Three. First, to give effect to any order under the Code — for example, where the trial court has imposed a sentence but failed to indicate whether it will run concurrently or consecutively with another (Shersingh v. State of M.P., (1989) CrLJ 632). Second, to prevent abuse of the process of any court — where the proceeding is malicious, vexatious, frivolous or barred at the threshold (State of Karnataka v. Muniswamy, AIR 1977 SC 1489). Third, otherwise to secure the ends of justice — the residuary ground, used where the express provisions of the Code do not supply a remedy and justice requires the court to act.

What is the Bhajan Lal seven-category guidance?

The Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604, set out seven illustrative categories where the High Court may exercise its inherent power to quash an FIR or complaint: (1) where the allegations do not constitute any offence even if accepted in entirety; (2) where the FIR does not disclose a cognizable offence; (3) where uncontroverted allegations and evidence collected do not disclose any offence; (4) where the FIR discloses only a non-cognizable offence and no Magistrate's order has been obtained; (5) where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable; (6) where there is an express legal bar to the proceeding; and (7) where the proceeding is manifestly mala fide. The Court called the catalogue illustrative, not exhaustive.

Can the High Court grant bail under Section 528 BNSS in circumstances not covered by the bail chapter?

No. The Supreme Court in Talab Haji Hussain v. Madhukar Purushottam Mondkar, AIR 1958 SC 376, held that the bail chapter is exhaustive of the High Court's bail jurisdiction. Section 528 BNSS cannot be used to grant bail in circumstances that the bail and bonds chapter does not contemplate. The High Court can, however, alter the terms and conditions of an order granting bail under the bail provisions themselves (Hazari Lal Gupta v. Rameshwar Prasad, (1972) 1 SCC 452) and can cancel bail granted by a subordinate court on irrelevant grounds, where the order amounts to abuse of process (Puran v. Rambilas, AIR 2001 SC 2023).

Can the High Court quash a chargesheet on the merits of the evidence under Section 528 BNSS?

No. The Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Salman Salim Khan, AIR 2004 SC 1189, and State of M.P. v. Rakesh, (2004) 13 SCC 523, held that the High Court cannot weigh the sufficiency or correctness of evidence at the stage of quashing a chargesheet. That is the function of the trial court. The High Court can quash only where, on the assumption that the allegations are true, no offence is made out — or where there is a fundamental legal defect such as want of sanction or breach of an express bar in the Code. The merits assessment is reserved for the trial.

Can Section 528 BNSS be used to review the High Court's own judgment?

Generally no. State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Agarwala, AIR 1979 SC 87, and Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa, AIR 2001 SC 43, hold that the Code does not authorise the High Court to review its own judgment, and Section 528 BNSS cannot be invoked under the cloak of inherent power to override the express bar in Section 403 BNSS (previously Section 362 CrPC). Three narrow exceptions are recognised: where the order was a nullity for want of jurisdiction; where it was passed in violation of natural justice without hearing the affected party; and where the facts and circumstances have genuinely changed since the earlier order, so that the second application is a fresh application and not a review (Superintendent v. Mohan Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1002).