Information to Police and Their Powers to Investigate — FIR and Zero FIR

Section 173 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — the re-enactment of Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — opens the criminal process. Every information about a cognizable offence, oral or written, must be reduced to writing, read over to the informant, signed, and entered in the station book; a copy must be supplied to the informant free of cost. The First Information Report is therefore not a piece of evidence so much as a procedural pivot: it is the document on which the investigation, the arrest, the charge, and the trial all hang.

BNSS expands Section 154 in three substantive ways. It codifies the Zero FIR by requiring registration ‘irrespective of the area where the offence is committed’. It legitimises the e-FIR by adding ‘by electronic communication’ to the modes of giving information. And it enacts the Lalita Kumari safeguard in statutory form: a preliminary inquiry of fourteen days is permitted, with the consent of a senior officer, where the offence carries a sentence of three years or more but less than seven. The candidate’s job is to read Section 173 BNSS as the new master-section and to file the old case law underneath it.

Statutory anchor and scheme

The opening Chapter of investigation is built on a binary the Code has carried since 1898: cognizable cases on one side, non-cognizable on the other. Section 173 BNSS (previously Section 154 CrPC) governs cognizable cases; Section 174 BNSS (previously Section 155 CrPC) governs non-cognizable cases. The downstream powers — Section 175 BNSS (previously Section 156 CrPC) on police investigation, Section 176 BNSS (previously Section 157 CrPC) on procedure, Section 180 BNSS (previously Section 161 CrPC) on examination of witnesses — flow from this divide. The first chapter of the present series of Code of Criminal Procedure notes set out the architecture; this chapter zooms in on the gateway.

The cognizable / non-cognizable line is doctrinal as well as statutory. If the information shows a cognizable offence, the police may at once start an investigation without the order of a Magistrate. If it shows a non-cognizable offence, no investigation may be commenced without a Magistrate’s order. Section 174(4) BNSS keeps the legacy fiction that a case mixing cognizable and non-cognizable offences is, for procedural purposes, treated as cognizable in toto.

Section 173 BNSS — the operative text

The opening words of Section 173(1) BNSS are the core of the whole chapter:

Three structural changes are visible at once. First, the words ‘irrespective of the area where the offence is committed’ statutorily abolish the territorial-jurisdiction objection that police stations had used for decades to refuse FIRs. Second, the words ‘by electronic communication’ cover e-mail, e-portals, and dedicated police-station e-FIR systems — subject to a three-day signature requirement that prevents anonymous abuse. Third, sub-section (3) introduces the structured preliminary inquiry: where the offence is punishable with three years or more but less than seven years, a police officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent may, with the prior permission of an officer not below Superintendent of Police, conduct a preliminary inquiry within fourteen days to ascertain whether a prima facie case exists. The companion treatment of the Zero FIR and e-FIR, with workflow specimens, is also collected on the dedicated Zero FIR and e-FIR explainer.

Object of the FIR

The Supreme Court has stated the purpose in two compact sentences. The object of the FIR ‘is to put into writing the statement of the informant before his memory fails or before he gets time and opportunity to embellish it’: Sirajuddin v. State of Madras, (1970) 1 SCC 595. It crystallises the prosecution’s version at the earliest point of time and serves as a touchstone against which the trial evidence will later be tested.

The corollary is procedural. As soon as the FIR is recorded, the informant is entitled to a free copy under sub-section (2). The informant’s identification of the accused, the time, the place, and the broad mechanics of the offence form the file the investigating officer carries to the spot. The investigation that follows — including arrest under Section 35 BNSS (previously Section 41 CrPC) covered in the arrest without and with warrant chapter — is organisationally tethered to this document.

Conditions for a valid FIR

The case law has settled four conditions. The information must:

1. Disclose a cognizable offence on its face. A vague or speculative complaint is not an FIR even if recorded as such (Manimohon v. Emp., AIR 1931 Cal 745).
2. Be given to the officer in charge of a police station — or to a superior officer who, under Section 30 BNSS (previously Section 36 CrPC), exercises the same powers (Kapur v. Pratap Singh, AIR 1961 SC 1117). The companion powers of police officers chapter sets out the hierarchy.
3. Be reduced to writing, read over, signed, and entered in the prescribed book. Sub-section (1) is mandatory in form. The substance of the information goes into the General Diary; an FIR is also generated.
4. Be the first information in point of time. Cryptic or anonymous communications that lack the elements of a complaint do not qualify, even if first received: Tapinder Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1970 SC 1566; Patai v. State of U.P., AIR 2010 SC 2254.

The information need not contain every detail. The Supreme Court has held that an FIR is not an encyclopaedia of the prosecution case — absence of names of all witnesses, exact distance of assault, or every weapon used does not render it unreliable: Bishan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1975 SC 461; Shivaji v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 446. The informant need not have personal knowledge: hearsay is permitted if the rest of the prosecution case picks up the slack — the FIR is an exception to the hearsay rule for the limited purpose of starting investigation: Hallu v. State of M.P., AIR 1974 SC 1936.

Lalita Kumari and registration as a duty

The constitutional bench in Lalita Kumari v. Government of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 held that registration of an FIR is mandatory under Section 154 CrPC if the information discloses a cognizable offence. The genuineness or credibility of the complaint is not to be examined at the registration stage. The Court carved out narrow exceptions where a preliminary inquiry may be appropriate — matrimonial/family disputes, commercial offences, medical-negligence cases, corruption cases, and cases with abnormal delay in reporting — but the inquiry is to be limited to ascertaining whether a cognizable offence is disclosed, not whether the information is true.

BNSS Section 173(3) gives the Lalita Kumari exception its statutory home, but with two refinements. The preliminary inquiry is now permitted only where the offence is punishable with three years or more but less than seven; serious offences (seven years and above) admit of no preliminary inquiry — the FIR must be registered at once. The inquiry must be authorised by a Superintendent of Police and conducted by an officer of Deputy Superintendent rank or above; it must close within fourteen days.

Where the officer in charge refuses to register the FIR, two remedies remain. Sub-section (4) of Section 173 BNSS (previously sub-section (3) of Section 154 CrPC) lets the aggrieved person send the substance of the information by post to the Superintendent of Police, and BNSS adds that, failing satisfaction, the aggrieved person may make an application to the Magistrate. The Magistrate’s power to direct registration is the procedural cousin of his power under Section 175(3) BNSS (previously Section 156(3) CrPC) to direct investigation; both are explained in detail in the police investigation powers chapter.

Zero FIR — codification of a long-standing practice

The Zero FIR was the practical answer to a procedural absurdity: a police station could refuse to register a complaint of rape, abduction, or any other cognizable offence on the ground that the offence was committed elsewhere. The Justice Verma Committee Report (2013), responding to the December 2012 Delhi case, recommended codification of the practice. Various State circulars — Delhi Police Standing Order, MHA advisories — followed. BNSS Section 173 puts an end to the controversy: the words ‘irrespective of the area where the offence is committed’ are now part of the statute itself.

The mechanics are simple. The receiving station registers the information as a Zero FIR (so called because the FIR carries the number ‘0’ until the case is transferred to the proper jurisdiction). It then forwards the FIR to the police station of the territorial jurisdiction, which renumbers and continues the investigation. Time is critical in offences against women, abduction, and accidents involving moving vehicles — the Zero FIR mechanism eliminates the wait while the territorial police argue over jurisdiction.

The Zero FIR does not displace the territorial scheme of investigation; it merely insists that the door not be shut at the threshold. Once registered, the FIR travels to the proper station. The trial Magistrate is determined by the place of occurrence under Section 197 BNSS (previously Section 177 CrPC) — the territorial-jurisdiction question for trial is unaffected.

e-FIR and electronic communication

Section 173(1)(ii) BNSS permits an FIR to be lodged by electronic communication. The information is taken on record by the officer in charge, but must be signed within three days by the person giving it. The signature requirement prevents abuse: anonymous e-FIRs cannot ripen into formal FIRs, but a verifiable complainant can lodge from anywhere.

State implementations vary. Most states maintain online FIR portals for limited categories (theft of vehicle, theft of mobile phone, missing persons). BNSS provides the umbrella authority for these systems and standardises the three-day signature window. The implementing rules and the question of which categories of offences may be lodged electronically remain a matter for State notification.

The e-FIR sits alongside other BNSS digital reforms — the audio-video recording of search and seizure requirements under Section 105 BNSS, the timelines under Section 193 BNSS for forwarding the chargesheet, and the mandatory forensic investigation in serious offences punishable with seven years or more. Together they describe a self-consciously digital criminal process.

Special category — offences against women

Sub-section (1) of Section 173 BNSS retains the two provisos that the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 had inserted into Section 154 CrPC. Where the information relates to specified offences against women — including offences under Sections 64 to 71 BNS (rape and aggravated rape, previously Sections 376 series IPC), Section 74 BNS (assault with intent to outrage modesty, previously Section 354 IPC), Section 75 BNS (sexual harassment, previously Section 354A IPC), Section 76 BNS (assault with intent to disrobe, previously Section 354B IPC), Section 77 BNS (voyeurism, previously Section 354C IPC), Section 78 BNS (stalking, previously Section 354D IPC) — the information must be recorded by a woman police officer or any woman officer.

Where the woman is temporarily or permanently mentally or physically disabled, the information must be recorded at her residence or at a place of her choice, in the presence of an interpreter or special educator, and must be video-recorded. The police officer must arrange for the statement to be recorded by a Judicial Magistrate under Section 183 BNSS (previously Section 164 CrPC) as soon as possible. These dignity-of-the-victim provisions ride alongside the FIR and trigger the moment the FIR is recorded.

Refusal to register an FIR — the route to compulsion

The duty to register a cognizable FIR is mandatory; the refusal is illegal. The aggrieved informant has a tiered remedy.

Step one — Superintendent of Police. Sub-section (4) of Section 173 BNSS permits the substance of the information to be sent in writing by post (or, in modern practice, by registered email) to the Superintendent of Police. If satisfied that the communication discloses a cognizable offence, the Superintendent shall either investigate himself or direct a subordinate officer to investigate.

Step two — Magistrate. Failing the Superintendent, BNSS now expressly authorises the aggrieved person to apply to the Magistrate. The Magistrate’s power to direct registration of an FIR and investigation has long been read into Section 156(3) CrPC and now Section 175(3) BNSS.

Step three — High Court. Where neither the police nor the Magistrate moves, a writ petition lies. The High Court, in the exercise of its Section 528 BNSS inherent power or under Article 226, may direct registration of an FIR. Lalita Kumari itself was such a writ petition.

An FIR registered under compulsion is, however, the same FIR. Its evidentiary character is governed by the same principles — relevant to corroborate or contradict the maker if the maker is examined as a witness, and admissible as part of the doctrine of res gestae in some narrow cases (see the admissions chapter for the full evidentiary treatment).

Quashing an FIR — the Bhajan Lal categories

Where an FIR discloses no cognizable offence, or is on its face mala fide, or is barred by an express legal provision, the High Court may quash it under its inherent power. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604, the Supreme Court enumerated seven illustrative categories where quashing is appropriate:

1. Allegations in the FIR, even if taken at face value, do not prima facie constitute any offence.
2. Allegations do not disclose a cognizable offence justifying investigation under Section 175 BNSS without a Magistrate’s order.
3. Uncontroverted allegations and the evidence collected do not disclose the commission of any offence.
4. The allegations disclose only a non-cognizable offence and no Magistrate’s order has been obtained under Section 174(2) BNSS.
5. The allegations are absurd and inherently improbable.
6. There is an express legal bar (e.g., requirement of sanction, limitation under Sections 514 to 520 BNSS).
7. The proceeding is mala fide, instituted with an ulterior motive.

The categories are illustrative, not exhaustive (Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, (1992) 4 SCC 305). The High Court’s exercise of inherent power must be sparing — it is not a substitute for trial. The same machinery handles a quashing on settlement, a quashing for non-application of mind in registration, and a quashing for breach of procedural safeguards.

FIR vs complaint — the doctrinal divide

An FIR under Section 173 BNSS is information given to the police; a complaint under Section 2(h) BNSS is information given directly to the Magistrate. The two routes lead to overlapping but distinct procedures: an FIR triggers police investigation under Section 175 BNSS; a complaint triggers the Magistrate’s examination of the complainant under Section 223 BNSS. The detailed walk-through of the second route is in the complaint procedure chapter.

For non-cognizable offences, the FIR door is shut. Section 174 BNSS requires the police to enter the substance of the information in the diary and to refer the informant to the Magistrate. The investigation cannot start without the Magistrate’s order. The mixed-offence exception under Section 174(4) BNSS turns the case into a cognizable case for procedural purposes if even one of the offences is cognizable.

Delay in lodging the FIR

The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that delay in lodging the FIR is not per se fatal, but it is a circumstance that goes to credibility. A delay properly explained — care of an injured person, communal tension, fear of the accused’s influence, distance from the police station — does not vitiate the prosecution. An unexplained delay, especially in offences where instinctive reporting is expected, gives rise to suspicion: the apprehension is that the time was used for embellishment, deliberation, or false implication.

Two precautions for the trial court. First, the FIR must be sent to the Magistrate without delay; an FIR ‘ante-timed’ to mask delay is detected by checking the time of dispatch against the GD entry. Second, the explanation for delay must be tested by the surrounding evidence, not accepted ipse dixit. The relevant FIR-as-evidence questions also overlap with the limitation for taking cognizance rules — the BNSS now expressly provides that the date of recording information under Section 173 is the relevant date for limitation under Sections 514 to 520 BNSS (previously Sections 467 to 473 CrPC).

Evidentiary value of an FIR

The FIR is not substantive evidence. It cannot prove the offence by itself. But it has three uses at trial:

1. To corroborate the maker, if the maker is examined as a witness (Section 158 IEA / corresponding BSA provision).
2. To contradict the maker, if the maker is examined as a witness and the FIR contains earlier inconsistent statements (Section 145 IEA).
3. As a dying declaration, where the informant has died and the FIR is admissible under Section 32(1) IEA / corresponding BSA provision — in such cases the FIR has substantive value.

An FIR cannot be used as evidence against persons mentioned in it as accused unless they are themselves the makers; admissions in an FIR by an accused-maker may be used against him subject to the bar in Section 25 IEA / corresponding BSA provision on confessions to police. A subsequent FIR lodged in a case where the police had already started investigation on earlier information is hit by Section 162 CrPC (now corresponding BSA section) and cannot be used to corroborate the witness, though it can be used to contradict: Paresh v. Sadiq, (1993) CrLJ 1857 (SC).

BNSS comparison — what changed and what did not

The BNSS leaves the heart of the FIR rule undisturbed. Section 173 BNSS reproduces the structure of Section 154 CrPC, the woman-officer provisos, the disability provision, the post-route remedy to the Superintendent of Police, and the entitlement to a free copy. The case law of Sirajuddin, Hallu, Bishan Singh, Tapinder Singh, Patai, and Bhajan Lal all transfers across.

The substantive additions are four. First, the Zero FIR is statutorily required, not merely permitted. Second, the e-FIR is recognised, with a three-day signature window. Third, the Lalita Kumari preliminary inquiry is codified for offences punishable with three to seven years, with rank and time-limit safeguards. Fourth, the route to the Magistrate is added explicitly to sub-section (4) where the Superintendent fails to act. These additions reflect a decade of post-CrPC litigation and the Verma Committee’s reform agenda.

Common defects and their consequences

Three failure modes recur in trial-court practice and in the appellate record.

FIR not the first information. Where the police acted on earlier oral or radio information and then drew up a formal FIR after the investigation was under way, the formal document is not an FIR but a statement under Section 180 BNSS (previously Section 161 CrPC). It is hit by the bar in Section 162 CrPC / corresponding BNSS provision and cannot be used to corroborate. The cryptic-phone-message line of cases (Tapinder Singh, A. Venkata Ravana) limits the rule: a cryptic message that does not disclose the elements of a cognizable offence is not an ‘information’ at all, and its existence does not disqualify a later, fuller FIR.

FIR not signed or read over. Sub-section (1) is mandatory in form. Failure is fatal at registration but, in trial, treated as an irregularity if the substance is otherwise reliable. The initiation of proceedings chapter handles the analogous question of when procedural irregularity vitiates cognizance.

FIR with vague allegations. An FIR that does not name a specific accused or specific transaction may still be valid, but cannot ground arrest of a named person without further investigation. Police arrest on the strength of such an FIR is open to review under Sections 35, 41A BNSS norms (Section 35 BNSS / Section 41 CrPC; Section 35(3) BNSS / Section 41A CrPC).

MCQ angle for exam aspirants

Five points repay memorisation.

1. FIR is for cognizable offences only. Non-cognizable cases require a Magistrate’s order under Section 174(2) BNSS. Mixed cases are treated as cognizable under Section 174(4) BNSS.
2. Lalita Kumari is mandatory but qualified. Registration is mandatory once a cognizable offence is shown. The BNSS-codified preliminary inquiry applies only to 3-to-7-year offences.
3. Zero FIR ≠ transfer. The receiving station must register; it then forwards to the territorial station for investigation. Trial jurisdiction is unaffected.
4. FIR is not substantive evidence. It is a corroborative or contradictory document, except where it is itself a dying declaration.
5. Bhajan Lal categories are illustrative. Quashing under inherent power is a sparing remedy, not a routine pre-trial check.

The chapter rewards reading the bare BNSS first and the case law second. Almost every settled doctrine on Section 154 CrPC survives unchanged under Section 173 BNSS — what changes is the additional architecture for Zero FIR, e-FIR, and the structured preliminary inquiry. A long-form mains answer should lead with Section 173 BNSS, set out the four conditions for a valid FIR, run through Lalita Kumari and its statutory codification, and finish with the Bhajan Lal quashing categories. A prelims MCQ angle will almost always tie to a fact-pattern that pivots on cognizability, the territorial Zero FIR rule, the woman-officer requirement, or the new fourteen-day preliminary-inquiry window.