Reference and Revision

Sections 436 to 446 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — previously Sections 395 to 405 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — collect two distinct supervisory routes that operate alongside the appeal regime: reference, by which a subordinate court invites the High Court’s ruling on the validity of a statute or a question of law, and revision, by which the High Court or the Sessions Judge calls for the record of an inferior criminal court to test the correctness, legality, propriety, or regularity of any finding, sentence, or order. Reference is a vertical channel built into the trial court itself; revision is a horizontal supervisory power exercised by the superior court, on a party’s application or suo motu, to prevent miscarriage of justice.

The BNSS retains the substantive architecture and changes only at the margins — the deletion of “Metropolitan Magistrate” and “or him” in Section 436 BNSS, the addition of “or bail bond” in Section 438 BNSS on suspension of sentence pending revision, and the replacement of “pleader” with “advocate” throughout. The doctrine — concurrent revisional jurisdiction of the High Court and Sessions Judge, the bar on second revision under Section 438(3), the bar on revision of interlocutory orders under Section 438(2), the bar on direct conversion of acquittal into conviction under Section 442(3), and the suo motu power confined to the High Court — carries forward without alteration.

Statutory anchor and scheme

The chapter divides into two unequal blocks.

1. Reference — Sections 436 and 437 BNSS (previously Sections 395 and 396 CrPC). A pending case before any criminal court that turns on the validity of an Act, Ordinance, or Regulation is referred to the High Court; the High Court’s order binds the referring court. A Court of Session may also refer any other question of law to the High Court at its discretion.
2. Revision — Sections 438 to 446 BNSS (previously Sections 397 to 405 CrPC). The High Court and the Sessions Judge have concurrent power to call for records, examine them, and pass orders; the powers are detailed (Section 442 BNSS / Section 401 CrPC), bounded by structural bars (interlocutory orders, second revisions, direct conviction in revision), and cross-cut by the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS treated in the inherent powers chapter.

The chapter sits at the intersection of three procedural architectures: the appeal regime (where appeal lies, revision generally does not), the trial regime treated in the trial before Sessions Court chapter, and the constitutional referral regime under Article 228. The full procedural map is in the Code of Criminal Procedure and BNSS notes.

Section 436 BNSS — reference to the High Court

Section 436 BNSS (previously Section 395 CrPC) is the statutory cousin of Article 228 of the Constitution. Where any criminal court is satisfied that a case pending before it involves a question as to the validity of any Act, Ordinance, or Regulation — the determination of which is necessary for the disposal of the case — and is of opinion that such law is invalid or inoperative, but has not been so declared by the High Court to which that court is subordinate or by the Supreme Court, the court shall state a case setting out its opinion and the reasons, and refer it for the High Court’s decision. Subordinate courts have no power to declare a law unconstitutional; the reference is the channel by which doubt about validity reaches the constitutional court.

The threshold conditions are three (State v. Palden Bhutia, 1984 NOC 80 AP): the court must be satisfied that a question of validity is raised in a pending case; the determination must be necessary for the disposal of the case; and the law in question must not already have been declared invalid by the relevant High Court or the Supreme Court. No reference lies where the case has already been disposed of (Mahesh v. State of Rajasthan, (1985) CrLJ 301 Raj FB), where the question is hypothetical, or where the question of law has already been decided by the High Court — a contrary view of another High Court is not, by itself, ground for reference (Qazi v. Mumtaz, 1990 CrLJ 171 Bom).

Sub-section (2) of Section 436 BNSS extends the reference power to questions of law generally. A Court of Session may refer to the High Court any question of law arising in a case pending before it, even where the validity of a law is not in question. The reference under sub-section (1) is mandatory once the threshold is crossed; the reference under sub-section (2) is discretionary — available only to the Court of Session under the BNSS (the CrPC also extended the discretionary power to a Metropolitan Magistrate, a reference now removed because the Metropolitan/non-Metropolitan distinction has been abolished).

The relationship with Article 228 is one of complementarity. Article 228 makes it obligatory for a subordinate court to refer a case involving a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution; Section 436(1) BNSS makes reference obligatory where the case turns on the validity of a statute. The two routes overlap where validity depends on constitutional interpretation, but the statutory route is wider in one respect: it covers validity even where no interpretation of the Constitution is necessary — for instance, where a statute is challenged for legislative competence under the Seventh Schedule without invoking any constitutional right.

Sub-section (3) lets the referring court, pending the High Court’s decision, either commit the accused to jail or release the accused on bail to appear when called upon. Section 437 BNSS (previously Section 396 CrPC) requires the High Court to pass such order on the reference as it thinks fit; the order is binding on the referring court, which must dispose of the case conformably. The High Court may direct who pays the costs of reference.

Section 438 BNSS — calling for records to exercise revisional powers

Section 438 BNSS (previously Section 397 CrPC) is the gateway to revision. The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior criminal court within its or his local jurisdiction, for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to (a) the correctness, legality, or propriety of any finding, sentence, or order, or (b) the regularity of any proceedings. The court may, in calling for the record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that the accused be released on bail or on his own bond pending examination — the BNSS adds “or bail bond” expressly.

The Explanation declares that all Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, are inferior to the Sessions Judge for purposes of revision and reference. The reach extends through the criminal-court hierarchy explained in the constitution of criminal courts chapter and the sentencing jurisdiction chapter. Orders that may be challenged in revision include orders framing or refusing charge, orders issuing process under the complaint procedure, orders directing investigation under the police investigation regime, orders refusing maintenance under the maintenance regime, and orders binding parties under the security-for-peace chapter.

Two structural bars circumscribe the reach. Sub-section (2) bars exercise of revisional power in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial, or other proceeding. Sub-section (3) declares that if an application has been made by any person to either the High Court or the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other — the alternative-not-cumulative rule.

Revision distinguished from appeal

The distinction is foundational. An appeal is a continuation of the original proceeding (Mahendra Pratap Singh v. Sarju Singh, AIR 1968 SC 707); revision is a step in aid of the superior court’s superintendence (Kunnhammad v. Abdul, (1978) CrLJ NOC 19 Ker). An appeal lies as of right, subject to express bars; revision is a discretionary remedy, exercised in exceptional cases of glaring defect, manifest error, or flagrant miscarriage of justice (Amar Chand Agarwala v. Shanti Bose, AIR 1973 SC 799). An appellate court may reassess evidence as a court of fact and law; the revisional court has no such power (Sukhram v. State, 1987 CrLJ 1024 J&K). Revision will not lie where appeal lies but the party has not filed an appeal (Section 442(4) BNSS / Section 401(4) CrPC). Where a party files an appeal in a case where appeal does not lie, the court may convert the appeal into a revision and exercise revisional powers under Section 438(1) (Asghar Khan v. State of U.P., AIR 1981 SC 1697).

The standard of interference is high. Mere defect or error of law or fact will not warrant interference in revision unless it has caused miscarriage of justice (Chaganti Kotaiah v. Gogineni Venkateswara Rao, AIR 1973 SC 1274). The revisional court cannot embark on re-appreciation of evidence as in appeal (State of A.P. v. Rajagopala Rao, (2000) 10 SCC 338); it cannot upset concurrent findings of fact (Bansilal v. Laxman Singh, AIR 1986 SC 1721); it cannot reverse acquittal on a different finding of fact and convict the accused directly. The grounds on which revision will lie are correctness, legality, propriety, regularity — the four heads enumerated in Section 438(1) BNSS itself.

Section 442 BNSS — High Court’s powers of revision

Section 442 BNSS (previously Section 401 CrPC) is the operative powers section. The High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, may exercise any of the powers conferred on a court of appeal under Section 427 BNSS (previously Section 386 CrPC) treated in the Section 427 powers, on a court by Sections 432, 433, and 460 BNSS, or on a Court of Session by Section 414 BNSS. The High Court may, however, not convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction in revision (sub-section 3); where revision is exercised over an acquittal, the only remedies available are setting aside the acquittal and directing a retrial, or alteration of an order short of conviction.

The Sessions Judge’s revisional power under Section 440 BNSS (previously Section 399 CrPC) is co-extensive with the High Court’s power under Section 442, with two structural differences. First, Section 440(2) bars the Sessions Judge from entertaining a second revision after dismissing the first — a strict reading of the alternative-not-cumulative rule. Second, the suo motu revisional power is reserved to the High Court alone (Pratap v. State of U.P., AIR 1973 SC 786); the Sessions Judge cannot exercise revisional power on his own motion, except in narrow situations like where a revision is filed against a refusal to recall process and the Sessions Judge examines the validity of the original process-issuing order itself (V. Faliero v. L. Fernandes, 2005 CrLJ 2498 Bom).

Section 441 BNSS (previously Section 400 CrPC) extends the Sessions Judge’s revisional power to the Additional Sessions Judge, where the Sessions Judge so directs. Section 443 BNSS (previously Section 402 CrPC) lets the High Court withdraw or transfer revision cases from the Sessions Court, providing the conflict-resolution mechanism between concurrent jurisdictions.

Concurrent revisional jurisdiction — the choice of forum

Both the High Court and the Sessions Judge exercise revisional jurisdiction over inferior criminal courts. The jurisdictions are concurrent, not hierarchical (State of Rajasthan v. Gurcharandas Chadha, AIR 1979 SC 1895). The aggrieved party has the option of moving the High Court directly under Section 438 without first approaching the Sessions Court (Kesavan v. Sreedharan, (1978) CrLJ 743 Ker FB; State v. Khizat, 1997 CrLJ 549 MP). The Supreme Court in C.B.I. v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2007 SC 2522 set aside a costs order imposed by a High Court that had criticised the C.B.I. for moving the High Court directly — there is no forum-of-first-instance rule.

The structural rule under Section 438(3) is that having moved one forum, the party cannot move the other. Where a revision is dismissed by the Sessions Judge, no second revision lies to the High Court at the same party’s instance (Chail Das v. State, 1975 CrLJ 129 P&H). Where a revision is withdrawn before disposal, the bar does not apply — the same party may move the High Court (Harak v. Lalmani, 1972 CrLJ 723 Pat). But where the revision is dismissed as “not pressed”, the bar attaches (Mohammed Khan v. Shamim, 1977 CrLJ 116). Different parties to the same proceeding may, however, move different forums — one party to the Sessions Judge and the other to the High Court (Dandapani v. Madan, 1978 CrLJ 2014 Ori).

The bar under Section 438(3) does not extinguish the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS. Where the order in question amounts to abuse of the process of court, or where ends of justice require it, the inherent power may be invoked even after Sessions-Judge revision is dismissed (Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 SC 47; Krishnan v. Krishnaveni, AIR 1997 SC 987; Rajathi v. C. Ganesan, AIR 1999 SC 2374). The Supreme Court has, however, cautioned that the inherent power must not be used to circumvent the express bar; ordinarily, when second revision is barred, the High Court should not exercise inherent jurisdiction (Yogendra Kumar v. Ashok Kumar, AIR 2007 (DOC) 129).

Bar on revision of interlocutory orders — Section 438(2) BNSS

Section 438(2) BNSS (previously Section 397(2) CrPC) bars the exercise of revisional power in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial, or other proceeding. The provision targets the time-killing potential of revisional challenges to procedural directions during trial. The Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 SC 47 framed the leading test: whether an order is “interlocutory” depends not on its stage in the proceeding but on whether it determines an important right or liability of the parties. An order issuing process under Section 227 BNSS is not strictly interlocutory in the harassment sense and may be challenged by inherent power if it amounts to abuse of process; an order framing charge, refusing discharge, granting or refusing process — all are challenged under the doctrine in Madhu Limaye.

The bar applies equally to the High Court exercising power under Section 442 and to the Sessions Court (Satyabrata v. Jamal, (1976) CrLJ 446 Or DB). It does not apply where the impugned order is a nullity for want of jurisdiction. Nor does it bar the High Court’s inherent power under Section 528 BNSS, where the order, though interlocutory, amounts to abuse of process and the constitutional remedy is necessary — though the High Court must be cautious in routinely converting Section 438(2)-barred matters into inherent-power matters.

Suo motu power — reserved to the High Court

The High Court can exercise revisional power either on a party’s application or suo motu on the basis of its own knowledge derived from any source (Ramesh Chandra J. Thakur v. A.P. Jhaveri, AIR 1973 SC 84; Pratap v. State of U.P., AIR 1973 SC 786). The Sessions Judge has no such suo motu power. The High Court’s power extends to enhancement of sentence in a proper case; even where the State has not preferred an appeal under Section 418 BNSS, the High Court may, in revision, suo motu enhance the sentence after notice and opportunity to the accused (Sahab Singh v. State of Haryana, (1990) CrLJ 1202; Govind Ramji Jadhav v. State of Maharashtra, (1990) 4 SCC 718).

The suo motu power must be exercised judicially. Where the High Court suo motu sets aside an acquittal, it cannot directly convict; it must remand for retrial (Naresh Kumar v. Registrar High Court of Punjab, 2002 SCC (Cri) 1015) — the bar in Section 442(3) BNSS is structural and applies regardless of the source of the revisional jurisdiction. Where the High Court enhances sentence suo motu, the accused must be given an opportunity to plead for acquittal or reduction of sentence under the same principle that governs Section 418(3) BNSS.

Revision against acquittal — the careful exception

Revision against an order of acquittal is permissible but rare. The Supreme Court in K. Chinnasami Reddy v. State of A.P., AIR 1962 SC 1788 identified three classic situations: where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence the prosecution sought to produce; where material evidence has been overlooked; and where the acquittal is based on a compounding of an offence that is invalid in law. Beyond these, the revisional court should not interfere with an acquittal on the ground of mere disagreement on appreciation of evidence (S. Abhay Naidu v. R. Sundarajan, 1994 CrLJ 641 Mad; Thankappan Nadar v. Gopala Krishnan, (2002) 9 SCC 393). Where two views are reasonably possible on the evidence, the trial court’s view must stand — revision is not a second bite at the appeal-against-acquittal apple (Hydru v. State of Kerala, (2004) 13 SCC 374; Reshambai v. M.P. Government, 2007 CrLJ 3977 MP).

A private party aggrieved by acquittal may apply for revision under Section 438 BNSS, even where the State has not preferred an appeal (Ramaswami v. Muthu, (1976) CrLJ 1504 Mad). The revisional court must, however, be especially cautious in entertaining such revisions; routine interference at private-party instance is discouraged (Ramu v. Jagannath, AIR 1994 SC 26). The structural bar under Section 442(3) BNSS is the controlling limit: the revisional court can set aside the acquittal and remand for retrial, but cannot itself record a conviction.

Revision against sentence — the suo motu enhancement

The revisional jurisdiction of the High Court over sentence is wider than its appellate jurisdiction (Pratap v. State of U.P., AIR 1973 SC 786). Where the sentence is manifestly inadequate, unduly severe, or violative of statutory minimums, the revisional court will interfere (Bedraj v. State of U.P., (1955) 2 SCR 582). The High Court may, in revision filed by a private party for enhancement, enhance the sentence even though the State has not appealed under Section 418 BNSS (U.J.S. Chopra v. State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 633). Where the sentence prescribes a statutory minimum and the trial court has gone below it, the revisional court must correct the illegality (Narasimhan v. I.T.O., (1995) CrLJ 629 Mad).

Section 442(2) BNSS (previously Section 401(2) CrPC) requires that no order shall be made to the prejudice of the accused or any other person unless that person has had an opportunity of being heard either personally or by an advocate in his own defence. The opportunity is the procedural safeguard mirroring the proviso to Section 427 BNSS in appeals.

Section 401(3) bar — no direct conversion of acquittal into conviction

Section 442(3) BNSS (previously Section 401(3) CrPC) declares that nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorise a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. The bar is structural: even where the High Court is satisfied that the acquittal was perverse and the prosecution case proved, the only remedy is to set aside the acquittal and direct retrial. Direct conviction in revision is not permitted (Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram, AIR 1973 SC 2145; Eknath Shankarrao Mukkawar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 1177). The same bar binds the Sessions Judge in revision under Section 440 BNSS by virtue of Section 442 being read into Section 440(1).

Section 444 BNSS — option of court to hear parties

Section 444 BNSS (previously Section 403 CrPC) declares that no party has any right to be heard before any court exercising powers of revision; the court may, however, in its discretion, hear any party either personally or by an advocate when exercising revisional powers. The discretion is subject to Section 442(2)’s mandatory hearing where an order is to be made to a person’s prejudice. The combined effect is: the revisional court may exercise its powers without hearing where it intends only to decline interference, but must hear before making an order of prejudice.

Sections 397 and 482 — the overlap with inherent jurisdiction

Section 528 BNSS (previously Section 482 CrPC) preserves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, to prevent abuse of the process of any court, or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The relationship between Section 442 BNSS revisional jurisdiction and Section 528 BNSS inherent jurisdiction has been worked out in a long line of decisions (Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 SC 47; Palaniappa Gounder v. State of T.N., AIR 1977 SC 1323; Raj Kapoor v. State, AIR 1980 SC 258).

The settled position has four limbs. First, the inherent power is residuary and extraordinary; it is not available where a specific provision applies. Second, where revision lies but has not been availed of, the inherent power is generally not invoked — the party must use the express remedy. Third, where the impugned order is interlocutory and barred from revision under Section 438(2), the inherent power may, in narrow cases of abuse of process, still be invoked. Fourth, the inherent power is wider in scope than revision — it can quash proceedings, expunge remarks, give consequential directions — but is bounded by the “nothing in this Code” non-obstante clause read with self-restraint (Krishnan v. Krishnaveni, AIR 1997 SC 987).

Section 445 BNSS — certification of order to lower court

Section 445 BNSS (previously Section 405 CrPC) closes the procedural loop. When a case is revised, the High Court or Sessions Judge shall certify its decision or order to the court by which the finding, sentence, or order revised was recorded or passed. The court to which the certificate is sent shall make such orders as are conformable to the decision so certified, and may, where necessary, amend the records accordingly.

BNSS comparison — what changed

The architecture is unchanged. The textual changes are:

1. Section 436 BNSS (previously Section 395 CrPC) — “Metropolitan Magistrate” and “or him” deleted; the discretionary reference under sub-section (2) is now confined to the Court of Session.
2. Section 438 BNSS (previously Section 397 CrPC) — “or bail bond” added to the modes of release; “bail” excluded as standalone term.
3. Section 442 BNSS (previously Section 401 CrPC) — “pleader” replaced with “advocate”.
4. Section 444 BNSS (previously Section 403 CrPC) — “pleader” replaced with “advocate”.

The case law on Sections 395 to 405 CrPC carries forward without amendment to Sections 436 to 446 BNSS. Madhu Limaye, Mahendra Pratap Singh, Amar Chand Agarwala, K. Chinnasami Reddy, Pratap v. State of U.P., Krishnan v. Krishnaveni, C.B.I. v. State of Gujarat, Bansilal, Akalu Ahir, Asghar Khan, Eknath Shankarrao Mukkawar — all good law.

Exam-angle takeaways

Five points exam-setters use without fail.

1. Reference under Section 436(1) BNSS is mandatory; under Section 436(2), discretionary. Sub-section (1) covers validity of statute; sub-section (2) covers any question of law, but only by a Court of Session.
2. Concurrent revisional jurisdiction of the High Court and Sessions Judge. Aggrieved party may move either, but having moved one, cannot move the other (Section 438(3) BNSS).
3. No revision of interlocutory orders. Section 438(2) bars the revisional route; the test of “interlocutory” is whether the order determines an important right or liability (Madhu Limaye).
4. Revision is discretionary; appeal is as of right. Mere defect or error in law or fact does not warrant revisional interference unless miscarriage of justice has resulted (Chaganti Kotaiah; Mahendra Pratap Singh). The revisional court does not reassess evidence as a court of fact.
5. Section 442(3) BNSS bars conversion of acquittal into conviction in revision. The High Court may set aside acquittal and order retrial; it cannot convict directly. Suo motu power is reserved to the High Court alone; the Sessions Judge has no suo motu revisional power (Pratap v. State of U.P.).

The reference and revision chapter is the supervisory backbone of the criminal process. A long-form mains answer should walk through the reference architecture under Article 228 and Section 436 BNSS, the concurrent revisional jurisdiction, the bars under Section 438(2)-(3) and Section 442(3), the suo motu power, and the overlap with the inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS. A prelims MCQ will pivot on the alternative-not-cumulative rule of Section 438(3), the “interlocutory order” test from Madhu Limaye, the absence of suo motu power in the Sessions Judge, the Section 442(3) bar on direct conviction in revision, or the procedural rules under Sections 444 and 445. The companion chapters — the appeals chapter from which revision is structurally distinguished, the transfer of criminal cases chapter that complements the supervisory architecture, and the inherent powers of the High Court chapter that is the residual constitutional safety valve — complete the post-trial supervisory map.

Frequently asked questions

When is a reference to the High Court mandatory under the BNSS?

Section 436(1) BNSS (previously Section 395(1) CrPC) makes a reference mandatory where any criminal court is satisfied that a case pending before it involves a question as to the validity of any Act, Ordinance, or Regulation, the determination of which is necessary for the disposal of the case, and is of opinion that such law is invalid or inoperative, but has not been so declared by the High Court to which that court is subordinate or by the Supreme Court. Three threshold conditions must be satisfied (State v. Palden Bhutia, 1984 NOC 80 AP): a question of validity in a pending case, necessity for disposal, and absence of a binding declaration of invalidity. Subordinate courts have no power to declare a law unconstitutional; the reference is the only channel by which doubt about validity reaches the constitutional court. Section 436(2), by contrast, is discretionary and lets only a Court of Session refer any question of law arising in a pending case.

Can a party move both the High Court and the Sessions Judge in revision?

No. Section 438(3) BNSS (previously Section 397(3) CrPC) declares that if an application has been made by any person to either the High Court or the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other — the alternative-not-cumulative rule. Where a revision is dismissed by the Sessions Judge, no second revision lies to the High Court at the same party’s instance (Chail Das v. State, 1975 CrLJ 129 P&H). Where the revision is withdrawn before disposal, the bar does not attach and the same party may move the High Court (Harak v. Lalmani, 1972 CrLJ 723 Pat). Different parties may, however, move different forums — the bar runs against the same person, not the same proceeding. The aggrieved party has the option of moving the High Court directly without first approaching the Sessions Court (Kesavan v. Sreedharan, (1978) CrLJ 743 Ker FB; C.B.I. v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2007 SC 2522).

What is an ‘interlocutory order’ for the purpose of the bar under Section 438(2) BNSS?

The Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 SC 47 framed the leading test: whether an order is “interlocutory” depends not on its stage in the proceeding but on whether it determines an important right or liability of the parties. Orders that finally dispose of a question on merits and affect substantive rights are not interlocutory even if they precede the final judgment — orders framing charge, refusing discharge, granting or refusing process, dismissing a complaint at the threshold may all be challenged in revision under the Madhu Limaye doctrine. Pure procedural directions during trial — adjournments, listing orders, summoning of witnesses — are interlocutory and barred from revision under Section 438(2) BNSS (previously Section 397(2) CrPC). The bar does not, however, extinguish the High Court’s inherent power under Section 528 BNSS where the order amounts to abuse of process.

Can the High Court convert an acquittal into a conviction in exercise of revisional power?

No. Section 442(3) BNSS (previously Section 401(3) CrPC) declares that nothing in the revisional power section shall be deemed to authorise a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. The bar is structural and applies regardless of how strongly the High Court is convinced that the acquittal was perverse. The only remedies available in revision against an acquittal are (i) setting aside the acquittal and directing a retrial, (ii) directing further inquiry, or (iii) altering any order short of conviction. Direct conviction in revision is not permitted (Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram, AIR 1973 SC 2145; Eknath Shankarrao Mukkawar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 1177; Naresh Kumar v. Registrar High Court of Punjab, 2002 SCC (Cri) 1015). The same bar binds the Sessions Judge in revision under Section 440 BNSS by virtue of the Section 442 powers being read into Section 440(1).

Does the Sessions Judge have suo motu revisional power?

No, ordinarily. The Supreme Court in Pratap v. State of U.P., AIR 1973 SC 786 confirmed that suo motu revisional power belongs to the High Court alone. The Sessions Judge cannot, on his own motion, call for the records of an inferior criminal court for revision — he must act on a party’s application under Section 440 BNSS (previously Section 399 CrPC). A narrow exception exists: where a revision is filed by the accused against an order refusing to recall process, the Sessions Judge in such revision may, on his own motion, examine the validity of the original order issuing process (V. Faliero v. L. Fernandes, 2005 CrLJ 2498 Bom). The High Court’s suo motu power, by contrast, is wide: it may exercise revisional power on its own knowledge derived from any source (Ramesh Chandra J. Thakur v. A.P. Jhaveri, AIR 1973 SC 84) and may even enhance sentence suo motu, after notice and opportunity to the accused (Sahab Singh v. State of Haryana, (1990) CrLJ 1202).