The Union Legislature — Parliament, Composition, Powers, Procedure

Article 79 of the Constitution declares that there shall be a Parliament for the Union, consisting of the President and two Houses — the Council of States and the House of the People. The architecture is deliberate: India did not adopt the British model of parliamentary sovereignty; the Constitution is supreme, and Parliament must function within the four corners of its limitations. Every power Parliament exercises — to legislate, to vote money, to question Ministers, to expel members — is a power conferred by the Constitution and is read subject to it. The judiciary is entrusted the task of construing those provisions and safeguarding fundamental rights, a position the Supreme Court reiterated in Raja Ram Pal v. Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha (2007) 3 SCC 184.

For the aspirant the scheme is clean. Articles 79 to 88 create the Houses and their officers. Articles 89 to 98 govern the Chairman and Speaker. Articles 99 to 106 deal with conduct of business, oath, quorum, vacation of seats, disqualifications and privileges. Articles 107 to 111 prescribe how Bills are passed, including joint sittings (Article 108) and Money-Bill procedure (Articles 109 and 110). Articles 112 to 117 regulate financial business. Articles 118 to 122 close with rules of procedure, language, restrictions on discussion of judges, and the bar on courts inquiring into Parliament's internal proceedings. Article 123 — sitting in the next chapter on the President's legislative powers — is the constitutional bridge between the executive and Parliament and is treated here. The wider constitutional history sets the context.

Composition — the two Houses

Article 80 fixes the composition of the Council of States. The maximum strength is 250 — twelve members nominated by the President for special knowledge in literature, science, art and social service, and not more than 238 representatives of the States and Union territories. Allocation between States is governed by the Fourth Schedule; State representatives are chosen by the elected members of the Legislative Assembly of the State by proportional representation through the single transferable vote.

The Rajya Sabha — the upper chamber — is a forum where seasoned public figures gain access without contesting a general election. It is a revising chamber. The Court in Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India (2006) 7 SCC 1 underlined an important caveat: although the Rajya Sabha is designed to represent the States, in practice its members vote not at the dictate of the State concerned but according to their own views and party affiliation. Residence in the State concerned is not a constitutional qualification for being elected. The 2003 deletion of Section 3 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 — which had earlier required a Rajya Sabha candidate to be an elector of the State concerned — was upheld as constitutionally valid. The same case held that the Constitution does not mandate secret ballot for the Rajya Sabha election; that is a matter for Parliament to legislate.

Article 81 fixes the composition of the Lok Sabha — not more than 530 members chosen by direct election from territorial constituencies in the States, plus not more than 20 members representing Union territories. The principle is uniformity: the ratio between a State's seats and its population should, so far as practicable, be the same for all States. The proviso freezes the allocation of seats to States until the first census taken after 2026.

Article 82 commands readjustment after each census, by such authority and in such manner as Parliament may by law determine. In Meghraj Kothari v. Delimitation Commission, AIR 1967 SC 669, the Court held that a delimitation order, once notified, is placed in the same street as a law made by Parliament itself, and is therefore protected from judicial interference by Article 329(a). The administration of elections under Articles 324 onwards is taken up in our chapter on elections and the Election Commission.

Duration — Article 83 and the dissolution puzzle

The Council of States is not subject to dissolution. As nearly as possible one-third of its members retire on the expiration of every second year. The House of the People continues for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting, and the expiration of that period operates as a dissolution. The proviso permits Parliament to extend the term by law — but only while a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, only for one year at a time, and not beyond six months after the Proclamation has ceased to operate. The mechanics of an Emergency proclamation are in our chapter on emergency provisions.

Dissolution of the Lok Sabha is not dissolution of government. U.N.R. Rao v. Indira Gandhi, AIR 1971 SC 1002, made clear that the Council of Ministers does not resign or stand dismissed immediately upon dissolution; the President must always have a Council of Ministers to aid and advise him. The relationship between Parliament and the executive — collective responsibility, the role of the Prime Minister — is taken up in our notes on the Union Executive.

Qualifications — Article 84 — and disqualifications — Article 102

Under Article 84, a person is qualified to fill a seat in Parliament only if (a) he is a citizen of India and makes the prescribed oath before a person authorised by the Election Commission, (b) he is at least thirty years old for the Council of States and twenty-five for the House of the People, and (c) he possesses such other qualifications as Parliament may prescribe. The framework of Indian citizenship under Articles 5 to 11 read with the Citizenship Act, 1955, is the gateway to qualification.

The age requirement is taken seriously. In Sushil Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar (2003) 8 SCC 673, the Court held that a forged school admission register and transfer certificate failed to satisfy proof of age, and an admission in a bail application that the candidate was below 25 years could be presumed correct. The electoral roll and the Election Commission identity card were held not to be conclusive proof of age.

Article 102 lists the disqualifications. A person is disqualified if he holds an office of profit under the Government (other than an office Parliament has declared not to disqualify), if he is of unsound mind, an undischarged insolvent, not a citizen of India, or so disqualified by any law made by Parliament. Clause (2), inserted by the 52nd Amendment Act, 1985, adds disqualification under the Tenth Schedule.

The expression "office of profit" has not been defined in the Constitution or in the Representation of the People Act, 1951. In Shibu Soren v. Dayanand Sahay (2001) 7 SCC 425, the Court held that "profit" connotes some pecuniary gain — the label of "honorarium" or "remuneration" is not material. Three elements are sine qua non: the person must hold an office under the Government, the office must be one of profit, and it must not be an office Parliament has declared not to disqualify. The object is to eliminate the risk of conflict between duty and interest.

The most consequential post-2013 development is Lily Thomas v. Union of India, AIR 2013 SC 2662, which held that the seat of a Member disqualified by an ordinary law made by Parliament under Article 102(1)(e) and Article 191(1)(e) automatically falls vacant by virtue of Articles 101(3)(a) and 190(3)(a). The Court read down Section 8(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which had earlier protected sitting members convicted of certain offences from immediate disqualification.

Decision on disqualification — Article 103

If any question arises whether a Member has become subject to a disqualification mentioned in Article 102(1), Article 103 commits the question to the President, who shall obtain the opinion of the Election Commission and shall act according to that opinion. As P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (CBI/SPE) (1998) 4 SCC 626 clarified, Article 103 does not confer power on the President to remove an MP — it only confers power to adjudicate whether an MP has incurred any disqualification. Disqualification on account of defection under the Tenth Schedule travels through a different track and engages the Speaker's jurisdiction. Both are distinct from the power of expulsion under Article 105(3).

Anti-defection — the Tenth Schedule and Article 102(2)

The 52nd Amendment, 1985, added the Tenth Schedule and Article 102(2) — the constitutional charter against political defection. A Member is disqualified if he voluntarily gives up the membership of his political party, or if he votes (or abstains) contrary to a direction issued by his party without prior permission and without the act being condoned within fifteen days. The Speaker (or Chairman) decides such disqualification.

The leading authority is Kihota Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651. The Constitution Bench upheld the Schedule's validity, but struck down Paragraph 7 — which had purported to bar courts from inquiring into the Speaker's decision — for not having been ratified under the proviso to Article 368(2). The Court held that the Speaker, while acting under the Tenth Schedule, is a tribunal whose decisions are amenable to judicial review on the limited grounds of jurisdictional error, mala fides, perversity, and violation of natural justice. The position of the Speaker is examined more fully in our parallel notes on the State Legislature.

Sessions, prorogation, dissolution — Article 85

The President shall summon each House to meet at such time and place as he thinks fit, but six months shall not intervene between the last sitting of one session and the first sitting of the next. The summoning power is exercised on the advice of the Council of Ministers under Article 74(1); an order without such advice would be unconstitutional, as U.N.R. Rao held. The summoning within six months of the last sitting is mandatory, as Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299, held; this cannot be defeated by the fact that some members are unable to attend due to detention or conviction. Even if a Constitution Amendment Act is passed during such a session, it cannot be challenged on the ground that some members were prevented from attending — amendment of the Constitution follows its own track under Article 368.

The President may prorogue either House and dissolve the House of the People. As Ramdas Athawale v. Union of India (2010) 4 SCC 1 explained, an adjournment is an interruption within a session; prorogation terminates a session and puts an end to all proceedings then current. The President's special address under Article 87 is required only at the commencement of the first session of each year — not at every session.

Officers — Articles 89 to 98

The Vice-President of India is ex officio Chairman of the Council of States (Article 89). The Council chooses a member as Deputy Chairman, who may be removed by a resolution of the Council passed by a majority of all the then members, with at least fourteen days' notice (Article 90). When the office of the Chairman is vacant or when the Vice-President is acting as President, the Deputy Chairman performs the Chairman's functions (Article 91). While a resolution for the removal of the Vice-President is under consideration, the Chairman shall not preside, and shall have no vote on that resolution (Article 92).

The Speaker and Deputy Speaker (Articles 93 to 96) are chosen by the House from among its members. The Speaker continues in office, even after the dissolution of the House, until immediately before the first meeting of the new House. The Speaker may be removed by a resolution passed by a majority of all the then members, on at least fourteen days' notice. While that resolution is under consideration, the Speaker shall not preside, but shall have a right to speak and a vote in the first instance — never a casting vote on his own removal. Salaries are fixed by Parliament by law (Article 97), and each House has its own secretarial staff (Article 98).

Conduct of business — Articles 99 to 100

Every member must, before taking his seat, make and subscribe an oath or affirmation under Article 99 in the form set out in the Third Schedule. In Rajesh Ranjan v. State of Bihar (2000) 5 SCC 419, the Supreme Court directed that an elected member in custody be brought to the Lok Sabha so that he could take oath and not lose his membership through the operation of Article 101(4) — the sixty-day-absence rule.

Article 100 governs voting. All questions are determined by a majority of members present and voting, other than the presiding officer. The presiding officer does not vote in the first instance, but has a casting vote in case of an equality. The House may act notwithstanding any vacancy. The quorum is one-tenth of the total membership.

Vacation of seats — Article 101

No person can be a member of both Houses, or of both Parliament and a State Legislature. A member's seat falls vacant on disqualification under Article 102(1) or (2), or on resignation accepted by the Chairman or Speaker. Following the Constitution (33rd Amendment) Act, 1974, the Chairman or Speaker may inquire into the genuineness of a resignation; if not satisfied that it is voluntary or genuine, he shall not accept it. As Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra, AIR 1978 SC 694, observed, until the resignation is accepted it may be withdrawn or revoked by the member. A seat also falls vacant if a member is, without permission, absent from all meetings of the House for sixty days.

Privileges, immunity and expulsion — Article 105

Article 105(1) guarantees freedom of speech in Parliament — an absolute freedom independent of Article 19, as P.V. Narasimha Rao made clear. The general framework of free speech under Article 19(1)(a) is therefore parallel but distinct. Article 105(2) immunises Members from any proceedings in any court in respect of anything said or any vote given by them in Parliament or any committee. The same immunity attaches to a person publishing, by or under the authority of either House, any report, paper, vote, or proceeding.

The reach of this immunity was tested in P.V. Narasimha Rao, where the charge was of criminal conspiracy among MPs to vote in a particular manner on a no-confidence motion in exchange for illegal gratification. The Court held that the bribe-takers who had cast their votes were entitled to immunity under Article 105(2) — the conspiracy and the acceptance of the bribe had a nexus with the vote actually given. The MP who had received the bribe but abstained from voting was not entitled to immunity, since the protection is for the speech actually made or vote actually given. The case has subsequently been referred for reconsideration, but the framework remains the textbook position.

Article 105(3) preserves to each House the powers, privileges, and immunities as may be defined by Parliament by law, and until so defined, those of the House immediately before the coming into force of Section 15 of the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978. The substituted reference is cosmetic — the powers and privileges of the House of Commons as on the commencement of the Constitution were the powers available to Parliament, and that package continues post-amendment.

The most far-reaching aspect of Article 105(3) is the power to expel. Raja Ram Pal v. Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha (2007) 3 SCC 184 — the cash-for-questions case — settled that Parliament's power of expulsion of Members can be claimed as one of the privileges inherited from the House of Commons through Article 105(3) (and at the State level through Article 194(3)). Vacancy, disqualification, and expulsion are different concepts — disqualification strikes at the root of qualification and bars re-election; expulsion deals with a Member otherwise qualified but considered unworthy, and does not bar re-election; vacancy is the consequence of a Member ceasing to hold a seat. Recognising the power of expulsion does not amount to adding a new ground of disqualification.

The Court also rejected the absolutist claim that the actions of Parliament are immune from judicial review except when translated into law. The judiciary remains the final interpreter and may scrutinise whether the particular power or privilege claimed by Parliament was contemplated by Article 105(3). The scope of review is limited but real — gross illegality, irrationality, violation of constitutional mandate, mala fides, perversity, and lack of jurisdiction are all reviewable. Amarinder Singh v. Special Committee, Punjab Vidhan Sabha (2010) 6 SCC 113 expanded on this — breach of privilege can only be established when the Member's act is directly connected with his duties as a legislator, and an expulsion can be sustained only if the action has obstructed legislative functions. Parliament's accountability ultimately rests on principles of basic structure doctrine — the Constitution, not Parliament, is supreme.

Three earlier authorities continue to inform the field. M.S.M. Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha, AIR 1959 SC 395 (Searchlight), held that Rules under Article 118 constitute "procedure established by law" within Article 21. Tej Kiran Jain v. N. Sanjiva Reddy, AIR 1970 SC 1573, held that anything said by a Member during the course of business in Parliament is shielded by Article 105(2). In re: Powers, Privileges and Immunities of State Legislatures, AIR 1965 SC 745 (the Keshav Singh reference), defined the relationship between legislative privileges and judicial process — a foundational reading also relevant to writ jurisdiction under Article 32.

Bills and the Money-Bill question — Articles 107 to 111

Article 107 lays down the general rule that, subject to Articles 109 and 117, a Bill may originate in either House. A Bill is deemed passed only when both Houses agree to it. A Bill pending in Parliament does not lapse on prorogation. A Bill pending in the Council of States that has not been passed by the House of the People does not lapse on dissolution of the House of the People. But a Bill pending in the Lok Sabha — or one passed by the Lok Sabha and pending in the Rajya Sabha — lapses on dissolution of the Lok Sabha (subject to Article 108). Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala, AIR 1962 SC 694, held that a Bill awaiting Presidential assent is still "pending" and does not lapse on prorogation or dissolution.

Article 108 governs the joint sitting — the answer to a deadlock between the Houses. If the other House rejects a Bill, or if the Houses finally disagree on amendments, or if more than six months elapse from the Bill's reception by the other House, the President may notify his intention to summon a joint sitting. The proviso is critical: the joint-sitting machinery does not apply to a Money Bill. At the joint sitting the Bill is passed by a majority of the Members of both Houses present and voting. The Speaker presides (Article 118(4)).

Article 109 prescribes the special procedure for a Money Bill. A Money Bill cannot be introduced in the Council of States. After Lok Sabha passage, it is transmitted to the Rajya Sabha for its recommendations; the Council must return the Bill within fourteen days. The Lok Sabha may accept or reject those recommendations. If accepted, the Bill is deemed passed by both Houses with the recommended amendments; if not, it is deemed passed in the original Lok Sabha form. If the Council fails to return it within fourteen days, it is deemed passed in the Lok Sabha form.

The definition of a Money Bill is in Article 110. A Bill is a Money Bill only if it contains "only" provisions dealing with the matters in Article 110(1)(a) to (g) — imposition or alteration of tax, regulation of borrowing, custody of the Consolidated Fund or Contingency Fund, appropriation, declaration of charged expenditure, receipt or audit of money on account of the Consolidated Fund or Public Account, and any matter incidental to the foregoing. Clause (2) carves out: a Bill is not a Money Bill merely because it provides for the imposition of fines or pecuniary penalties, or for fees for licences or services rendered, or for taxation by a local authority. Under Article 110(3), if a question arises whether a Bill is a Money Bill, the decision of the Speaker of the House of the People is final, and the Speaker's certificate is endorsed on the Bill when it is transmitted to the Council under Article 109 and when it is presented to the President for assent under Article 111.

Article 111 governs assent. When a Bill is presented to the President, he shall declare that he assents or that he withholds assent. The proviso allows the President, in the case of a non-Money Bill, to return the Bill to the Houses with a message requesting reconsideration. If the Bill is passed again, with or without amendment, and presented for assent, the President shall not withhold assent. The President's veto power is therefore a one-shot revisional check, not an absolute negative.

Financial procedure — Articles 112 to 117

Article 112 is the constitutional mandate for the annual financial statement — the Budget. The President shall cause to be laid before both Houses a statement of the estimated receipts and expenditure for every financial year. The estimates must distinguish expenditure "charged" upon the Consolidated Fund of India (not voted) from expenditure proposed to be made from the Fund (voted). Charged expenditure under Article 112(3) includes the emoluments of the President; the salaries of the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Council of States and the Speaker and Deputy Speaker; the debt charges of the Government; salaries and pensions of Judges of the Supreme Court; the salary of the Comptroller and Auditor-General; and sums required to satisfy any judgment, decree or award of any court or arbitral tribunal. The financial relationship between Centre and States is taken up in our chapter on centre-State financial relations.

Article 113 distinguishes between the two categories. Charged expenditure is not submitted to the vote of Parliament — though it may be discussed. Other expenditure is submitted to the House of the People as demands for grants, which the House may assent to, refuse, or assent to subject to reduction. No demand for a grant may be made except on the recommendation of the President.

Article 114 is the Appropriation Bill — the legal authorisation to draw money from the Consolidated Fund of India for the grants made and the charged expenditure laid before Parliament. No money may be withdrawn from the Consolidated Fund except under appropriation made by law. Bhim Singh v. Union of India (2010) 5 SCC 538 held that the Appropriation Act made under Article 114 is "law" for the purposes of the Constitution. Article 115 provides for supplementary, additional or excess grants; Article 116 for votes on account, votes of credit and exceptional grants; Article 117 distinguishes "financial Bills" — Bills involving any of the Article 110 matters but not falling within the strict Money-Bill definition — and prescribes that they cannot be moved except on the recommendation of the President and cannot be introduced in the Council of States.

Procedure generally — Articles 118 to 122

Article 118 empowers each House to make rules for regulating its procedure, subject to the Constitution. The President, after consultation with the Chairman and Speaker, may make rules for joint sittings; the Speaker presides at a joint sitting. Courts have no power to interfere with such Rules unless there is contravention of a constitutional provision, but the mere availability of Rules is no guarantee that they have been followed. Raja Ram Pal upheld the constitution of an Inquiry Committee by the Speaker (separate from the Ethics Committee) to examine MPs accused of accepting money for raising questions — the Committee was not a court stricto sensu and was not bound by the technical rules of evidence.

Article 119 lets Parliament regulate the procedure for the timely completion of financial business by law, with such law prevailing over rules under Article 118. Article 120 provides that business in Parliament shall be transacted in Hindi or in English, with the presiding officer permitting a member to address the House in his mother-tongue if he cannot adequately express himself in Hindi or English. Language policy more broadly is the subject of our chapter on official language.

Article 121 is the constitutional bar on parliamentary discussion of the conduct of any Judge of the Supreme Court or a High Court in the discharge of his duties — except upon a motion for an address to the President praying for the removal of the Judge under Article 124(4) or 217(1)(b). The procedural framework for the removal of judges and the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, is taken up in our notes on the Union Judiciary.

Article 122 immunises parliamentary proceedings from judicial scrutiny on grounds of irregularity. The validity of any proceedings shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure. No officer or member of Parliament in whom powers are vested for regulating procedure shall be subject to the jurisdiction of any court in respect of the exercise of those powers. As Ramdas Athawale put it, the Speaker is the sole judge of the lawfulness of the House's procedural proceedings, and his decision is final and binding. The bar in Article 122(1) is, however, on "irregularity of procedure" — substantive illegality remains reviewable, as Raja Ram Pal and Amarinder Singh confirm.

The President's ordinance power — Article 123

Article 123 is the constitutional bridge between the executive and Parliament. If at any time, except when both Houses are in session, the President is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action, he may promulgate such Ordinances as the circumstances appear to require. An Ordinance has the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament. It must be laid before both Houses and shall cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of Parliament, or earlier if disapproved by resolutions of both Houses. The President may withdraw an Ordinance at any time. An Ordinance is void to the extent it makes a provision Parliament would not be competent to enact.

The 38th Amendment had inserted Clause (4) declaring the President's satisfaction non-justiciable. The 44th Amendment omitted Clause (4), and the satisfaction is now justiciable on the test of relevant material — though courts will not examine the sufficiency or adequacy of the material. A.K. Roy v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 710, held that the President's satisfaction is a condition precedent and is amenable to judicial review. R.K. Garg v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 2138, held that an Ordinance can create an offence and amend a tax law without complying with Articles 109 and 110. Conversely, an Ordinance cannot do what Parliament could not do by enacting an Act — it is constrained, for instance, by the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III.

The decisive re-statement is Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (2017) 3 SCC 1. The seven-Judge Bench held that laying an Ordinance before Parliament under Article 123(2)(a) is a mandatory constitutional obligation. The expressions "cease to operate" and "void" are deliberately distinct — an Ordinance is void only when it makes a provision Parliament would not be competent to enact. Whether rights, obligations, and liabilities created by an Ordinance survive its ceasing to operate is decided as a matter of construction, applying the test of public interest and constitutional necessity. The earlier line in State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar Bose, AIR 1962 SC 945, and T. Venkata Reddy v. State of A.P., AIR 1985 SC 724, accepting "enduring rights" surviving an Ordinance, was held no longer good law. The constitutional pathology Krishna Kumar Singh sought to cure was the practice of "re-promulgation" — repeatedly issuing the same Ordinance to bypass Parliament, condemned in D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 579, as a fraud on the Constitution.

The Parliament–State interface and exam-angle distinctions

The legislative competence of Parliament — the Union List, the Concurrent List, and the residuary power — is the subject of our chapter on distribution of legislative powers. The doctrines of pith and substance, colourable legislation, and repugnancy under Article 254 are best read alongside the centre-State framework in our notes on centre-State legislative relations. The reserved seats for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Anglo-Indians under Articles 330 and 331 are dealt with in our chapter on special provisions for SC, ST, OBC and Anglo-Indians. The architecture of the constitutional framework as a whole — the supremacy of the Constitution over Parliament — is the subject of our broader Constitution of India notes.

Six distinctions repay close reading. First, prorogation versus adjournment versus dissolution: prorogation terminates a session, adjournment is an interruption within a session, dissolution ends the House. Second, lapsing of Bills: a Bill pending only in the Council of States survives a Lok Sabha dissolution; a Bill pending in the Lok Sabha (or pending in the Rajya Sabha after Lok Sabha passage) lapses on Lok Sabha dissolution; a Bill pending for Presidential assent does not lapse. Third, Money Bills versus financial Bills: a Money Bill must contain "only" the matters in Article 110(1); a financial Bill under Article 117 may contain other matters too. Fourth, joint sitting: available for ordinary Bills but not for Money Bills or constitutional amendments under Article 368. Fifth, expulsion versus disqualification: Raja Ram Pal distinguishes them — expulsion is a privilege under Article 105(3), disqualification under Article 102 is a constitutional incapacity. Sixth, Article 122 versus Article 105(3) judicial review: Article 122 bars review on grounds of irregularity but not on grounds of substantive illegality.

Frequently asked questions

Can the Speaker's certification of a Bill as a Money Bill be challenged in court?

Article 110(3) declares the Speaker's decision "final", and Article 122(1) bars courts from inquiring into proceedings on grounds of irregularity. However, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held — most clearly in Raja Ram Pal v. Hon'ble Speaker (2007) — that a finality clause does not oust review on grounds of gross illegality, irrationality, violation of constitutional mandate, mala fides, or perversity. If a Bill plainly does not satisfy the "only" test in Article 110(1), the certification is open to limited judicial review on substantive constitutional grounds, even though the procedural irregularity bar in Article 122 continues to operate.

Is the President's satisfaction under Article 123 justiciable after the 44th Amendment?

Yes. The 38th Amendment had inserted Clause (4) making the satisfaction non-justiciable; the 44th Amendment deleted it. Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (2017) confirmed that the satisfaction is amenable to judicial review on the test of whether it is based on relevant material. The Court will not examine the sufficiency or adequacy of the material, but it will inquire whether there was no satisfaction at all, whether it constitutes a fraud on power, or whether it was actuated by oblique motive. The burden rests on the petitioner to make out a prima facie case before the government is called upon to disclose facts.

Does an Ordinance create rights that survive its ceasing to operate?

Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (2017) reset the law. The earlier view in State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar Bose (1962) and T. Venkata Reddy (1985) — which had recognised "enduring rights" surviving an Ordinance on the analogy of temporary enactments — was held no longer good law. Whether rights, obligations, or liabilities created by an Ordinance survive must be determined as a matter of construction, applying the test of public interest and constitutional necessity, and whether the consequences are of an irreversible character. In a suitable case, the Court may mould the relief.

Are MPs immune from prosecution for accepting bribes to vote in a particular way?

Under P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (1998), the MPs who accepted bribes and actually voted in pursuance of the conspiracy were held immune under Article 105(2), since the conspiracy and the vote had a nexus. The MP who accepted the bribe but abstained was held not immune, since Article 105(2) protects only votes "actually given" or speech "actually made". The bribe-givers could be prosecuted for criminal conspiracy with the abstaining MP. The case has subsequently been referred for reconsideration; the principle of nexus, however, remains the textbook framework.

Can Parliament expel a Member, and if so, on what grounds?

Yes. Raja Ram Pal v. Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha (2007) — the cash-for-questions case — held that the power of expulsion is a privilege inherited from the House of Commons through Article 105(3) and is available to both Houses of Parliament (and through Article 194(3), to State Legislatures). Expulsion is distinct from disqualification: a Member otherwise qualified may be expelled for conduct that obstructs legislative functions or is unworthy of membership. Expulsion does not bar re-election. The exercise of the power is amenable to limited judicial review on grounds of jurisdictional error, mala fides, gross illegality, perversity, and violation of natural justice.

What is the difference between a Money Bill and a financial Bill?

A Money Bill under Article 110 must contain "only" provisions dealing with the matters listed in Article 110(1)(a) to (g) — taxation, borrowing, custody and appropriation of the Consolidated Fund, declaration of charged expenditure, and incidental matters. The Speaker certifies it under Article 110(3)–(4); the Council of States has only recommendatory power and a fourteen-day window; no joint sitting lies. A financial Bill under Article 117 contains Article 110 matters but not exclusively — it requires the President's recommendation and cannot be introduced in the Council of States, but otherwise follows the ordinary Bill procedure under Article 107, including the joint-sitting machinery under Article 108.