Elections — Election Commission, Electoral Rolls (Articles 324–329)

Articles 324 to 329 form Part XV of the Constitution and constitute the entire architecture of Indian electoral governance. Article 324 vests the superintendence, direction and control of every Parliamentary, Assembly and Presidential election in a single permanent body — the Election Commission. Articles 325 and 326 then declare the universal franchise: one common electoral roll, no exclusion on grounds of religion, race, caste or sex, and adult suffrage at eighteen. Articles 327 and 328 distribute the legislative power over election machinery between Parliament and the State Legislatures. Article 329 then closes the door to courts during the actual conduct of an election, channelling all disputes into the post-election remedy of an election petition.

For the judiciary aspirant, Part XV is examined less for its bare text and more for the doctrinal gloss the Supreme Court has built on it. The Constituent Assembly's choice to insulate the electoral machinery from the ordinary executive is part of the design traced in the historical background of the Constitution; the underlying democratic commitment that Part XV serves is articulated in the Preamble. Two strands dominate. First, the Article 324(1) plenary or residuary power of the Election Commission, articulated in Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr. (AIR 1978) and refined in Election Commission v. Ashok Kumar (2000). Second, the Article 329(b) bar on judicial intervention during the election, traced from Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer (1952) through Mohinder Singh Gill and into the modern decisions on Model Code of Conduct enforcement. Both strands sit inside the wider basic-structure framework that treats free and fair elections as a non-negotiable feature of the polity — as recognised in the line of authority from Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) onwards, and reinforced through the basic structure doctrine after Kesavananda Bharati.

Article 324 — the Election Commission and its plenary powers

Article 324(1) opens with five operative words: superintendence, direction and control. They cover the preparation of the electoral roll, the conduct of every election to Parliament and to the State Legislatures, and the elections to the offices of President and Vice-President. The grant is sweeping. The vesting is in a single Commission — the Election Commission of India (ECI) — which is constituted under Article 324(2) of a Chief Election Commissioner and such other Election Commissioners as the President may from time to time fix.

Article 324(3) makes the CEC the Chairman of the Commission once any other Election Commissioner is appointed. Article 324(4) permits the President, before each general election to the Lok Sabha or to a State Legislative Assembly (and before each biennial election to a Council where one exists), to appoint Regional Commissioners after consultation with the Commission to assist with its functions. Article 324(5) is the security-of-tenure clause. The CEC cannot be removed except in like manner and on like grounds as a Judge of the Supreme Court — that is, by an address of both Houses on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity. The conditions of service of the CEC cannot be varied to his disadvantage after appointment. Other Election Commissioners and Regional Commissioners can be removed only on the recommendation of the CEC. Article 324(6) obliges the President and the State Governors to make such staff available to the Commission as it requests for the discharge of its functions.

The plenary character of Article 324(1)

The most exam-heavy idea in Part XV is the plenary or residuary nature of the Article 324(1) power. The leading authority remains Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr. (AIR 1978). Krishna Iyer J., for the Constitution Bench, held that the words 'superintendence, direction and control' carry their fullest amplitude. They are a reservoir of power in areas left unoccupied by legislation. The Commission may therefore cancel a poll, order a re-poll at a particular polling station, postpone an election in disturbed conditions, or take any other step necessary for the smooth and fair conduct of the election.

The same idea recurs through later cases. In Kanhiya Lal Omar v. Trivedi (AIR 1986) the Court treated Article 324(1) as a residual power conferring on the Commission whatever directions are necessary for free and fair elections, and held that the provision must be construed liberally. In Election Commission v. Ashok Kumar (2000) the Court added that 'superintendence, direction and control' include powers not specifically provided but necessary to accomplish the task of holding elections. The reach of the power is not confined to what the Representation of the People Act spells out.

Two important illustrations of the plenary power are well settled. The Commission may introduce Electronic Voting Machines for recording votes — recognised in Mathew K.C. v. Election Commr. (AIR 1982) and revisited in subsequent challenges — and it may issue the Symbols Order and decide disputes about allotment of election symbols to political parties, recognised in Sadiq Ali v. Election Commn. (AIR 1972). When a recognised party splinters into rival groups owing to defection, it is the Commission that determines which faction is entitled to the party's symbol, again traced to Sadiq Ali and to All Party Hill Leader's Conference v. Sangma (AIR 1977).

Limits on the plenary power

The plenary power is not unlimited. Three limitations recur in the cases. First, the Commission's orders must be traceable to some existing law and cannot violate any statute, including a State Act — Maharashtra Wine Merchants Association v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1992). Where the law is silent the Commission may act, but where Parliament or the State Legislature has spoken validly under the federal scheme of legislative relations, the Commission must obey. Second, the Commission cannot encroach on the powers of other constitutional functionaries — for instance the President's power to issue the notification under Section 14 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Third, the Commission's quasi-judicial orders must obey natural justice, as Mohinder Singh Gill and Uma Ballav Rath v. Maheshwar Mohanty (1999) make clear. Once a revision petition is decided, the Commission cannot re-open it on a fresh representation.

An equally important refinement was offered in Special Reference No. 1 of 2002. The Court there held that the fixing of election schedules is in the exclusive domain of the Commission and is not subject to law made by Parliament. Parliament can frame the law of election conduct, but actual conduct rests with the Commission, and any statute purporting to take that plenary power away would be repugnant to Article 324. The same Reference recognised that even where there is no outer limit in the Constitution or the 1951 Act for holding fresh Assembly elections, the judiciary remains a watchdog and would step in to safeguard democracy as a basic feature.

Composition of the Commission — from one to three

The Commission was a single-member body for most of its early history. In October 1989 the President notified the appointment of two additional Election Commissioners alongside the CEC. On 1 January 1990 that notification was revoked, and the two Commissioners lost office. The Supreme Court in S.S. Dhanoa v. UOI (AIR 1991) rejected the resulting Article 32 challenge. The reasoning had three limbs. First, the creation and abolition of posts is an executive prerogative under Article 324(2), and abolition gives rise to no cause of action. Second, while it is obligatory to appoint a CEC, the appointment of other Election Commissioners under Article 324(2) and Regional Commissioners under Article 324(4) is left by the Constitution to the discretion of the President. Third, on the facts there was no evidence of malice. Dhanoa also observed that the CEC was in a superior position because of the asymmetric removal protections in Article 324(5).

That balance was reset in T.N. Seshan v. UOI (JT 1995). After the Government issued the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners (Conditions of Service) Amendment Act, 1993, with retrospective effect, T.N. Seshan as CEC challenged the Act. The Constitution Bench upheld it. Four propositions emerge from the judgment. The Act is valid and is not actuated by malice. The President's decision under Article 324(2) on whether to appoint Commissioners other than the CEC is not justiciable. The notification appointing additional Commissioners had made the ECI a multi-member body. And — overruling the implication in Dhanoa that the CEC was primus inter pares — all business of the Commission must as far as possible be transacted unanimously, and where there is difference of opinion, by the opinion of the majority. If the CEC is on leave his functions are taken over by the next senior Commissioner, not delegated to a Deputy Election Commissioner.

Appointment process after Anoop Baranwal

Article 324(2) leaves the appointment of the CEC and other Commissioners to the President 'subject to the provisions of any law made in that behalf by Parliament'. For decades no such law was made; appointments were made by the President on the advice of the Council of Ministers, in practice on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. In Anoop Baranwal v. UOI (2023) a Constitution Bench held that this gap could no longer continue and read in an interim mechanism: until Parliament legislated, the appointment would be made by the President on the advice of a committee comprising the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition (or single largest opposition party leader) in the Lok Sabha, and the Chief Justice of India. The decision was anchored in the imperative of insulating the Commission from executive influence — an aspect of free and fair elections, itself part of the basic structure. Parliament thereafter enacted the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023, replacing the Chief Justice in the selection committee with a Union Cabinet Minister; the constitutional validity of that statute is itself in litigation.

Article 324(6) — power to requisition staff

Clause (6) obliges the President and Governors to make available such staff to the Commission as it requests. Two refinements emerge from the cases. First, 'staff' in this clause means employees of the Central or State Government and does not extend to employees of public sector undertakings such as banks or the Life Insurance Corporation, even if those bodies are wholly Government-owned — ECI v. State Bank of India Staff Association (AIR 1995). The Commission therefore has no general power to requisition the services of bank staff or to exercise control over them. Second, where there are irreconcilable differences over security arrangements between the Government and the Commission, the proper course is mutual resolution; the Court in ECI v. State of Tamil Nadu (1995) emphasised the need for a machinery to resolve such disputes.

Articles 325 and 326 — one roll, no caste exclusion, adult suffrage

Article 325 makes two declarations of equal-citizenship significance. There shall be one general electoral roll for every territorial constituency. And no person shall be ineligible for inclusion in any such roll, or claim inclusion in any special electoral roll, on grounds only of religion, race, caste or sex. The provision is a structural guarantee of equality of political participation. In R.C. Poudyal v. UOI (1994) the minority opinion treated Article 325 as crucial to the secular character of the Republic and observed that any contravention would adversely affect that basic feature. Entries in an electoral roll carry a presumption of correctness; corrections can be made only after a quasi-judicial inquiry, as held in Lal Babu Hussein v. Electoral Registration Officer (AIR 1995).

Article 326 lays down the qualifications of a voter for the Lok Sabha and the State Legislative Assembly: adult suffrage, that is, every citizen not less than eighteen years of age (the age was lowered from twenty-one by the Constitution (61st Amendment) Act, 1988), unless disqualified under any law made by the appropriate Legislature on the grounds of non-residence, unsoundness of mind, crime or corrupt or illegal practice. Three points are pressed in the exam. First, Article 326 fixes the qualifications of a voter, not the qualifications of a candidate; the qualifications for candidature to the Houses of Parliament sit in Article 84 and for the State Legislatures in Article 173 — and these are also engaged with the structure under Articles 168 to 212. Second, the right to vote is not a fundamental right but a constitutional and statutory right; nevertheless it is a vital instrument of citizenship rooted in the law of citizenship. Third, the right to know about candidates' antecedents — discussed below under UOI v. Association for Democratic Reforms — has been read into the voter's right of expression under Article 19(1)(a).

Articles 327 and 328 — legislative competence over elections

Article 327 empowers Parliament to make provision with respect to all matters relating to or in connection with elections to either House of Parliament or to either House of the State Legislatures, including preparation of electoral rolls, delimitation of constituencies, and all other matters necessary for securing the due constitution of such Houses. Article 328 grants the same legislative power to the State Legislatures with respect to elections to State Legislatures, in so far as Parliament has not made provision. The two principal Parliamentary statutes occupying this field are the Representation of the People Act, 1950 (electoral rolls and qualifications) and the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (conduct of elections, qualifications and disqualifications, election petitions, corrupt practices). The Delimitation Act, 2002 governs constituency delimitation; orders of the Delimitation Commission under Sections 8, 9 and 10(1) are placed on the same footing as Parliamentary law.

Two doctrinal points must be remembered. First, Parliamentary law under Article 327 is subject to other constitutional provisions — including Article 324 itself. Article 324 is therefore an independent source of power, and the Commission may act in areas the 1951 Act leaves unoccupied (cancellation of poll, repoll, postponement). On the other hand, the Commission cannot act in derogation of a valid law made under Article 327 or Article 328 — recognised in Mohinder Singh Gill and reaffirmed in Kuldip Nayar v. UOI (2006). Second, the expression 'all matters' in Article 327 covers every stage of the entire election process, including delimitation, as held in Meghraj Kothari v. Delimitation Commission (AIR 1976).

Article 329 — bar to judicial interference in electoral matters

Article 329 opens with a non-obstante clause. Clause (a) declares that the validity of any law relating to delimitation of constituencies, or the allotment of seats to such constituencies, made or purporting to be made under Article 327 or Article 328, shall not be called in question in any court. Clause (b) provides that no election to either House of Parliament or to either House of a State Legislature shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided by or under any law made by the appropriate Legislature.

Clause (a) is a complete ouster of judicial review over delimitation laws and over Delimitation Commission orders that are statutorily equated with such laws. The Court in Meghraj Kothari read the bar literally. More recently in J&K National Panthers' Party v. UOI (2011) the Court held that postponement of the J&K delimitation exercise by amendments to Section 3 of the J&K Representation of Peoples Act, 1957 was insulated from challenge by Article 329(a); the demand for a uniform value of one's voting right through delimitation, disregarding the historical and statutory dispensation, is not a justiciable right.

Clause (b) — election petition as the exclusive remedy

Clause (b) is the heart of the section. Two foundational cases trace its sweep: N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer (1952) and Mohinder Singh Gill. Together they establish four propositions that recur in nearly every judiciary paper on Part XV.

1. Article 329(b) is a blanket ban on legal proceedings — including a writ petition under Article 226 — to challenge any electoral step taken by the Election Commission and its officers in carrying forward the election process. The bar runs from the President's notification under Section 14 of the 1951 Act to the formal declaration of the result.
2. The word 'election' in clause (b) is not confined to the final result; it covers the entire process culminating in a candidate being declared elected — Election Commn. v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao (1953).
3. The only remedy to challenge the legality of any such step is an election petition, presented after the election is over, calling the election into question. There is no intermediate remedy, even where the dispute relates to a step anterior to polling such as acceptance or rejection of a nomination — Hari Vishnu v. Ahmed (1955).
4. Even after the election, the election cannot be set aside under Article 226 on grounds such as the electoral roll being defective, or revision having been dispensed with by an unchallenged ECI order — Inderjit Barua v. ECI (AIR 1984), Kabul Singh v. Kundan Singh (AIR 1970).

The narrow window left open

The blanket bar is not absolute. A High Court may interfere with an order of the Election Commission outside the protected zone — for example where the order is contrary to a law enacted under Article 327, is arbitrary or mala fide, or is in excess of jurisdiction. Election Commission of India v. Ashok Kumar (2000) is the leading modern decision: it reads Article 329(b) together with Section 100 of the 1951 Act and explains that judicial intervention is barred where it would impede the progress of the election, but a court may correct an order where the conduct of the election is not hindered by interference. The High Court hearing an election petition can also adjudicate the vires of a law where that becomes necessary to declare an election void under Section 100 — Hari Shanker Jain v. Sonia Gandhi (2001) — though Article 329(a) remains a hard limit on questioning delimitation laws.

The forum for election petitions

Before 1966 election petitions were heard by an Election Tribunal under the 1951 Act. By the Representation of the People (Amendment) Act, 1966, the jurisdiction was transferred to the High Court sitting as a statutory tribunal under Section 80A, with an appeal to the Supreme Court under Section 116A. The Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976 attempted to revert to the pre-1966 position by inserting Article 323B(2)(f) — part of the wider regime of administrative and other tribunals — but the implementing law has never been made; the High Courts therefore continue to hear election petitions, as recognised in Nawab Khan v. Vishwanath Shastri (AIR 1993). The Constitution (39th Amendment) Act, 1975 had inserted Article 329A, which sought to make a special provision for the elections of the Prime Minister and the Speaker; that provision was struck down in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) as offending the basic structure of free and fair elections, and Article 329A was finally repealed by the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978. The High Court hearing an election petition retains its powers of contempt under Article 215 — Deen Dayal v. High Court of A.P. (1997).

The grounds on which an election may be set aside are catalogued in Section 100 of the 1951 Act — corrupt practices, improper acceptance or rejection of nomination, non-compliance with the Constitution or the Act materially affecting the result, and so on. Section 100 is, as the Supreme Court put it in ECI v. Ashok Kumar, the product of Article 329(b); its sweep helps determine the span of the constitutional bar. Only matters falling within Section 100 can be put in issue in the petition.

Model Code of Conduct and the Article 324(1) reservoir

The Model Code of Conduct (MCC) is not a statute. It is a body of guidelines issued by the Commission under Article 324(1) governing the conduct of political parties, candidates, public meetings, processions, polling day, the party in power, and the use of official machinery during the election period. Its constitutional foundation has been examined in S. Subramaniam Balaji v. State of Tamil Nadu (2013), where the Supreme Court directed the Commission to frame guidelines for election manifestos as part of the MCC, observing that Article 324 is the fountainhead of the powers under which the MCC orders are issued. The Commission's MCC enforcement is binding administratively on its officers but does not have the force of statutory law; failure of an Electoral Officer to comply with non-statutory directions does not invalidate an election — Lakshmi Charan Sen v. A.K.M. Hassan Uzzaman (AIR 1985).

Voter rights, candidate disclosures and electoral reform

A series of post-2000 decisions has reshaped the franchise side of Part XV by reading voter information and candidate disclosure into the constitutional fabric. In UOI v. Association for Democratic Reforms (2002) the Supreme Court held that the voter's right to know the antecedents of a candidate — including criminal cases, assets, liabilities and educational qualifications — flows from Article 19(1)(a). The decision was issued where the Representation of the People Act and the Rules were silent; Article 324 was treated as a reservoir of power for the avowed purpose of free and fair elections. Parliament's subsequent attempt in the Representation of the People (Amendment) Ordinance, 2002 to dilute that disclosure was struck down in People's Union for Civil Liberties v. UOI (2003).

The Court's intervention has continued. In Lily Thomas v. UOI (2013) the Supreme Court read down Section 8(4) of the 1951 Act and held that a sitting member of Parliament or a State Legislature stands disqualified immediately upon conviction for an offence carrying the trigger sentence under Section 8 — the three-month protection for sitting members was unconstitutional. In Public Interest Foundation v. UOI (2018) a Constitution Bench addressed the criminalisation of politics and directed candidates and political parties to publicise pending criminal cases through specified media. In Resurgence India v. ECI (2014) the Court held that incomplete or blank columns in the candidate's affidavit on assets and antecedents amount to non-disclosure and the Returning Officer is duty-bound to reject the nomination. The introduction and continued use of Electronic Voting Machines was upheld through several decisions — including Subramanian Swamy v. ECI (2013), which directed the phased introduction of the Voter-Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) and read the requirement into the right to a free and fair election. The voter-information line is itself a corollary of the wider Article 19(1)(a) doctrine and of the dignity-rich reading of Article 21 developed since Maneka Gandhi. The constitutional validity of the Electoral Bond Scheme was decided in Association for Democratic Reforms v. UOI (2024), where the Supreme Court struck down the scheme as violative of the voter's right to information under Article 19(1)(a).

Free and fair elections as basic structure

Part XV does not stand alone. It is the procedural anchor of a substantive constitutional commitment — that elections shall be free, fair and periodic. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that this commitment is part of the basic structure of the Constitution and cannot be amended away. The proposition was first formulated in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975), where Article 329A — insofar as it sought to validate the Prime Minister's election by removing it from judicial scrutiny — was struck down as destroying free and fair elections. The proposition has been reaffirmed in Kuldip Nayar v. UOI (2006) and in Anoop Baranwal v. UOI (2023), which treated the insulation of the Election Commission from executive control as itself basic-structure imperative. The same logic underwrites the Court's willingness to direct VVPAT introduction in Subramanian Swamy and to require asset and antecedent disclosure in ADR and Resurgence India.

For the exam-aspirant the takeaway is structural. Article 324 is wide; Article 329(b) is narrow; and the space between is occupied by the principle that the franchise and its machinery cannot be tinkered with in ways that compromise free and fair elections. Where Parliament legislates within constitutional limits, the Commission obeys; where Parliament is silent, the Commission fills the gap; and where any actor — the Government, the Commission or the Legislature — strays into territory that compromises the basic structure, the Court intervenes by way of election petition or, post-result, by writ.

Cognate Articles and overlap with other parts

Two cognate provisions complete the picture. First, Article 174(1) deals with the summoning, prorogation and dissolution of State Legislatures. The Supreme Court in Special Reference No. 1 of 2002 held that Article 174(1) and Article 324 operate on different fields — Article 174(1) does not concern elections, and the Commission's plenary domain over election conduct is not subject to Article 174. Second, the disqualification regime under the Tenth Schedule and under Sections 8 to 10A of the 1951 Act interfaces with Article 326's reference to crime, corrupt and illegal practices; conviction under specified offences disables both a voter under Article 326 and a candidate under Article 102 / Article 191. The interplay with the offices of State Executive functionaries and with Union Executive offices arises wherever a sitting member is convicted; Lily Thomas is the leading authority.

Drafting points and recurring exam angles

Three drafting points deserve emphasis. First, the non-obstante clause at the opening of Article 329 is the key textual hook. It must be invoked in any answer dealing with the bar on judicial review during the election. Second, the proviso to Article 324(5) creates a calibrated security-of-tenure regime — high for the CEC, lower for the other Commissioners and Regional Commissioners — and the asymmetry has a doctrinal purpose, namely the insulation of the apex office. Third, Article 324(2) leaves the size of the Commission to executive discretion subject to Parliamentary law; Dhanoa and Seshan together set the boundaries of judicial review of that discretion.

Recurring exam angles include: the distinction between Article 324(1) plenary power and Article 327 statutory power; the sweep of 'election' in Article 329(b); the four propositions of Mohinder Singh Gill; the multi-member character of the Commission after the 1993 Act and Seshan; the appointment process after Anoop Baranwal and the 2023 Act; the voter-information line of cases from ADR through Lily Thomas, Subramanian Swamy, Resurgence India, PUCL and PIF; and the basic-structure status of free and fair elections from Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain. Aspirants writing the COI paper should be able to compose an answer mapping the architecture of Part XV in three movements — vesting (Article 324), franchise (Articles 325 to 326), legislative competence and bar on judicial review (Articles 327 to 329) — and to defend the residual power doctrine without overstating it. For a fuller view of the constitutional architecture, see our complete Constitution of India notes.

Conclusion

Articles 324 to 329 are short in text but vast in implication. The Election Commission they constitute is one of the few permanent bodies the Constitution itself creates outside the three branches of government, and the doctrinal gloss applied by the Supreme Court has made it the practical guardian of the franchise. The voter equality of Articles 325 and 326 is the egalitarian core. The legislative-competence regime of Articles 327 and 328 channels Parliamentary and State legislative power. Article 329 then trades pre-poll judicial intervention for the post-result discipline of the election petition, on the calculation that elections must move quickly and disputes must be resolved on a single statutory track. The whole design rests on the basic-structure understanding that free and fair elections are inviolable. Read together with the wider constitutional scheme — including the chapters on citizenship, the freedom of speech that grounds the voter's right to know, the Union and State Executives, and the Parliamentary and State Legislatures — Part XV stands as the procedural backbone of Indian democracy.

Frequently asked questions

What is the source of the Election Commission's plenary power under Article 324?

The plenary power flows directly from the words 'superintendence, direction and control' in Article 324(1). In Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr. (AIR 1978) the Constitution Bench treated these words as a reservoir of power in areas left unoccupied by legislation. The Commission may cancel a poll, order a re-poll, postpone an election in disturbed conditions, or take any step necessary for free and fair elections. The position was reaffirmed in Kanhiya Lal Omar v. Trivedi (AIR 1986) and Election Commission v. Ashok Kumar (2000), but the orders must be traceable to law and cannot violate any statute or encroach on another constitutional functionary's powers.

Can a writ petition be filed under Article 226 challenging a Returning Officer's rejection of a nomination?

No. Article 329(b) is a blanket bar on judicial intervention during the election process — from the President's Section 14 notification to the declaration of the result. In N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer (1952) the Supreme Court held that the rejection of a nomination falls within the election process and the only remedy is an election petition after the election. The bar is reinforced by the non-obstante clause opening Article 329. The High Court may consider it later in an election petition, where Section 100 of the 1951 Act lists improper rejection of nomination as a ground.

Is the right to vote a fundamental right?

No. The right to vote is a constitutional right (under Article 326) and a statutory right (under the Representation of the People Act, 1951). It is not part of the Fundamental Rights chapter. However, the Supreme Court in UOI v. Association for Democratic Reforms (2002) held that the voter's right to know the antecedents of a candidate flows from the right of expression under Article 19(1)(a). And the right to a free and fair election has been recognised as part of the basic structure since Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) — so the franchise enjoys constitutional protection even though it is not itself a fundamental right.

How does the Anoop Baranwal judgment change the appointment of Election Commissioners?

Article 324(2) leaves appointments to the President 'subject to the provisions of any law made in that behalf by Parliament', but no such law existed for decades. In Anoop Baranwal v. UOI (2023) a Constitution Bench filled the gap and held that, until Parliament legislated, appointments would be made on the recommendation of a committee comprising the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha, and the Chief Justice of India. Parliament then enacted the 2023 Act, replacing the CJI on the committee with a Cabinet Minister. The constitutional validity of that statutory change is itself in litigation.

Can the Election Commission make law? What are the limits on its plenary power?

The Commission cannot legislate, but its directions under Article 324(1) operate as binding instructions in areas Parliament has left unoccupied. Three limits apply. First, its orders must be traceable to existing law and cannot violate any statute, including a State Act — Maharashtra Wine Merchants Association v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1992). Second, it cannot encroach on another constitutional functionary's power, such as the President's Section 14 notification — Mohinder Singh Gill (AIR 1978). Third, where Parliament has validly legislated under Article 327, the Commission must obey, though the Commission may still act in genuine gaps — Special Reference No. 1 of 2002.

Why was Article 329A struck down and how does Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain matter today?

Article 329A was inserted by the Constitution (39th Amendment) Act, 1975 to validate the Prime Minister's election retrospectively and to remove it from judicial scrutiny. In Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) the Supreme Court struck down the relevant clauses of Article 329A as offending the basic structure — specifically free and fair elections, rule of law and judicial review. Article 329A was finally repealed by the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978. The case remains the foundational authority for treating free and fair elections as basic structure, a proposition extended in Anoop Baranwal v. UOI (2023) to demand insulation of the Commission from executive control.