Centre-State Legislative Relations (Articles 245–255)

Articles 245 to 255 of the Constitution of India draw the legislative map of the federation. Article 245 fixes the territorial reach of Parliament and of the State Legislatures; Article 246 distributes subject-matter between them through the three Lists in the Seventh Schedule; Articles 247 to 253 then tilt the balance back towards the Union for additional courts, residuary matters, national-interest legislation, emergencies, inter-State requests and treaty obligations; and Articles 254 to 255 close the chapter with the rule of repugnancy and the procedural safety-net of subsequent assent. Read together, they answer two questions every legislative-competence problem starts with — who can legislate, and where the law can reach.

The architecture is recognisably federal but Union-leaning. Where the Government of India Act, 1935 and the constitutional history that preceded it had three Lists with residuary power resting in the Governor-General, our Constitution kept the three-List scheme but vested the residue in Parliament. Every doctrinal device the courts later developed — pith and substance, colourable legislation, harmonious construction, occupied field — is built on top of this textual scaffolding. The doctrines themselves are taken up in the companion chapter on the distribution of legislative powers and its interpretive doctrines; this chapter stays with the text and the structural cases that read it.

Article 245 — Extent of laws made by Parliament and the States

Article 245(1) opens the Part with two parallel grants of competence. Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India. The Legislature of a State may make laws for the whole or any part of that State. Both grants begin with the words "subject to the provisions of this Constitution", which means that legislative power is plenary inside its appointed sphere but is hemmed in by Part III on Fundamental Rights, by the distribution of powers under Article 246, and by the other mandatory provisions of the Constitution such as Article 286 and the freedom of inter-State trade, commerce and intercourse under Articles 301 to 307. If any of these limits is transgressed, the law is liable to be struck down. The point was put across the bench in Re Powers, Privileges and Immunities of State Legislatures, AIR 1965, where the Supreme Court catalogued the limitations on what is otherwise plenary legislative power.

The territorial reach of Parliament is the whole of India as defined in Article 1(3) and the chapter on the Union and its territory. A Central Act not extended to a particular State cannot be made applicable by a High Court through judicial fiat — that was the holding in Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami (1997). Parliament's reach is itself "subject to the provisions of this Constitution": Article 240(2) lets Presidential regulations repeal or amend Acts of Parliament for certain Union Territories, paragraph 5(1) of the Fifth Schedule lets the Governor bar or alter the application of Acts of Parliament to Scheduled Areas, and paragraph 12A(b) of the Sixth Schedule does the same for Tribal Areas in the North-East. None of these dilute the legislative power; they only redirect its mode of operation in special territories.

Article 245(2) and extra-territorial operation

Clause (2) of Article 245 is a one-line shield against an entire class of arguments. "No law made by Parliament shall be deemed to be invalid on the ground that it would have extra-territorial operation." If Parliament chooses to legislate for events, persons or transactions outside India, the validity of that law cannot be impeached on extra-territoriality alone. That was reaffirmed in Regional Provident Fund Commissioner v. Shillong City Bus Syndicate (1996).

The shield is broad but not infinite. The Constitution Bench in GVK Industries Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer (2011) read into Article 245(1) a test of nexus or expected impact: Parliament's power does not extend to extra-territorial activities or causes that have no impact on, or nexus with, India. Parliament may legislate for extra-territorial aspects only when those aspects have, or are expected to have, some impact, effect or consequence for (a) the territory of India or any part of it, or (b) the interests, welfare, well-being or security of inhabitants of India and Indians. Inside that perimeter Article 245(2) is conclusive; outside it, the law would be ultra vires.

State Legislatures and the doctrine of territorial nexus

State Legislatures are differently placed. Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 245 read together imply that they have no extra-territorial powers. The legislative subjects in the State List, and matters in the Concurrent List in their application to the State, must be read as referring to objects situated within the State or as objects between which and the State there is a sufficient territorial nexus. State of Bombay v. R.M.D.C., AIR 1957 settled the point and gave the doctrine its working test. When a State legislation is impugned for extra-territorial operation, its validity "depends on the sufficiency of the purpose" for which it is used in the territorial connection — in Bengal Immunity v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955, the Court framed this as the controlling enquiry.

For taxing statutes the test crystallises into two limbs: the connection between the State and the person or transaction sought to be taxed must be (a) real and not illusory, and (b) the liability imposed must be pertinent to that connection. If both limbs are satisfied, the extent of the connection is a matter of legislative policy and not of constitutional validity, even if the liability appears disproportionate to the territorial link. State of A.P. v. National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd. (2002) added an important refinement in the context of electricity: where sale and consumption are inseparable, a State cannot artificially split the events to claim nexus over the sale alone. The depth of this doctrine — Wallace's case under the 1935 Act, the long line of taxing nexus decisions — is taken up in the chapter on the doctrines that fill out Article 246; here the textual rule is that State Legislatures live within their borders unless a real nexus carries them across.

Article 246 — Subject-matter and the three Lists

Article 246 is the workhorse of the chapter. It distributes the legislative power conferred by Article 245 across the three Lists in the Seventh Schedule. Clause (1) gives Parliament exclusive power over the matters in List I (the Union List) — defence, foreign affairs, banking, currency, atomic energy, railways, Union taxes and the like — all matters where Parliament alone holds the legislative pen. Clause (3) gives the State Legislature exclusive power over the matters in List II (the State List) — public order and police, local government, public health, agriculture, forests, fisheries, State taxes — the everyday subjects on which the State Legislatures hold exclusive competence. Clause (2) confers concurrent power on Parliament and the State Legislatures over List III (the Concurrent List) — criminal law and procedure, civil procedure, marriage and divorce, contracts, trusts, economic and social planning. Clause (4) ensures that Parliament has full legislative reach over Union Territories even on matters in the State List — Union Territories being defined and governed under the special-provisions framework for certain States and Territories.

Federal supremacy and the non-obstante clauses

The opening words of clause (1) — "Notwithstanding anything in clauses (2) and (3)" — and the qualifying words of clauses (2) and (3) — "subject to clause (1)" — together lay down the principle of federal supremacy. Where an entry in the Union List irreconcilably conflicts with an entry in the State or Concurrent List, the Union entry prevails pro tanto. The State Legislature loses its competence over the disputed area only to the extent the Union has occupied it. The classic restatement is in Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1983, where the Court warned that federal supremacy is a rule of last resort, attracted only after every attempt at reconciliation has failed.

That "attempt at reconciliation" is the doctrine of harmonious construction. Entries should be read together, given their widest natural meaning, and reconciled wherever language permits, so that neither List is rendered nugatory. The ruling in Calcutta Gas Co. v. State of W.B., AIR 1962 set the canon: harmonise the entries, and only where harmony is impossible let the Union entry prevail. This is reinforced by the doctrine of pith and substance — the true nature and character of the impugned law is ascertained, and if in pith and substance it falls in a List allotted to the enacting Legislature, incidental encroachment on another List is no ground of invalidity. The companion chapter on interpretive doctrines works that doctrine through.

Entries demarcate fields, not power

A point that frequently catches aspirants out: the entries in the Seventh Schedule are not themselves the source of legislative power. They merely demarcate the fields of legislation. The source of competence is Article 246 itself, read with Article 245. The proposition is from Vijay Kumar Sharma v. State of Karnataka (1990) and was restated in Welfare Association ARP, Maharashtra v. Ranjit P. Gohil (2003). The same case-line establishes that taxing power must be traced to a specific taxation entry; it cannot be inferred as ancillary to a general regulatory entry — State of W.B. v. Kesoram Industries Ltd. (2004) treats this as a structural feature of the Seventh Schedule, where Lists I and II separately enumerate general legislative subjects and heads of taxation in two distinct groups.

Article 246A — the GST overlay

The 101st Constitutional Amendment, 2016, inserted Article 246A as a self-contained scheme for goods and services tax that operates notwithstanding Articles 246 and 254. Both Parliament and every State Legislature have concurrent power to make laws on GST imposed by the Union or by such State. Inter-State supplies are reserved exclusively to Parliament. This is a structural exception to the List-based scheme of Article 246 and was the constitutional foundation for the CGST, SGST and IGST architecture.

Article 247 — Parliament's power to set up additional courts

Article 247 is short but important. "Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, Parliament may by law provide for the establishment of any additional courts for the better administration of laws made by Parliament or of any existing laws with respect to a matter enumerated in the Union List." It permits Parliament to add a tier of courts — over and above the regular hierarchy of subordinate courts and High Courts — wherever the better administration of Union laws so requires. The provision has rarely been invoked directly, but it is read together with Entry 11A of List III ("administration of justice; constitution and organisation of all courts, except the Supreme Court and the High Courts"), which is concurrently exercised by Parliament and the State Legislatures.

Two structural points should be remembered. First, the language of Article 247 does not denude the State Legislature of its power under Entry 11A to constitute courts within the State; the Union and State Legislatures share the field, with Parliament's slice being specifically directed at additional courts for Union or existing laws — the position in Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal v. State of Bihar (2016). Second, Judicial Tribunals can be created only by statutes or by rules made under statutory authority — neither the executive nor the High Court, in exercise of writ powers, can create such Tribunals. The extended discussion of tribunals belongs to the chapter on Articles 323A and 323B and the tribunalisation of justice.

Article 248 — Residuary power of legislation

Article 248 vests the residuary legislative power exclusively in Parliament. Clause (1) — now subject to Article 246A — provides that Parliament has exclusive power to make any law with respect to any matter not enumerated in the Concurrent List or State List. Clause (2) extends the residue to taxation: Parliament may impose any tax not mentioned in either of those Lists. Entry 97 of List I — "Any other matter not enumerated in List II or List III including any tax not mentioned in either of those Lists" — gives effect to Article 248.

The Court has cautioned that resort to the residuary power is a matter of last refuge. If the subject-matter can fairly be brought within any entry in the three Lists, the residuary power should not be invoked — that was the line taken in Subramaniyam Chettiar v. Muthuswami Goundan, AIR 1941 and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Second Gift Tax Officer v. D.H. Nazareth, AIR 1970. But once it is found that a legislative subject is not specifically covered by any entry, Article 248 read with Entry 97 supplies a competence framed in the widest possible terms — Union of India v. Har Bhajan Singh Dhillon, AIR 1972. The Wealth Tax Act, the Gift Tax Act and the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 are classic instances upheld under the residuary head.

One taxonomic discipline runs through the residuary jurisprudence: the power to legislate on a matter does not by itself carry the power to tax that matter. Heads of taxation are separately enumerated in Lists I and II, and the silence of those two Lists on a particular tax is what triggers Article 248(2). State of W.B. v. Kesoram Industries Ltd. (2004) drives the point home: "the power to tax cannot be deduced from a general legislative entry as an ancillary power."

Article 249 — Legislation in the national interest

Article 249 is the first of three exceptional gateways through which Parliament can enter the State field. Where the Council of States — by a resolution supported by not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting — declares that it is necessary or expedient in the national interest that Parliament should make laws on a specified matter in the State List (or on GST under Article 246A), Parliament becomes competent to legislate on that matter for the whole or any part of India for as long as the resolution remains in force.

The duration is rigidly capped. Clause (2) limits the resolution to one year, but it may be renewed by a fresh two-thirds resolution "as often" as needed, each renewal extending the operation by another year. Clause (3) softens the landing: a law that Parliament could not have made but for the resolution ceases to have effect six months after the resolution lapses, except as respects things already done. The phrase "national interest" is wide enough to cover any matter that has an incidence over the country as a whole, as distinguished from any particular locality or section. Critically, Article 249 does not require an emergency — it works in normal times — and that is what distinguishes it from Article 250.

Two well-known instances of Acts passed in exercise of an Article 249 resolution are the Supply and Prices of Goods Act, 1950 and the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 1951. The Supreme Court in Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India (2006) noted that Article 249, read with Article 251, in effect permits the Council of States to encroach upon the legislative competence of a State by labelling a matter one of national importance — a power that, however nuanced its original design, can be politically delicate where the Centre and the State are governed by different parties.

Article 250 — Legislation during a Proclamation of Emergency

Article 250 is the emergency counterpart of Article 249. While a Proclamation of Emergency under Article 352 is in operation, Parliament has power to make laws for the whole or any part of India with respect to any matter in the State List (and on GST). No Council-of-States resolution is required — the proclamation itself unlocks the power. Clause (2) mirrors Article 249(3): such a law ceases to have effect six months after the proclamation has ceased to operate, save for things done during its currency.

Article 250 enlarges Parliament's vertical reach without disturbing its core competence; it is a temporary expansion, not a permanent transfer — itself a feature of constitutional design tested against the basic structure doctrine evolved after Kesavananda Bharati. The full architecture of emergency declarations, their grounds, duration, parliamentary approval and judicial review, is treated under the emergency provisions in Articles 352 to 360. For the purpose of Centre-State legislative relations, Article 250 simply records that emergency dissolves the partition between List I and List II — for Parliament — for the duration of the proclamation plus six months.

Article 251 — How an inconsistency is resolved under Articles 249 and 250

What happens when Parliament has made a law on a State subject under Article 249 or 250, and the State Legislature simultaneously has a law on the same subject? Article 251 provides the answer. Nothing in Articles 249 and 250 restricts the State Legislature's power to make any law it has competence to make. But if any provision of the State law is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament under those two articles, the parliamentary law prevails — and the State law, to the extent of the repugnancy, becomes inoperative (not void) for as long as the parliamentary law continues to have effect.

The drafting choice is deliberate. The State law is suspended, not destroyed. The moment Parliament's special-window competence under Article 249 or 250 lapses (one year for an unrenewed Article 249 resolution; the duration of the proclamation plus six months for Article 250), the parliamentary law itself ceases. The State law, whose vitality was merely paused, comes back to life automatically — there is no need for re-enactment. This contrasts sharply with the Article 254(1) regime, where a repugnant State law in the Concurrent List is void to the extent of repugnancy.

Article 252 — Parliament legislating with the consent of States

Article 252 is the cooperative federalism gateway. If the Legislatures of two or more States consider it desirable that any matter — on which Parliament has no power to legislate for the States except under Articles 249 and 250 — should be regulated by Parliament, and if resolutions to that effect are passed by all the Houses of those Legislatures, Parliament becomes competent to pass an Act regulating that matter. The Act so passed applies to the consenting States, and to any other State that subsequently adopts it by a resolution of its own Legislature.

The architecture is consensual but, once invoked, irreversible from below. Clause (2) bars any State Legislature to which the Act applies from amending or repealing it. Only Parliament — by a Central Act passed or adopted in like manner — may amend or repeal. The State, by passing the resolution, surrenders its legislative competence on that matter for the duration of the Central Act. The surrender is, however, limited to the four corners of the resolution; matters outside the resolution remain with the State Legislature. The Supreme Court in Her Highness Maharani Shanti Devi v. Savjibhai Haribhai Patel (2001) read the Gujarat resolution surrendering urban land ceiling matters as a limited surrender; town planning and development, being independent subjects, were not surrendered.

Important Acts passed under Article 252 include the Prize Competition Act, 1955, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, and the Transplantation of Human Organs Act, 1994. The Wild Life and Water Acts are particularly important because both deal with subjects that, in their pure form, lay in the State List but were given a single national framework through Article 252. When such a Central Act is repealed, an embargoed State law on the same subject springs back into operation — see State of Gujarat v. Manohar Sinhji Pradyuman Sinhji Jadeja (2013).

Although Article 254 does not by its terms apply to Article 252 legislation, the Supreme Court has read the same conflict-rule into the architecture: in case of conflict between an Article 252 Central Act and a State Act in a State to which the Central Act applies, the Central Act prevails — Rangayya Tumati v. State of A.P., AIR 1978. The doctrine of severability, however, applies, so only the conflicting portion of the State law gives way.

Article 253 — Implementation of international agreements

Article 253 is the treaty-implementation gateway. Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of the Chapter, Parliament has power to make any law for the whole or any part of India for implementing any treaty, agreement or convention with another country, or any decision made at an international conference, association or other body. The article is in conformity with Article 51(c), which directs the State to foster respect for international law and treaty obligations, and is reinforced by Entry 14 of List I, which assigns treaty-making to the Union.

The crucial words are "notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter". They mean that the distribution of legislative powers between the Union and the States cannot restrict Parliament's power to legislate under Article 253. Parliament may invade List II to the extent that is necessary to implement India's treaty obligations — without that, the Union could not honour its international commitments at all. The proposition is from Maganbhai v. Union of India, AIR 1969, which also clarifies that no cession of Indian territory is permissible without a constitutional amendment, but that the settlement of a boundary dispute does not amount to cession and can be effected without amendment or even legislation.

Article 253 does not, however, override the rest of the Constitution. Fundamental Rights cannot be violated under the colour of treaty implementation — Ajaib Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1952. In Dadu v. State of Maharashtra (2000), Section 32A of the NDPS Act was struck down to the extent it took away the Court's power to suspend sentence; the Government's claim that the section discharged India's obligations under the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances was rejected on a careful reading of the Convention itself, which had never sought to oust national judicial review.

Familiar Article 253 enactments include the Diplomatic Relations (Vienna Convention) Act, 1972, the Anti-Hijacking Act, 1982, the Geneva Conventions Act, 1960 and the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (which traces its long title to the Stockholm Conference, 1972). Each was enacted on a subject-matter that touched the State List — environment, public health, civil aviation safety — but was sustained on the ground that an international obligation was being given domestic effect.

Article 254 — Inconsistency between Union and State law

Article 254 governs the central conflict scenario in our federal scheme: a clash between a parliamentary law and a State law in the Concurrent List. Clause (1) lays down the general rule. If any provision of a State law is repugnant to any provision of a parliamentary law that Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of an existing law on a Concurrent List matter, the parliamentary law (or the existing law) prevails, whether passed before or after the State law, and the State law is void to the extent of the repugnancy.

Clause (2) carves out an exception. Where a State law on a Concurrent matter contains provisions repugnant to an earlier parliamentary law (or existing law) on that matter, the State law — if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received Presidential assent — prevails in that State notwithstanding the repugnancy. The proviso to clause (2) protects parliamentary supremacy in the long run: nothing prevents Parliament from later making a fresh law on the same matter, including a law that adds to, amends, varies or repeals the State law that was once preserved by Presidential assent.

When does Article 254 apply?

The doctrinal mechanics — direct conflict, occupied field, implied repeal — are taken up in depth in the chapter on repugnancy and the interpretive doctrines. The textual scope of Article 254 may be summarised as follows. First, Article 254 is attracted only when both the Centre and the State have actually legislated on the same Concurrent List matter and the two laws conflict. The mere possibility of repugnancy with some future order is not enough — Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1999). Second, Article 254 does not apply where the State Act is, in pith and substance, on a State List matter and only incidentally touches the Concurrent List — State of A.P. v. K. Krishna, AIR 1957. Third, the onus of showing repugnancy lies on the party who attacks the State law — Tika Ramji v. State of U.P. (1956).

The classification of repugnancy in M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India, AIR 1979 is the textual touchstone. A State law may be repugnant when there is a direct conflict between the two provisions; when both laws operate in the same field and cannot stand together; or when Parliament has, expressly or by necessary implication, evinced an intention to cover the entire field, leaving no room for State legislation. The third limb — the doctrine of "occupied field" — was applied in State of Kerala v. Mar Appraem Kuri Co. Ltd. (2012) to hold that the Kerala Chitties Act, 1975 became void on the enactment of the Central Chit Funds Act, 1982, because Parliament had intended to cover the entire field relating to chits.

Reservation, consideration and Presidential assent

Clause (2) requires three things: the State Bill must be reserved for the consideration of the President under Article 200, the President must apply his mind, and assent must follow. The Constitution Bench in Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt. Ltd. v. National Textile Corporation (2002) made clear that consideration is not an idle formality. Both "consideration" and "assent" are limited to the proposal made by the State Government — assent operates only with respect to the laws for which repugnancy was specifically pointed out and Presidential assent was sought. A blanket assent is not on offer.

The effect of a properly given assent is that the State Act prevails in that State and overrules the Central Act in its applicability to that State alone; the Central Act continues to operate in the rest of India. This balance survives only until Parliament chooses to enact a new law adding to, amending, varying or repealing that State Act under the proviso — at that point the State Act stands impliedly repealed to the extent of the conflict. Zaverbhai Amaidas v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 establishes that even where the subsequent parliamentary law does not expressly repeal the saved State law, implied repeal operates if the two cannot stand together.

Article 254 does not apply where

Three frequently tested negatives bear repetition. (a) Article 254 has no application where the State law is, in pith and substance, on a State List subject. (b) Article 254 does not apply to a conflict between a State Act made under List II and a Central Act made under List III — Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. v. Electricity Inspector and ETIO (2007). (c) There is no repugnancy where the two enactments operate in different fields, or where the State law makes additional or supplemental provisions, or additional rules of evidence, provided the Central Act was not intended to be exhaustive. The doctrine of severability also applies — only the offending portion of the State law gives way.

Article 255 — Recommendations and previous sanctions are matters of procedure

Article 255 is the procedural safety-net. No Act of Parliament or of a State Legislature, and no provision in any such Act, shall be invalid by reason only that some recommendation or previous sanction required by the Constitution was not given, if assent was eventually given — by the Governor or the President where the Governor's recommendation was required, by the Rajpramukh or the President where the Rajpramukh's recommendation was required, and by the President where the President's recommendation or previous sanction was required.

The point is that these procedural prerequisites — for instance, the President's previous sanction under the proviso to Article 304(b) for State Bills imposing reasonable restrictions on inter-State trade — are not jurisdictional; their absence is curable by subsequent assent. Jawaharmal v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 is the leading authority. But Article 255 cannot be stretched. The President cannot, by giving assent to a subsequent Bill, retrospectively validate an earlier Act that had failed for want of his assent under Article 255 itself — that would amount to a Presidential declaration that non-compliance with Article 255 is of no consequence, which the President has no power to make. The proposition is from Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works v. State of Mysore, AIR 1963 and was reaffirmed in Rashid v. State of U.P., AIR 1978.

The Seventh Schedule — three Lists at a glance

The Seventh Schedule supplies the substantive content for Article 246. The Union List contains 98 entries (Entries 1 to 81 deal with general subjects; Entries 82 to 92C with taxation; Entry 97 is the residuary entry). The State List contains 59 entries (Entries 1 to 44 are general subjects; Entries 45 to 63 are taxation). The Concurrent List contains 52 entries covering criminal law and procedure, civil procedure, marriage and divorce, contracts, transfer of property other than agricultural land, trusts, evidence, social and economic planning, education, factories, and welfare of labour.

Three structural points are worth committing to memory. First, where an entry in List II is general and a part of it is dealt with specifically in List I, the List I entry takes effect. Second, a number of entries in List II are expressly made "subject to" entries in List I — Entry 17 of List II (water) is subject to Entry 56 of List I; Entry 23 of List II (mines and minerals) is subject to Entry 54 of List I; Entry 24 of List II (industries) is subject to Entries 7 and 52 of List I; Entry 33 (trade and commerce in goods) is subject to Entry 60; Entry 37 (betting and gambling) is subject to Entry 72. The State retains its general competence except to the extent the Union has actually occupied the field by a declaration under the matching List I entry. Third, the GST overlay under Article 246A operates outside this scheme. The Seventh Schedule is unpacked — together with the Constitution's other twelve schedules — in the chapter on the Schedules to the Constitution.

Reading the Part as a whole

Articles 245 to 255 are best read as one continuous instrument. Article 245 fixes the territorial reach. Article 246 partitions the subject-matter through the three Lists. Article 247 supplements with additional courts; Article 248 absorbs everything not partitioned; Articles 249 and 250 carve emergency-style and national-interest pathways for Parliament; Article 251 calibrates how the conflict-of-laws problem under those two articles is resolved without destroying the State law; Article 252 builds in cooperative federalism for inter-State subjects; Article 253 cuts through the partition for treaty implementation; Article 254 governs Concurrent List repugnancy with its assent exception; and Article 255 cures procedural lapses in assent.

For the exam, the highest-value comparisons are these: Article 249 versus Article 250 (Council of States resolution versus emergency proclamation; one-year cap versus duration of proclamation); Article 252 versus Article 249 (consent of two-or-more States versus Council of States resolution; permanent surrender by participating States versus temporary one-year window); Article 251 versus Article 254 (State law inoperative versus State law void; automatic revival versus need for re-enactment); Article 253 versus Article 254 (treaty obligation overrides distribution versus repugnancy resolved within Concurrent List). The chapters on Centre-State administrative relations under Articles 256 to 263 and on Centre-State financial relations under Articles 264 to 293 complete the federal architecture; the doctrinal chapter on pith and substance, colourable legislation and repugnancy works the cases more thoroughly. For background on the Constitution as a whole, see the comprehensive Constitution of India notes hub, the Preamble and its interpretive role, and the landmark cases that have shaped constitutional doctrine.

What the text leaves the courts to manage — the doctrines that decide which entry an impugned law actually falls under, when a Central Act has "occupied the field", how to read entries that overlap, and what the limits of incidental encroachment are — is the subject-matter of the next chapter. Articles 245 to 255 are the floor on which those doctrines are built, and any answer that begins by identifying the correct article and List entry already has its constitutional footing right.

Frequently asked questions

What is the difference between Article 249 and Article 250?

Both let Parliament legislate on a State List matter, but the trigger and duration differ. Article 249 requires a Rajya Sabha resolution supported by at least two-thirds of the members present and voting, declaring the matter to be in the national interest; the resolution lasts up to one year and is renewable. Article 250 requires no resolution at all — it operates automatically while a Proclamation of Emergency is in force under Article 352. In both cases, a law made by Parliament ceases to have effect six months after the resolution lapses or the proclamation ends, except as respects things already done.

Under Article 251, is a State law repugnant to a Parliamentary law made under Articles 249 or 250 void or only inoperative?

Only inoperative, not void. Article 251 expressly says that the State law is inoperative "so long only as the law made by Parliament continues to have effect". The State law is suspended, not destroyed. The moment the parliamentary law lapses — when the Article 249 resolution expires or the Article 250 proclamation ends and the six-month grace period runs out — the State law springs back into operation automatically without needing re-enactment. This is the textual contrast with Article 254(1), where a repugnant State Concurrent law is void to the extent of repugnancy.

Can a State withdraw its consent under Article 252 once Parliament has enacted a law?

No. Once two or more States pass resolutions under Article 252(1) and Parliament enacts a law in pursuance of them, clause (2) bars the State Legislatures of those States from amending or repealing the Central Act. Only Parliament can do so, by an Act passed or adopted in like manner. The State has surrendered its competence on the resolved matter for the duration of the Central Act. The surrender is, however, limited to the four corners of the resolution — matters not covered by the resolution remain with the State.

Does Article 245(2) make every extra-territorial law of Parliament valid?

No. Article 245(2) prevents a Parliamentary law from being struck down on the ground of extra-territoriality alone. But the Constitution Bench in GVK Industries Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer (2011) read into Article 245(1) a nexus requirement: Parliament's power does not extend to extra-territorial activities or causes that have no impact on, or nexus with, India. Parliament may legislate on extra-territorial aspects only when those aspects have, or are expected to have, some impact, effect or consequence for India's territory or for the interests, welfare or security of inhabitants of India and Indians.

What is the doctrine of territorial nexus and when does it apply to State legislation?

The doctrine of territorial nexus permits a State Legislature to make a law that has effects outside the State, provided there is a real and not illusory connection between the State and the object of the legislation, and the liability or burden imposed is pertinent to that connection. It originated in the context of the 1935 Act and was settled by the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. R.M.D.C., AIR 1957. For taxing statutes the connection must be real, not illusory, and the liability sought to be imposed must be pertinent to that connection. The depth of the doctrine is taken up in the chapter on the doctrines of pith and substance and colourable legislation.

Can Parliament legislate on a State List subject to give effect to an international treaty?

Yes. Article 253 begins with the words "Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter" and gives Parliament power to make any law for implementing any treaty, agreement or convention with another country, or any decision made at an international conference. This power overrides the distribution under Article 246, so Parliament may invade the State List to the extent necessary for treaty implementation — Maganbhai v. Union of India, AIR 1969. But the rest of the Constitution remains binding; Fundamental Rights cannot be violated under the cover of Article 253, as Dadu v. State of Maharashtra (2000) confirms.

Does Presidential assent under Article 254(2) freeze a State law permanently against parliamentary repeal?

No. The proviso to Article 254(2) preserves parliamentary supremacy. Even after the President has assented to a State law that conflicts with an earlier Central Act, Parliament remains free to enact a fresh law on the same matter — including one that adds to, amends, varies or repeals the State law that was preserved by assent. If Parliament's later law cannot stand together with the saved State law, the State law is impliedly repealed to the extent of the inconsistency. Zaverbhai Amaidas v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 is the leading authority.