Part III of the Constitution of India — Articles 12 to 35 — is the Indian Bill of Rights. It withdraws certain subjects from the area of political controversy, places them beyond the reach of transient majorities and entrenches them as legal principles enforceable by the courts. The Founding Fathers, while equipping the State with extensive powers, simultaneously equipped the citizen with a guaranteed shield against executive and legislative despotism. Part III is that shield. It is the device by which the Constitution makes itself enforceable against the very Government it creates, and it is the most significant constitutional control on legislative power.

The expression fundamental is doing real work. These are not statutory rights at the gift of Parliament; they are pre-political, inherent in the human person, recognised and confirmed (not conferred) by Part III. The State cannot take them away by ordinary legislation; even a constitutional amendment cannot destroy their core, because the basic-structure doctrine evolved in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461, treats the essential content of fundamental rights as part of the unamendable framework. The negative obligations they cast on the State have been described in judgments as transcendental, inalienable and primordial; the Supreme Court has called them "the heart and soul of the Constitution" and "the conscience of the Constitution". For the judiciary aspirant, this chapter is the doorway: every later chapter — on the meaning of "State" in Article 12, on the right to equality, on the seven freedoms under Article 19, on life and personal liberty — sits inside this larger architecture. Read this overview before the substantive chapters; come back to it when those substantive chapters start to feel disconnected.

The concept — what makes a right "fundamental"

Three features distinguish a fundamental right from an ordinary legal right. First, it is a limitation on the power of the State rather than a benefit conferred on the individual. Article 13(2) operationalises this — "The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void." Any law inconsistent with Part III is, to the extent of the inconsistency, stillborn. The judicial review of legislation flows directly from this clause.

Second, fundamental rights are justiciable — the citizen has a guaranteed right to move the Supreme Court directly under Article 32 (and the High Courts under Article 226) for their enforcement. Dr Ambedkar, in the Constituent Assembly, called Article 32 itself "the heart and soul of the Constitution" because without an enforcement mechanism the rights would be empty professions. The Supreme Court in Daryao v. State of UP, AIR 1961 SC 1457, treated the right to move the Court for the enforcement of a fundamental right as itself a fundamental right. This is the structural difference from the directive principles in Part IV: the directives are positive obligations of governance addressed to the State and expressly declared non-justiciable by Article 37, whereas the fundamental rights are negative obligations — limitations — enforceable through the writ jurisdiction.

Third, although fundamental, the rights are not absolute. Each right carries its own limitation clause permitting reasonable restrictions in the interest of identified public goods — sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, public order, decency, morality, contempt of court, defamation and incitement to offence under Article 19(2); public order, morality and health under Articles 25 and 26; and so on. The Supreme Court in People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (2004) 2 SCC 476, made clear that no right under Part III is absolute; the rights conferred on individuals carry with them the claims of society, and reasonable restrictions are the price of liberty in a constitutional democracy. Equally, however, the rights cannot be hollowed out: in Dharam Dutt v. Union of India, (2004) 1 SCC 712, the Court held that Parliament can only impose reasonable restrictions, never extinguish the right.

Scheme of Part III — the architecture of Articles 12 to 35

Part III runs from Article 12 to Article 35. Walking through it from the top will fix the architecture in mind:

  1. Articles 12 and 13 — General. Article 12 defines the "State" against whom fundamental rights are enforceable; Article 13 declares the supremacy of Part III over all laws — pre-Constitution and post-Constitution alike — and supplies the doctrine of judicial review. Together they form the gateway to Part III.
  2. Articles 14 to 18 — Right to Equality. The equality cluster: equality before law and equal protection of the laws (14), prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth (15), equality of opportunity in public employment (16), abolition of untouchability (17), abolition of titles (18).
  3. Articles 19 to 22 — Right to Freedom. The liberty cluster: the six (originally seven) freedoms of speech, assembly, association, movement, residence and profession (19); protection in respect of conviction for offences — ex post facto, double jeopardy, self-incrimination (20); protection of life and personal liberty (21); the right to free and compulsory education for children aged 6 to 14 (21A, inserted by the 86th Amendment, 2002); and protection against arrest and detention in certain cases (22).
  4. Articles 23 and 24 — Right against Exploitation. Prohibition of traffic in human beings and forced labour (23); prohibition of employment of children below 14 in hazardous occupations (24).
  5. Articles 25 to 28 — Right to Freedom of Religion. Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion (25); freedom to manage religious affairs (26); freedom from compulsory taxation for promotion of any particular religion (27); freedom from religious instruction in wholly State-funded institutions (28).
  6. Articles 29 and 30 — Cultural and Educational Rights. Protection of the language, script and culture of any section of citizens (29); the right of religious and linguistic minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice (30).
  7. Article 32 — Right to Constitutional Remedies. The guaranteed right to move the Supreme Court for the enforcement of any fundamental right, with power in the Court to issue the prerogative writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari.
  8. Articles 33 to 35 — Saving and enabling provisions. Article 33 empowers Parliament to restrict or abrogate the rights in their application to the Armed Forces, paramilitary forces and intelligence agencies; Article 34 provides for restriction of rights when martial law is in force; Article 35 vests in Parliament alone the power to make laws giving effect to certain provisions of Part III.

Three structural points follow from the architecture. First, Article 31 (the original right to property) was deleted by the 44th Amendment, 1978, and re-enacted as a bare legal right in Article 300A; Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 are no longer part of the chapter on fundamental rights. Second, Article 21A on the right to education was inserted by the 86th Amendment, 2002, after the Supreme Court's decision in Unni Krishnan v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 SCC 645, had already read a fundamental right to elementary education into Article 21. Third, the chapter is internally interlinked. As Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597, decisively established, the rights in Articles 14, 19 and 21 are not water-tight compartments; a law affecting personal liberty must satisfy the test of fairness under Article 14, the test of reasonable restriction under Article 19 and the test of just, fair and reasonable procedure under Article 21 — a triple-headed test that has powered the entire post-1978 expansion of Part III.

Classification — the six recognised heads

Once Article 31 was deleted in 1978, the fundamental rights are conventionally grouped under six heads:

  1. Right to Equality (Articles 14 to 18)
  2. Right to Freedom (Articles 19 to 22)
  3. Right against Exploitation (Articles 23 and 24)
  4. Right to Freedom of Religion (Articles 25 to 28)
  5. Cultural and Educational Rights (Articles 29 and 30)
  6. Right to Constitutional Remedies (Article 32)

The classification is mnemonic rather than analytical — examiners frequently test it as a recall question, and it is not unusual to see it framed as "originally seven heads, now six after deletion of the right to property". The seventh, removed by the 44th Amendment, was the right to property.

Citizens vs. all persons — the dichotomy across Part III

Some fundamental rights are guaranteed only to citizens, while others are available to all persons, including foreigners and corporations (with certain limitations). The distinction matters in writ practice and in MCQ design. Rights restricted to citizens include Articles 15 (non-discrimination on certain grounds), 16 (equality of opportunity in public employment), 19 (the six freedoms), 29 and 30 (cultural and educational rights). Rights available to all persons — including non-citizens — include Articles 14 (equality before law), 20 (protection in respect of conviction for offences), 21 (life and personal liberty), 21A (free education for children), 22 (protection against arrest), 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28. A foreigner facing deportation, for instance, can invoke Article 21 but not Article 19; a corporation can invoke Article 14 but not Article 19. Hold this distinction firmly — it generates a steady supply of objective questions.

Part III and Part IV — the social-revolution thesis

The Constituent Assembly enacted Part III and Part IV as twin instruments of social revolution. Part III imposes negative obligations on the State — it must not abridge equality, must not arbitrarily restrict speech, must not deprive a person of life or liberty save by just procedure. Part IV imposes positive obligations — the State shall direct policy towards securing a living wage, equal pay for equal work, public health, free legal aid and so on. As the Supreme Court summarised in I.R. Coelho v. State of T.N., (2007) 2 SCC 1, Parts III and IV together constitute "the core of commitment to social revolution" and are "the conscience of the Constitution".

The justiciability split flows from Article 37: the directive principles "shall not be enforceable by any court" but are nevertheless "fundamental in the governance of the country". The principles are addressed to the legislature and the executive; the rights are addressed to the courts. Yet the two parts are mutually reinforcing. Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789, held that the harmony and balance between Part III and Part IV is itself a feature of the basic structure: to destroy the guarantees of Part III in order to achieve the goals of Part IV is to subvert the Constitution. The Court has equally held that the directive principles cannot, in themselves, invalidate a legislation, but they assist in assessing the reasonableness of restrictions placed on fundamental rights — the Article 37 / Article 19(6) calibration repeatedly applied since State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat, (2005) 8 SCC 534. For a fuller treatment, see the chapter on the Directive Principles of State Policy.

Article 13 — the doctrine of judicial review

Article 13 is the engine room of Part III. Clause (1) declares that all laws in force at the commencement of the Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of Part III, are void to the extent of the inconsistency. Clause (2) prohibits the State from making any law that takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III, with the same consequence of voidness to the extent of contravention. Clause (3) defines "law" expansively to include ordinances, orders, bye-laws, rules, regulations, notifications, custom or usage having the force of law. Clause (4), inserted by the 24th Amendment, 1971, provides that nothing in Article 13 shall apply to an amendment of the Constitution made under Article 368 — a clause that supplied the legislative response to Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643, where a six-judge majority had held that constitutional amendments are also "law" within Article 13(2) and could be invalidated for violating fundamental rights. The 24th Amendment was upheld in Kesavananda Bharati, but the Court simultaneously fashioned the basic-structure doctrine: while Parliament's amending power is wide enough to amend any provision, it cannot be used to destroy the basic structure, of which the essential core of fundamental rights forms a part.

From Article 13 flow several subsidiary doctrines that students must know: the doctrine of severability (only the offending portion is struck down where the void portion can be separated from the valid); the doctrine of eclipse (a pre-Constitution law inconsistent with a fundamental right is not dead but eclipsed, and revives if the right is amended out or if the law is brought within constitutional limits); and the doctrine of waiver (the Supreme Court in Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income Tax, AIR 1959 SC 149, held that fundamental rights cannot be waived, since they are conferred not for the individual's private benefit alone but as a matter of public policy).

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The expansion of fundamental rights through judicial interpretation

Until 1970 the dominant view, traceable to A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27, was that the fundamental rights are mutually exclusive silos: a law restricting personal liberty must be tested only against Article 21, a law restricting speech only against Article 19(1)(a), and so on. R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248 (the Bank Nationalisation case), broke that silo theory. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597, then established that the rights overlap and that a law affecting any right must satisfy the cumulative tests of Articles 14, 19 and 21 — the procedure prescribed by law to deprive a person of life or personal liberty must be "just, fair and reasonable", a substantive due-process import that has powered four decades of Article 21 expansion.

The Supreme Court has, since Maneka, read into Article 21 a series of unenumerated rights: the right to live with human dignity, the right to a clean environment, the right to privacy (recognised as a fundamental right by a unanimous nine-judge bench in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, 2017), the right to legal aid, the right to a speedy trial, the right to shelter, the right to know, the right to health, the right to education (later codified as Article 21A), and many more. The Court has described the fundamental rights as "empty vessels into which each generation must pour its content" and has used Article 21 as the principal vessel for that pouring.

The expansion has been calibrated by the basic-structure doctrine on the one hand and the reasonable-restrictions clauses on the other. Even today, the operative judicial test for any State action that touches a fundamental right runs along the Maneka grid: is the law authorised, is its procedure fair, is the restriction reasonable, and is the action otherwise non-arbitrary under Article 14?

Suspension during Emergency — the architecture of Articles 358 and 359

The framers anticipated that in a national emergency the ordinary working of the fundamental-rights regime might paralyse the State's response. Two articles — Article 358 and Article 359 — provide for the suspension of fundamental rights during a Proclamation of Emergency under Article 352. The two articles operate differently and the difference is regularly tested in objective papers.

Article 358 — automatic suspension of Article 19

Article 358(1), as originally enacted, provided that during a Proclamation of Emergency the freedoms guaranteed by Article 19 stand suspended automatically, and the legislature and the executive may make laws or take action inconsistent with Article 19 without the protection of that Article being available. The suspension was complete: once the Proclamation lapsed, the rights revived, but legislation enacted and executive action taken during the Emergency could not be challenged even after the Emergency ended on the ground of contravention of Article 19. Amadalavalasa Co-operative Agricultural and Industrial Society v. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 958, restated this position.

The 44th Amendment Act, 1978, narrowed Article 358 in three significant ways. First, Article 358 now operates only when the Proclamation of Emergency is on the ground of war or external aggression, not on the ground of armed rebellion (the 44th Amendment having replaced "internal disturbance" with "armed rebellion" as the second ground for emergency under Article 352). Second, the Article now applies only to laws or executive action which the Legislature or executive would otherwise have been incompetent to make or take but for Article 19. Third, the immunity for any law that violates Article 19 is now available only if the law contains a recital that it is in relation to the Proclamation of Emergency in force when the law was made — the so-called "recital" requirement under Article 358(2).

Article 359 — Presidential Order suspends the remedy

Article 359 differs from Article 358 in two key respects. First, it does not suspend the fundamental rights themselves; it suspends the citizen's right to move any court for the enforcement of those of the rights specified in a Presidential Order. As the Supreme Court explained in Makhan Singh Tarsikka v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 381, what the Order under Article 359(1) does is to bar the remedy — the rights remain in theory alive but cannot be enforced. Second, the suspension is not automatic; it requires a separate Presidential Order specifying the rights whose enforcement is suspended, and may be limited in duration to a period shorter than the Proclamation. Clause (1A), inserted by the 38th Amendment, 1975, makes explicit that during the operation of the Order the legislature acquires the temporary power to make laws inconsistent with the suspended rights.

The 44th Amendment — Articles 20 and 21 lifted out of Article 359

The bitter experience of the 1975-77 Internal Emergency drove the most important constitutional reform in the suspension regime. In ADM Jabalpur v. S.S., AIR 1976 SC 1207 (the Habeas Corpus case), a four-to-one majority of the Supreme Court (Khanna J. dissenting) held that when the enforcement of Article 21 was suspended by a Presidential Order under Article 359, a person imprisoned or detained "loses his locus standi to regain his liberty on any ground" — even on the ground of mala fide or ultra vires exercise of statutory power, even on the ground that no executive order at all had been made authorising the detention. The decision was widely criticised as the nadir of judicial protection of liberty during the Emergency.

The 44th Amendment Act, 1978, cut the Gordian knot. It inserted in Article 359(1) the words "other than Articles 20 and 21" — so that even during a Proclamation of Emergency it is now constitutionally impermissible to suspend the enforcement of Article 20 (protection against ex post facto laws, double jeopardy and self-incrimination) or Article 21 (protection of life and personal liberty). The Amendment supersedes ADM Jabalpur on the question of suspension of Article 21. The decision in ADM Jabalpur was itself formally overruled by the nine-judge bench in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, on the question of the basis of fundamental rights, removing the last shred of authority for the proposition that liberty during an Emergency is at the mercy of the executive. The 44th Amendment also added the "recital" requirement to Article 359(1B), mirroring Article 358(2): no law and no executive action under it has any immunity from challenge unless the law contains an express recital that it is in relation to the Proclamation of Emergency.

Article 358 vs. Article 359 — the comparative grid

It is worth fixing the contrast between the two provisions in a single grid:

  1. Trigger. Article 358 operates automatically with the Proclamation of Emergency (now only on the ground of war or external aggression, after the 44th Amendment); Article 359 requires a separate Presidential Order specifying the rights whose enforcement is suspended.
  2. Scope of rights affected. Article 358 suspends only Article 19; Article 359 may suspend the enforcement of any right in Part III except Articles 20 and 21.
  3. What is suspended. Article 358 suspends the right itself (during the Emergency); Article 359 suspends the remedy — the right to move a court for enforcement.
  4. Duration. Article 358 lasts as long as the Proclamation; Article 359 lasts for the period specified in the Order, which may be shorter than the Proclamation.
  5. Recital requirement. Both articles, after the 44th Amendment, require any law sought to be protected to contain a recital that it relates to the Proclamation in force.
  6. Effect on prior law. Article 358 immunises only laws and acts done during the Emergency; pre-existing laws void for violation of Article 19 are not revived by the Proclamation.

The Proclamation of Emergency itself is now justiciable on the ground of mala fides — Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789 — so a person aggrieved by an Order under Article 359 may strike at the root by attacking the underlying Proclamation. The fuller treatment of the emergency framework appears in the chapter on the Emergency Provisions (national, state and financial).

Article 32 — the right to constitutional remedies

The guarantee of fundamental rights would be hollow without a guaranteed forum to enforce them. Article 32(1) makes the very right to move the Supreme Court for the enforcement of a fundamental right itself a fundamental right. Article 32(2) clothes the Supreme Court with power to issue directions, orders or writs — including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari — for that enforcement. Article 32(3) permits Parliament to empower other courts to exercise these powers. Article 32(4) provides that the right under Article 32 cannot be suspended except as provided by the Constitution itself — the only constitutional carve-out being Article 359.

The Court's writ jurisdiction under Article 32 is independent of and runs parallel to the writ jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226. There is, however, an important difference of scope: a writ under Article 32 lies only for the enforcement of a fundamental right, whereas a writ under Article 226 lies both for the enforcement of a fundamental right and "for any other purpose" — that is, on grounds outside Part III as well. This is why most writ litigation in India is filtered through the High Courts under Article 226 first. The mechanics of the five prerogative writs are dealt with in the dedicated chapter on the writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari.

Reading the chapter — what to take into the substantive articles

For the judiciary aspirant the Part III overview yields a few load-bearing propositions that must travel into every later chapter:

  1. Fundamental rights are negative obligations — limitations on State action — and are confirmed, not conferred, by Part III.
  2. The State against whom they are enforceable is defined inclusively by Article 12 to include the Union, the States, all local authorities and "other authorities" within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India.
  3. The rights are justiciable through Articles 32 and 226 and the right to move the Supreme Court is itself a fundamental right.
  4. The rights are not absolute — each carries its own reasonable-restriction clause — but they cannot be hollowed out by ordinary legislation.
  5. The classification is six-fold after the deletion of the right to property by the 44th Amendment, 1978, which moved the right to property to Article 300A as a bare legal right.
  6. The rights overlap; Maneka Gandhi killed the silo theory of A.K. Gopalan and supplied the cumulative Articles 14-19-21 test.
  7. Parts III and IV are complementary — the directive principles guide the application of the fundamental rights, but cannot in themselves invalidate legislation.
  8. During a Proclamation of Emergency, Article 19 is suspended automatically by Article 358 (only when the Proclamation is on the ground of war or external aggression, after the 44th Amendment); the enforcement of other Part III rights — except Articles 20 and 21 — may be suspended by a Presidential Order under Article 359. Articles 20 and 21 are now permanently outside the suspension regime, the most enduring legacy of the 44th Amendment.

Carry these eight propositions into every later chapter on the substantive rights — on equality under Articles 14 to 18, on the freedoms of Article 19, on Article 21, on the protection against exploitation under Articles 23 and 24, on freedom of religion under Articles 25 to 28, on the cultural and educational rights of minorities under Articles 29 and 30. The hub page for the entire subject — the Constitution of India notes — collects every chapter in this section and is the natural starting point when you want to switch quickly between provisions.

Frequently asked questions

Why are fundamental rights described as negative obligations of the State?

Because Part III is structured as a series of prohibitions on State action, not as commands to the State to act. Article 13(2) tells the State what it shall not do — make laws abridging Part III rights. Articles 14 and 15 tell the State whom it shall not discriminate against. Article 19 tells the State what restrictions it cannot impose on speech, assembly, association and movement. Article 21 tells the State that it cannot deprive a person of life or personal liberty save by just, fair and reasonable procedure. The negative formulation is what makes the rights judicially enforceable: a court can strike down State action that crosses the prohibition, but cannot ordinarily compel the State to perform a positive task — that is the office of the directive principles in Part IV.

How many heads do fundamental rights now fall under, and which one was deleted?

Six. After the 44th Amendment, 1978, deleted Article 31 (right to property) and Article 19(1)(f), the fundamental rights are conventionally classified under six heads: right to equality (Articles 14 to 18), right to freedom (Articles 19 to 22), right against exploitation (Articles 23 and 24), right to freedom of religion (Articles 25 to 28), cultural and educational rights (Articles 29 and 30), and the right to constitutional remedies (Article 32). The deleted seventh head was the right to property, which now survives as a bare legal — not fundamental — right under Article 300A. Examiners frequently test this transition; the correct answer in objective papers is six fundamental rights, with Article 300A as a constitutional but non-fundamental right.

What is the difference between the suspension under Article 358 and the suspension under Article 359?

Article 358 suspends Article 19 itself, automatically, the moment a Proclamation of Emergency on the ground of war or external aggression is in force (after the 44th Amendment). Article 359 does not suspend any right; it suspends only the enforcement — the citizen's right to move a court — of those Part III rights specified in a separate Presidential Order, and only for the period stated in the Order. After the 44th Amendment, Articles 20 and 21 cannot be included in any Order under Article 359, so the enforcement of the rights to protection from ex post facto laws, double jeopardy, self-incrimination, and life and personal liberty is now permanently available even during an Emergency.

Did the 44th Amendment overrule ADM Jabalpur v. S.S.?

It superseded the operative result. ADM Jabalpur, AIR 1976 SC 1207, held that when the enforcement of Article 21 was suspended by a Presidential Order under Article 359, a detenu lost locus standi to challenge his detention on any ground. The 44th Amendment, 1978, inserted the words "other than Articles 20 and 21" into Article 359(1), making it constitutionally impossible to repeat the ADM Jabalpur situation. The decision was finally and formally overruled by the nine-judge bench in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1, on the question of the very basis of fundamental rights — burying the proposition that fundamental rights are at the mercy of executive Proclamation.

Are fundamental rights and directive principles in conflict, and which prevails?

They are complementary, not antagonistic, and neither prevails by abstract priority. Article 37 makes the directives non-justiciable but "fundamental in the governance of the country". Minerva Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789, held that the harmony and balance between Parts III and IV is itself part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Where a legislative restriction on a fundamental right is challenged, the directive principles assist the court in assessing the reasonableness of the restriction (the calibration applied in State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat, (2005) 8 SCC 534), but the directives cannot, by themselves, invalidate any legislation, and a fundamental right cannot be destroyed in the name of giving effect to a directive principle.

Can Parliament amend a fundamental right out of existence?

No — not the essential core. Initially, Shankari Prasad and Sajjan Singh held that constitutional amendments under Article 368 are not "law" within Article 13(2) and could amend fundamental rights without limit. Golak Nath, AIR 1967 SC 1643, reversed that. The 24th Amendment, 1971, then inserted Article 13(4) and Article 368(1) to restore Parliament's amending power. The Supreme Court in Kesavananda Bharati, AIR 1973 SC 1461, upheld the 24th Amendment but evolved the basic-structure doctrine: Parliament can amend any provision but cannot destroy the basic structure, of which the essential content of fundamental rights forms a part. Minerva Mills, AIR 1980 SC 1789, struck down the 42nd Amendment's attempt to oust judicial review of constitutional amendments altogether.