Robbery and Dacoity (Sections 390–402 IPC)

Sections 309 to 313 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) — re-enacting Sections 390 to 402 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — codify the law of robbery, dacoity, and the gang-related aggravations. Section 309 BNS folds the IPC's Sections 390, 392, 393 and 394 into a single section with six sub-sections that define robbery, supply the basic punishment, criminalise the attempt, and punish voluntary hurt caused in the course of robbery. Section 310 BNS folds the IPC's Sections 391, 395, 396, 399, 402 and 400 into a single section with six sub-sections that define dacoity, supply its punishment, address dacoity-with-murder, criminalise preparation, criminalise assembly, and punish gang membership. Section 311 BNS reproduces Section 397 IPC on robbery or dacoity with attempt to cause death or grievous hurt. Section 312 BNS reproduces Section 398 IPC on attempt when armed with a deadly weapon. Section 313 BNS reproduces Section 401 IPC on the gang-of-robbers offence, replacing "thieves" with "robbers" in the heading. The wider Indian Penal Code and BNS framework on offences against property places this cluster between Section 308 BNS on extortion and the misappropriation chapter that follows.

The doctrinal core of the cluster is the principle that theft and extortion become robbery when force or fear of instant force is added. Robbery is therefore not a free-standing offence — it always rests on a foundation of either theft or extortion. Dacoity is a further aggravation: robbery committed by five or more persons conjointly. The legislative architecture is layered, and the BNS preserves that architecture intact while adding two notable changes: a mandatory minimum of ten years' imprisonment under Section 310(3) BNS for dacoity with murder (the IPC text had carried only the maximum), and the textual relabelling of the gang-of-thieves offence as the gang-of-robbers offence under Section 313 BNS.

Statutory anchor and the BNS scheme

Section 309(1) BNS opens with the rule of construction: in all robbery there is either theft or extortion. Sub-section (2) explains when theft is robbery — when the offender, for the end of committing or carrying away the theft, voluntarily causes or attempts to cause death, hurt, or wrongful restraint, or fear of instant death, hurt or restraint. Sub-section (3) explains when extortion is robbery — when the offender at the time of the extortion is in the presence of the victim and induces fear of instant death, hurt, or wrongful restraint to him or another. The Explanation defines presence: the offender is present if he is sufficiently near to put the other person in fear of instant death, hurt or restraint. Sub-section (4) supplies the basic punishment — rigorous imprisonment up to ten years and fine; up to fourteen years where the robbery is on the highway between sunset and sunrise. Sub-section (5) punishes the attempt with up to seven years and fine. Sub-section (6) punishes voluntary hurt in robbery with imprisonment for life or up to ten years and fine, with both the actual hurt-causer and any other person jointly concerned in the robbery liable.

Section 310(1) BNS reproduces the dacoity definition — five or more persons conjointly committing or attempting a robbery, with persons present and aiding counted in the five. Sub-section (2) carries the punishment of life imprisonment or up to ten years and fine. Sub-section (3) addresses dacoity with murder, with the BNS innovation of a mandatory minimum of ten years' imprisonment in addition to the death-or-life-or-up-to-ten-years tariff of the IPC predecessor. Sub-section (4) punishes preparation. Sub-section (5) punishes assembly. Sub-section (6) punishes gang membership. Section 311 BNS sets a minimum of seven years where the offender used a deadly weapon, caused grievous hurt, or attempted to cause death or grievous hurt. Section 312 BNS sets the same seven-year floor for the attempt-when-armed pattern. Section 313 BNS punishes membership of a gang of robbers (formerly "thieves") with up to seven years and fine.

The robbery formula — theft plus instant force

The defining mechanism of Section 309 BNS is that robbery is theft (or extortion) plus the element of instant force or fear of instant force. The Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Joseph Mingel Koli, (1997) 2 Crimes 228, parsed the section into five elements that must coexist: (a) the act must be in order to the committing of theft; or (b) in committing the theft; or (c) in carrying away or attempting to carry away property obtained by theft; (d) the offender must do this for that end; and (e) he must voluntarily cause or attempt to cause death, hurt, wrongful restraint, or fear of any of these instantly. The crucial linkage is the "for that end" requirement — the violence must be instrumental to the theft, not merely contemporaneous or subsequent.

The line was drawn classically in Kalio Kerio, (1872) 7 BLR 499, where the accused caused hurt only to escape capture after the theft was complete. The court held that the offence remained theft and did not escalate to robbery — the violence was not for the end of committing the theft. The reasoning carries into Section 309 BNS. The accused who throws stones at a pursuer to deter pursuit is guilty of theft, not robbery. The accused who slaps the victim during the train-snatching to facilitate getting away with the property is guilty of robbery, because the slap was instrumental to the carrying away (Harish Chandra v. State of U.P., AIR 1976 SC 1430).

Theft, extortion, and robbery — the doctrinal triad

The Supreme Court in Venu v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 3 SCC 94, summarised the relationship: robbery is an aggravated form of theft or extortion. The aggravation is the use of violence causing death or fear of death, hurt, or restraint. The violence must be in the course of the theft and not subsequently. Even an attempt to commit violence is enough — the actual infliction is not necessary. The cognate criminal-force regime under Sections 128 to 131 BNS supplies the meaning of the violence element, and the cognate hurt and grievous-hurt provisions of Sections 114 to 125 BNS supply the medical-evidence threshold for the higher-tariff aggravations.

The accidental infliction of injury does not convert theft into robbery. The Code requires that the hurt be caused voluntarily — the cutter who accidentally cuts the wrist of the basket's owner while trying to detach the basket is guilty of theft, not robbery. The voluntariness requirement traces to Section 39 BNS (previously Section 39 IPC) which defines "voluntarily". The cognate general-definitions framework of Section 2 BNS supplies the meanings of "hurt", "grievous hurt", "wrongful restraint", and "injury" — each engaged at every step of the Section 309 BNS analysis.

Dacoity — five or more persons conjointly

Section 310(1) BNS defines dacoity as robbery committed by five or more persons conjointly. The number five is a strict minimum — fewer than five cannot be convicted of dacoity, however clear the conjoint design. The Supreme Court in Raj Kumar v. State of Uttaranchal, (2008) 11 SCC 709, held that where six accused are charged but two are acquitted without a finding that the offence was committed by six persons (and the remaining four were merely unidentified), the four cannot be convicted of dacoity because the strict five-person threshold is not satisfied. Where, by contrast, the trial court records a finding that more than five persons in fact participated and that the identity of some could not be established, the conviction of the identified accused (even if fewer than five) can stand — the rule from Ghamandi v. State of U.P., AIR 1970 All 192.

"Conjointly" is the operative word — it requires united or concerted action. Persons present and aiding at the scene are counted in the five. The mere presence of women living as wives or mistresses with dacoits does not make them members of the gang unless there is evidence that they themselves were associated for the purpose of habitually committing dacoity. The four-stage criminalisation — assembly under Section 310(5) BNS, preparation under Section 310(4) BNS, attempt under Section 310(1) BNS (because attempt to commit dacoity is itself dacoity), and the completed offence under Section 310(2) BNS — was the statutory scheme noted in Dhanpat v. State, AIR 1960 All 18, and is preserved in the BNS without textual change.

Dacoity with murder — Section 310(3) BNS

Section 310(3) BNS reproduces Section 396 IPC and adds the BNS innovation of a mandatory minimum of ten years' imprisonment. The provision is one of the BNS's heaviest collective-liability rules. If any one of the five or more persons conjointly committing dacoity commits murder in so committing dacoity, every one of those persons is punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or rigorous imprisonment of not less than ten years extending to ten years (the BNS innovation tightens what was a discretionary maximum into a mandatory minimum). The Supreme Court in Rafiq Ahmed v. State of U.P., AIR 2011 SC 3114, held that the offence of murder is by specific language incorporated into Section 396 IPC, with the same connotation, meaning, and ingredients as Section 300 IPC — the reasoning carries into Section 310(3) BNS where the cognate provision is now Section 103 BNS.

It is not necessary that the murder be in the immediate presence of all the dacoits or that it be within their previous contemplation. As long as the murder is committed in the course of the dacoity, every dacoit is liable — Samunder Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1965 SC 1545. The exception, as Shyam Behari v. State, 1957 SCR 497, established, is the case where the dacoits are forced to retreat without booty and the murder is committed only by one of them in the course of the retreat — there the actual murderer is liable under Section 103 BNS but the others remain only at the dacoity stage under Section 310(2) BNS. The death penalty has been imposed in particularly heinous fact patterns under the rarest-of-rare framework — Sonu Sardar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 7 SCC 100, upheld death for the killing of five members of a family including two minor children in a planned dacoity-cum-murder.

Aggravation by deadly weapon — Sections 311 and 312 BNS

Section 311 BNS imposes a minimum of seven years' imprisonment where the robbery or dacoity offender uses any deadly weapon, causes grievous hurt, or attempts to cause death or grievous hurt. The Supreme Court has consistently treated the section as regulating punishment, not as creating a new offence. The liability under Section 311 BNS is individual — only the offender who himself uses the weapon or causes the hurt is caught, not the others jointly concerned in the robbery or dacoity. The Court drew the line in Paramjeet Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2001 SC 2827: the section relates only to the offender who actually uses the weapon and has no scope for constructive liability under the cognate common-intention rule of Section 3(5) BNS.

The phrase "uses any deadly weapon" is read broadly. The Supreme Court in Phool Kumar v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1975 SC 905, held that levelling a revolver at a victim is enough — the offender need not fire it. Carrying a knife open to the view of the victims is enough to terrorise them and amounts to use within the section. Bamboo sticks and lathis are not deadly weapons (Dhanai Mahto v. State of Bihar, 2001), and a toy pistol mistaken for a real one is not within the section either (Babulal Jairam Maurya v. State of Maharashtra, 1993). Section 312 BNS sets the same seven-year minimum for the attempt-when-armed pattern — the offender attempted robbery or dacoity while armed with a deadly weapon, even if no actual robbery was completed and no actual use of the weapon followed.

Voluntary hurt in robbery — Section 309(6) BNS

Section 309(6) BNS imposes life imprisonment or rigorous imprisonment up to ten years and fine where any person, in committing or attempting to commit robbery, voluntarily causes hurt — and importantly, the section extends liability to any other person jointly concerned in the robbery even if that person did not himself cause the hurt. The Supreme Court in Aslam v. State of Rajasthan, (2008) 9 SCC 227, drew the contrast: Section 309(6) BNS classifies two distinct categories of persons — those who actually cause hurt and those who do not but are jointly concerned. The second class become liable independently of the knowledge of the likelihood of hurt or a reasonable belief in its probability. The provision is therefore the principal vehicle by which co-robbers are made vicariously liable for hurt caused by one of them, in contrast with Section 311 BNS which imposes individual liability only.

Gang membership — Sections 310(6) and 313 BNS

Section 310(6) BNS punishes membership of a gang of persons associated for the purpose of habitually committing dacoity. Section 313 BNS punishes membership of a gang of persons associated for the purpose of habitually committing theft or robbery (the BNS replaces the IPC's "thieves" with "robbers" in the heading and adopts the broader formulation). The Supreme Court in Bhima Shaw v. Emperor, AIR 1956 Cal 470, established the meaning of "belong" — something more than casual association for one or two dacoities. The expression refers to those who habitually associate with a gang of dacoits and actively assist them in their operations. The Code's purpose is to break up organised gangs by criminalising the membership itself, regardless of whether the member participated in any specific dacoity.

The cognate offences of Section 111 BNS on organised crime and Section 112 BNS on petty organised crime have, since 1 July 2024, broadened the field considerably. Section 310(6) and Section 313 BNS now operate alongside the wider organised-crime regime, with the choice of charge depending on whether the syndicate's pattern fits the gang-of-dacoits formula or the wider organised-crime definition.

Procedure, presumption, and recovery

All offences in this cluster are cognizable and non-bailable. Section 309 BNS basic offences are triable by a Magistrate of the First Class or Sessions Court depending on the tariff; Section 310 BNS is triable by a Court of Sessions throughout. Investigation under the BNSS proceeds in the usual way for cognizable offences, with the additional procedural protections of test identification parade and prompt recovery of stolen property. The presumption under Section 119 BSA (previously Section 114(a) IEA) operates strongly in this cluster — when stolen property is recovered from an accused soon after the commission of robbery or dacoity, the court may presume that he is the thief, robber, or recipient knowing the property to be stolen, depending on the surrounding circumstances. The Supreme Court in Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1983 SC 446, applied the presumption to a one-year-old recovery where the absconding of the accused supplied the explanation of the delay.

Recovery of the property is governed by the BNSS provisions on disposal, with stolen property restored to the rightful owner and innocent purchasers compensated where possible. The cognate criminal-conspiracy provisions of Section 61 BNS are routinely added in dacoity charge-sheets, and the cognate abetment provisions of Sections 45 to 60 BNS apply to those who instigated or facilitated the offence without being present.

Defences and the cognate field

The defences track the ingredients. Absence of dishonest intention (the foundation of any theft-based robbery) is the principal defence — the bona fide claim of right works in robbery prosecutions just as it works in theft. The Supreme Court in G. Raminadin v. State of A.P., AIR 1980 SC 1944, qualified the defence in dacoity prosecutions — the accused must show that the belief in his right was reasonable and was based on some documents and title, however weak. The defences of mistaken identity (often raised in dacoity cases where the test identification parade is delayed or defective), of alibi, and of contradictory eyewitness testimony are commonly invoked. The cognate general exceptions framework of Sections 14 to 44 BNS applies in principle but rarely succeeds — private defence does not extend to violent property-taking, necessity does not authorise robbery, and intoxication does not excuse a voluntary criminal act.

Sentencing patterns and the BNS innovations

Sentencing across the cluster reflects the gravity gradient. Section 309(4) BNS basic robbery typically attracts five to ten years; the highway-at-night aggravation pushes the maximum to fourteen years. Section 309(6) BNS hurt-in-robbery typically attracts seven to ten years. Section 310(2) BNS dacoity typically attracts seven to ten years; life imprisonment is reserved for cases involving particular brutality or repeat conduct. Section 310(3) BNS dacoity-with-murder now carries the BNS-introduced mandatory minimum of ten years, with life imprisonment or death available for the rarest-of-rare cases. Sections 311 and 312 BNS impose seven-year minimums for the deadly-weapon aggravations. The wider sentencing framework of Sections 4 to 13 BNS on punishments applies. Compounding is not permitted in any offence in the cluster — Shiji v. Radhika, (2012) 1 SCC 159, established that even Section 394 IPC (now Section 309(6) BNS) is non-compoundable, though the High Court may quash proceedings under its inherent jurisdiction in light of a parties' compromise.

Exam angle and quick recap

For any objective question on this cluster, the four anchors are: the rule of construction in Section 309(1) BNS that all robbery is theft or extortion; the five-element analysis from Joseph Mingel Koli with the for-that-end requirement; the strict five-person threshold for dacoity (Raj Kumar v. Uttaranchal); and the BNS innovations — the mandatory ten-year minimum in Section 310(3) BNS for dacoity-with-murder, and the textual relabelling of "thieves" as "robbers" in Section 313 BNS. For prelims-style questions the most often-tested points are the four-stage criminalisation of dacoity (assembly, preparation, attempt, completed), the individual-versus-vicarious liability distinction between Sections 311 BNS and 309(6) BNS, and the broad reading of "deadly weapon" in Phool Kumar. For mains-style answers the BNS reform of mandatory minimum sentencing for dacoity-with-murder and the doctrinal architecture of the cluster as a graduated escalation from theft are the headline reform points.

Frequently asked questions

What turns theft into robbery under Section 309 BNS?

The voluntary causing or attempting to cause death, hurt or wrongful restraint, or fear of any of these instantly, in order to commit the theft or in carrying away the property obtained by it. The Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Joseph Mingel Koli, (1997) 2 Crimes 228, parsed the section into five elements that must coexist — the violence must be instrumental to the theft, not merely contemporaneous or subsequent. Where the hurt is caused only to escape capture after the theft is complete, the offence remains theft and does not escalate to robbery.

Is the strict five-person threshold for dacoity displaced by an acquittal of some accused?

Only where the trial court records a finding that more than five persons in fact participated and that the identity of some could not be established. The Supreme Court in Raj Kumar v. State of Uttaranchal, (2008) 11 SCC 709, held that where six accused are charged but two are acquitted without such a finding, the remaining four cannot be convicted of dacoity. The contrasting position — Ghamandi v. State of U.P., AIR 1970 All 192 — applies where the trial court does record the finding that the participants exceeded five with some unidentified.

What is the BNS innovation in Section 310(3) BNS on dacoity with murder?

A mandatory minimum sentence. The IPC predecessor under Section 396 carried death, life imprisonment, or rigorous imprisonment 'for a term which may extend to ten years' — leaving the trial court free to impose a lesser sentence in suitable cases. Section 310(3) BNS now adds that the imprisonment 'shall not be less than ten years', tightening what was a discretionary maximum into a mandatory minimum. The death-or-life options remain available for cases meeting the rarest-of-rare framework, but the floor for any imprisonment sentence is now fixed at ten years.

Is the use of a deadly weapon under Section 311 BNS individual or vicarious in liability?

Individual only. The Supreme Court in Paramjeet Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2001 SC 2827, drew the line — Section 397 IPC (now Section 311 BNS) relates only to the offender who actually uses the weapon and has no scope for constructive liability. The contrast is with Section 309(6) BNS (previously Section 394 IPC) on voluntary hurt in robbery, which is both individual and vicarious — the hurt-causer and any other person jointly concerned in the robbery are both liable. The choice of charge between Sections 311 BNS and 309(6) BNS therefore turns on whether vicarious liability is sought.

Does carrying a knife in view of the victim amount to 'use' of a deadly weapon?

Yes. The Supreme Court in Phool Kumar v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1975 SC 905, held that the offender need not actively brandish or fire the weapon — carrying a knife open to the view of the victim is sufficient use within Section 397 IPC (now Section 311 BNS) to terrorise him. The same applies to a revolver levelled at the victim without firing. The reasoning is consistent with the broader textual purpose of the section — to deter the carrying of deadly weapons in the course of robbery or dacoity. A toy pistol mistaken for a real one, however, is not a deadly weapon (Babulal Jairam Maurya, 1993).