Criminal Force and Assault

Sections 128 to 131 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) — re-enacting Sections 349 to 358 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 — define and graduate the offences below the threshold of hurt and grievous hurt. Force, criminal force and assault occupy the conceptual space between physical injury and mere intimidation. They are the offences that the law uses when there is no actual hurt but the victim's bodily integrity, security or dignity has been violated by the defendant's voluntary act.

The chapter is short — four BNS sections covering the IPC's original ten — but it is doctrinally rich. The definitions of force in Section 128 BNS and criminal force in Section 129 BNS are the most carefully drafted in the entire Code; they have changed little since 1860, and the BNS retains them substantively unchanged. Assault under Section 130 BNS is the offence that captures the apprehension of force — the threat that has not yet ripened into actual contact. The aggravated forms in the parallel sections — assault to deter a public servant, assault with intent to dishonour, assault to commit theft, assault to wrongfully confine, and assault on grave provocation — give the chapter its operational bite.

Statutory anchor and scheme

Section 128 BNS (previously Section 349 IPC) defines force. Section 129 BNS (previously Section 350 IPC) defines criminal force. Section 130 BNS (previously Section 351 IPC) defines assault. Section 131 BNS (previously Section 352 IPC) prescribes the punishment for assault or criminal force otherwise than on grave provocation. The BNS makes one drafting refinement in Section 128 — the IPC's "First, Secondly, Thirdly" become clauses (a), (b) and (c) — and raises the fine in Section 131 from five hundred to one thousand rupees. The aggravated and mitigated forms — IPC Sections 353 to 358 — carry forward as further sections in the BNS chapter, with similar drafting refinements and fine increases.

The conceptual hierarchy is important. Force is the genus — the bare causing of motion, change of motion or cessation of motion to another, by one's bodily power, by disposing of any substance, or by inducing an animal. Criminal force is force used intentionally, without consent, in order to commit an offence or with intention or knowledge that injury, fear or annoyance will result. Assault is the gesture or preparation that causes the apprehension of imminent criminal force — the threat without the contact. The three sections build a graduated structure that the case-law has explored in detail.

Force — Section 128 BNS

Section 128 BNS (previously Section 349 IPC) defines force as causing motion, change of motion or cessation of motion to another, or causing any substance to come into contact with any part of another's body, or with anything that other is wearing or carrying. The contact must affect the other's sense of feeling. The force must be brought about by one of three means — bodily power, the disposition of substances such that motion follows without further act, or the inducement of an animal.

Three ingredients matter. First, force must be applied to a person, not to an inanimate object. The Lahore line in Bihari Lal (1934) — "force contemplates the presence of the person to whom it is used" — remains the operative rule. The Kerala High Court in Devaki Amma v. State (1981) confirmed the same: criminal force is force applied to a person, not to an inanimate object or substance. Second, the contact must affect the sense of feeling — direct or mediated, but always perceived. Third, the means of application is one of three — bodily power, substance-disposition, or animal-inducement; nothing else qualifies.

Criminal force — Section 129 BNS

Section 129 BNS (previously Section 350 IPC) makes force criminal where two further conditions are met. First, the force must be intentional and without the consent of the person to whom it is used. Second, it must be used either (a) in order to commit an offence, or (b) with the intention to cause, or knowledge of likelihood of causing, injury, fear or annoyance to the person. The Patna High Court in S. P. Mallik v. State of Orissa (1982) restated the architecture: the criminal force contemplated is force as applied to a person, not to a substance.

The Code's eight illustrations to Section 350 IPC — carried forward into Section 129 BNS — exemplify the breadth of the offence. Unfastening the moorings of a boat to set it adrift; lashing horses to quicken their pace; seizing the pole of a palanquin to stop it; intentionally pushing against a person in the street; throwing a stone that strikes water and dashes water against the victim; pulling up a woman's veil; pouring boiling water into a person's bath; inciting a dog to spring upon a person — each is criminal force. The breadth of the definition reflects the Code's intent to capture every substantial violation of bodily integrity that falls short of hurt.

Bhupinder Singh v. State of Punjab (1997) — where the petitioners snatched and tore ballot papers from the custody of public servants — was held to be criminal force. Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill (AIR 1996 SC 309) — the Supreme Court line on workplace harassment — reaffirmed that Section 352 is a minor offence in relation to Section 354 IPC; the latter (now Section 74 BNS) includes the ingredients of the former.

Slight criminal force — Section 95 IPC carry-over

The general exception under Section 95 IPC — now Section 33 BNS — that an act causing only slight harm of a kind that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of, is no offence, applies to criminal force as it does to any other harm. The combined effect of Section 129 BNS and Section 33 BNS is to set a de minimis threshold: trivial pushes, accidental brushes, and the routine jostlings of everyday life fall outside the criminal-force offence. The threshold connects the chapter to the foundational general-exceptions framework.

Assault — Section 130 BNS

Section 130 BNS (previously Section 351 IPC) defines assault as the making of any gesture or any preparation, intending or knowing it likely that the gesture or preparation will cause any person present to apprehend that the maker is about to use criminal force. The Explanation provides that mere words do not amount to an assault, but words may give a gesture or preparation a meaning that makes it an assault.

The English law foundation and the Indian formulation

The English law on assault was articulated by Tindal CJ in Stephens v. Myers (1830): a person advancing in a threatening attitude with intention to strike, who would have struck but for being stopped, commits an assault even though at the moment of stopping he was not yet near enough for the blow to take effect. The Indian Code transposes the same principle into the gesture-or-preparation formulation. Rupabati v. Shyama (1958, Cut) confirmed that a threat constitutes assault — actual hurt is not required. Swadesh Mahato (1979, Pat) held that pointing a loaded pistol at another is assault under Section 130 BNS, punishable under Section 131 BNS, even where it does not amount to attempt to murder.

Three ingredients

The section requires: (i) the making of a gesture or preparation by the accused in the presence of another; (ii) the intention or knowledge of likelihood that such gesture or preparation will cause the other to apprehend imminent criminal force; (iii) the apprehension must be of force from the maker, not from a third party. The Lucknow Full Bench in Muneshwar Bux Singh (1938) clarified the third point — where the accused himself did nothing that came under the definition of assault, but his followers advanced threateningly at his gesture, the offence of assault by the principal is not made out unless the apprehension arises from the principal's own conduct.

Words and gestures

The Explanation's rule that mere words do not amount to assault, but words may colour gestures, is the operational rule. The Bombay line in AC Cama v. HF Morgan (1864) held that words may also prevent a gesture from amounting to assault — for example, a threat coupled with the words "if you do not leave, I will hit you" indicates a conditional and future use of force, not the immediate use that the section requires. Birbal Khalifa (1902) followed the same line — preparation taken with words causing apprehension that force would be used only if the victim persisted in a particular course is not assault, absent evidence of intention to use force then and there.

The Kerala line in Mathew v. State of Kerala (1993) — where the accused armed with a sharp-edged weapon hurled a challenge from some distance threatening to kill the victim — held that the manner of the challenge, taken with the gesture, was assault under Section 351 IPC, justifying the victim's retaliation in self-defence. The connection between the chapter and the right of private defence is here at its sharpest: assault triggers the right of defence, even before any criminal force is used.

Punishment for assault or criminal force — Section 131 BNS

Section 131 BNS (previously Section 352 IPC) provides imprisonment up to three months or fine up to one thousand rupees (raised from the IPC's five hundred), or both, for assault or use of criminal force otherwise than on grave and sudden provocation. The Explanation — identical with Exception 1 to Section 101 BNS on murder — provides that grave and sudden provocation does not mitigate the offence if the provocation is sought or voluntarily provoked, given by anything done in obedience to the law, given by a public servant in lawful exercise of his powers, or given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence.

The section therefore graduates the punishment by reference to the same provocation framework that runs through Section 122 BNS (hurt on provocation) and Exception 1 to Section 101 BNS (murder reduced to culpable homicide not amounting to murder by provocation). The entire architecture of provocation in the BNS is conceptually unified — the deeper-dive sits in the chapter on the exceptions to murder.

Assault on a public servant

The IPC Section 353 — assault or criminal force to deter a public servant from discharge of his duty — carries forward in Section 132 BNS, attracting up to two years and fine. The provision protects only public servants acting in the execution of duty, and the Calcutta line in Raman Singh v. State (1900) holds that the section will not protect an act done in good faith under colour of office where the act exceeds lawful duty. Where hurt is caused, the parallel offence in Section 121 BNS (previously Sections 332 or 333 IPC) applies — the relationship is one of overlapping but distinct provisions, addressed in the dedicated chapter on bodily-injury offences against public servants. The compounding regime under Section 320 BNSS for these offences is the same as for the underlying hurt-related sections, and where settlement between the parties is reached, the High Court's inherent power may be invoked to quash the proceedings on appropriate facts.

The Supreme Court in Chandrika Sao (AIR 1967 SC 170) — the Sales Tax inspection case where the accused snatched account books from an Assistant Superintendent of Commercial Taxes — held that the act amounted to use of criminal force on a public servant in execution of duty. Manumiya v. State (AIR 1979 SC 1706) — where a Deputy Sarpanch kicked a transport-department driver — held that driving or standing by the bus is public duty, and the kick was Section 353 IPC. The Madhya Pradesh line in Bhairon Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2010) sustained Section 353 IPC where the accused created hindrance in police duties to avoid arrest.

The line is drawn elsewhere too. State of HP v. Durga (1980) — resistance to an illegal order of attachment — held to be no offence under Section 353 IPC because the public servant was not acting in lawful execution of duty. State of Karnataka v. M. Chandrappa (1987) — assault on a peon enforcing an executive order without statutory backing — held that the rules did not have the force of law and the public servant was therefore not in execution of duty. State of Tripura v. Sashimohan (1977) — assault on a forest officer making an arrest outside the five-mile zone — held that the arrest was unauthorised and the offence not made out. The Supreme Court in Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka (2015) — Facebook posts criticising police — held that mere expression without intention to cause alarm is insufficient.

Section 353 IPC versus Section 186 IPC

The Kerala line in Devaki Amma v. State (1981) drew the conceptual distinction. Section 353 IPC requires criminal force or assault on a public servant in execution of duty — a cognizable offence. Section 186 IPC requires only voluntary obstruction of a public servant in the discharge of his duties — a non-cognizable offence. The two offences are of different quality: Section 186 deals with contempt of lawful authority, addressed in the chapter on contempts of lawful authority; Section 353 deals with offences affecting the human body. A mere obstruction or resistance unaccompanied by criminal force or assault will not constitute Section 353 IPC; mere obstruction without force is Section 186 IPC.

Assault to outrage modesty — Section 354 IPC and the BNS reformulation

Section 354 IPC carries forward in the BNS as Section 74 BNS — assault or criminal force to a woman with intent to outrage her modesty. The 2013 amendment to the IPC raised the punishment to a minimum of one year and a maximum of five years. The full doctrinal treatment of modesty offences and the related provisions on sexual harassment, voyeurism and stalking sits in the dedicated chapters on sexual harassment, voyeurism and stalking. For the present chapter, two structural points matter. First, the offence requires the use of criminal force as defined in Section 129 BNS; without the actus reus of force, Section 354 IPC is not made out. Second, the Supreme Court in Aman Kumar v. State of Haryana (AIR 2004 SC 1497) and Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill (AIR 1996 SC 309) confirmed that knowledge that modesty is likely to be outraged is sufficient — deliberate intention is not required.

Assault to dishonour, to commit theft, to wrongfully confine

The IPC Sections 355, 356 and 357 carry forward in the BNS as parallel aggravated forms. Section 355 IPC (now Section 133 BNS) — assault or criminal force with intent to dishonour, otherwise than on grave provocation — attracts up to two years. The Allahabad case Altaf Mian (1907) — where an accused under trial struck a Sub-Inspector giving evidence against him — illustrates the dishonour-intent requirement. Section 356 IPC (now Section 134 BNS) — assault in attempt to commit theft of property carried by a person — attracts up to two years. Section 357 IPC (now Section 135 BNS) — assault in attempt to wrongfully confine — attracts up to one year and connects the chapter directly to the wrongful-restraint chapter. Section 358 IPC (now Section 136 BNS) — assault on grave provocation — attracts up to one month and is the parallel mitigated offence.

Selected leading authorities

Definition and ingredients: Bihari Lal (1934), Devaki Amma (1981), S. P. Mallik (1982), Bhupinder Singh (1997). Assault — common-law foundation: Stephens v. Myers (1830), Rupabati v. Shyama (1958), Swadesh Mahato (1979). Apprehension and presence: Muneshwar Bux Singh (1938), Mathew v. State of Kerala (1993). Words and gestures: AC Cama v. HF Morgan (1864), Birbal Khalifa (1902). Modesty: Aman Kumar (2004), Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Gill (1996), State of Punjab v. Major Singh (1967), Tarkeshwar Sahu (2006), Kanwar Pal S. Gill (2005), Kailas v. State of Maharashtra (2011). Section 353 IPC: Chandrika Sao (1967), Manumiya (1979), State of UP v. Sant Prakash (1976, FB), State of HP v. Durga (1980), Manik Taneja (2015), Bhairon Singh (2010). Section 353 versus 186: Devaki Amma (1981).

Procedural side, sentencing and exam angle

The basic offences under Sections 130 and 131 BNS are non-cognizable, bailable and triable by any Magistrate; the aggravated forms are cognizable and triable by a Magistrate of the first class. Compounding is available with the permission of the court for the basic forms but not for the aggravated forms involving public servants. Three lines of question recur. First, the conceptual hierarchy of force, criminal force and assault — candidates must be able to distinguish the three sections, identify the ingredients of each, and apply the framework to a fact-pattern. Second, the gesture-or-preparation rule and the words-and-gestures architecture in Section 130 BNS — the Stephens v. Myers foundation, the Mathew line on words colouring gestures, and the AC Cama rule on words preventing gestures from being assault. Third, the public-servant offence in Section 132 BNS — the lawful-execution-of-duty requirement, the dividing line with Section 186 IPC (now Section 211 BNS, addressed in the chapter on contempts), and the Supreme Court's modern restatements on the limits of the section. Cross-cutting questions on the relationship with the modesty offence (Section 354 IPC, now Section 74 BNS), the kidnapping chapter (Section 357 IPC's connection to kidnapping and abduction), and the provocation framework that runs through Sections 131, 122 BNS and Exception 1 to Section 101 BNS appear regularly. Candidates writing answers should always remember the two threshold rules — the force must be applied to a person, and the apprehension in assault must be of force from the maker, not from a third party — and should connect the chapter back to the definitions clause in Section 2 BNS for the meaning of "voluntarily" and "injury".

Frequently asked questions

What is the difference between force, criminal force and assault?

Force, defined in Section 128 BNS (previously Section 349 IPC), is the bare causing of motion, change of motion or cessation of motion to another by bodily power, substance-disposition or animal-inducement. Criminal force, defined in Section 129 BNS (previously Section 350 IPC), is force used intentionally, without consent, in order to commit an offence or with intention or knowledge of causing injury, fear or annoyance. Assault, defined in Section 130 BNS (previously Section 351 IPC), is the gesture or preparation that causes the apprehension of imminent criminal force. The three sections build a graduated structure: force is the genus, criminal force adds mens rea and lack of consent, and assault captures the threat without the contact.

Do mere words amount to an assault under Section 130 BNS?

No, but words may give gestures or preparation a meaning that makes them an assault. The Explanation to Section 130 BNS makes the rule explicit: mere words do not amount to assault, but the words used may give gestures such a meaning as to make those gestures amount to assault. Conversely, the Bombay line in AC Cama v. HF Morgan (1864) holds that words may also prevent a gesture from amounting to assault — for example, a threat coupled with conditional language indicates future and not immediate use of force. Illustration (c) to the section — A taking up a stick saying "I will give you a beating" — exemplifies the rule.

When is criminal force used on a public servant within Section 132 BNS?

When criminal force is used on a public servant who is acting in the execution of his duty, or with intent to deter him from his duty, or in consequence of anything done in lawful discharge of his duty. The Supreme Court in Chandrika Sao (AIR 1967 SC 170) — the Sales Tax inspection case — held that snatching account books from an Assistant Superintendent of Commercial Taxes was Section 353 IPC. The line is drawn at lawful execution of duty: where the public servant exceeds his lawful authority — as in State of HP v. Durga (1980) and State of Karnataka v. M. Chandrappa (1987) — the section does not apply, and the citizen's right of private defence may be available.

Is pointing a loaded pistol at another person assault?

Yes. The Patna High Court in Swadesh Mahato (1979) held that pointing a loaded pistol at another is assault within Section 351 IPC — now Section 130 BNS — and is punishable under Section 352 IPC, even where it does not amount to attempt to murder under Section 307 IPC. The act is a preparation by the accused that causes the victim to apprehend the imminent use of criminal force. Whether the same conduct also amounts to attempt to murder turns on the further test in Section 307 IPC — whether the act, had it succeeded, would have constituted murder under Section 300 IPC. The answer connects the chapter to the foundational distinction between criminal force and the homicide offences.

What is the difference between Section 353 IPC and Section 186 IPC?

The Kerala line in Devaki Amma v. State (1981) drew the conceptual distinction. Section 353 IPC requires criminal force or assault on a public servant in execution of duty — it is a cognizable offence and sits in Chapter XVI on offences affecting the human body. Section 186 IPC requires only voluntary obstruction of a public servant in the discharge of his duties — it is non-cognizable and sits in Chapter X on contempts of lawful authority. The two offences differ in quality: Section 353 requires force or assault, Section 186 only requires obstruction. A mere obstruction or resistance unaccompanied by criminal force will not constitute Section 353 IPC; mere obstruction without force is Section 186 IPC.