Kidnapping, Abduction, Slavery, Forced Labour

Sections 137 to 146 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) — re-enacting Sections 359 to 374 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — group every offence in which the victim's body is itself the object of the crime: removed from a guardian, carried beyond the country's limits, secreted away for ransom, sold for begging or prostitution, trafficked, enslaved, or compelled to labour against the will. The thread that runs through the cluster is liberty — the freedom of movement, the freedom from being made an object of commerce. Where Sections 126 and 127 BNS protect liberty against confinement at one end of the spectrum, Sections 137 to 146 BNS protect it at the other end where the person is moved, sold, or kept.

The architecture is layered. Sections 137 and 138 BNS supply the two definitions — kidnapping and abduction. Section 140 BNS adds aggravation by listing four contumacious purposes for which the kidnapping or abduction may be done. Sections 142 to 146 BNS pick up post-kidnapping conduct — concealment, trafficking, exploitation, slavery, forced labour. The student is expected to keep the definitional sections distinct from the aggravated forms, because each turns on a different mens rea.

Statutory anchor and scheme

The cluster sits inside Chapter VI of BNS — Of Offences Affecting the Human Body — alongside the life offences in Sections 100 to 113 BNS and the restraint and confinement offences in Sections 126 to 127 BNS. The legislature retained almost the entire IPC scheme, but introduced four kinds of changes that the exam-aspirant must hold in mind.

1. Gender neutrality. Section 137(1)(b) BNS replaces the IPC's age-and-sex bifurcation (under sixteen if male, under eighteen if female) with the single word child. The same gender-neutral substitution is carried into Section 139 BNS (begging), Section 143 BNS (trafficking) and Section 144 BNS (exploitation of trafficked person). After 1 July 2024 there is no statutory distinction between a kidnapped boy and a kidnapped girl below eighteen.
2. Stiffer punishment for begging. Section 139 BNS adds the word rigorous before imprisonment and extends the upper limit to imprisonment for the remainder of the convict's natural life. The IPC's clause 4(b) of the begging definition was excluded.
3. Boys included in importation. Section 141 BNS rewrites Section 366B IPC by adding the words any boy under the age of eighteen years; the predecessor protected only girls.
4. Heavier exploitation sentence. Section 144 BNS raises the upper limit of imprisonment for exploitation of a trafficked person from seven years to ten years for sub-section (1), and from five to seven years for sub-section (2).

Outside the 137–146 numerical block, two cognate sections sit in the same chapter and complete the picture: Section 87 BNS (kidnapping or abducting a woman to compel marriage, etc., earlier Section 366 IPC) and Section 96 BNS (procuration of a child, earlier Section 366A IPC). Both must be read alongside the trafficking provision because the same fact-pattern frequently spills across them.

Kidnapping — the two species under Section 137 BNS

Section 137(1) BNS opens with a deceptively short clause. Kidnapping, it declares, is of two kinds — kidnapping from India and kidnapping from lawful guardianship. The literal meaning of kidnapping is child-stealing; the statutory meaning is wider on one limb (any person, when the conveyance is beyond India) and narrower on the other (only a child, when the taking is from a guardian).

Kidnapping from India — Section 137(1)(a) BNS

Earlier Section 360 IPC, this clause is conveying any person beyond the limits of India without that person's consent, or the consent of a person legally authorised to consent on his behalf. Two ingredients are exhaustive — conveyance beyond the territorial limit, and absence of consent. The provision applies to a grown-up as well as to a child; if the person is above the age threshold and personally consents, no offence is committed.

Kidnapping from lawful guardianship — Section 137(1)(b) BNS

This is the centre of gravity. Earlier Section 361 IPC, the provision punishes whoever takes or entices a child or a person of unsound mind out of the keeping of the lawful guardian without the guardian's consent. The Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Raja Ram, AIR 1973 SC 819, restated the four ingredients that recur in every fact-pattern: (i) taking or enticing a minor or a person of unsound mind, (ii) the minor being below the statutory age, (iii) the taking being out of the keeping of a lawful guardian, and (iv) the absence of the guardian's consent. The consent of the minor is wholly immaterial; only the guardian's consent takes the case out of the provision.

The Court in S. Varadarajan v. State of Madras, AIR 1965 SC 942, drew a careful line between taking and merely allowing: a person who allows a minor who has already left the guardian's protection to accompany him commits no offence. Active solicitation or persuasion is required, even if no force or fraud is used. T.D. Vadgama v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1973 SC 2313, refined this further — earlier persuasion that planted the desire to leave the guardian is enough, even if no active part is played at the moment of departure. Prakash v. State of Haryana, (2004) 1 SCC 339, restates the rule.

The exception clause survives intact: a person who in good faith believes himself to be the father of an illegitimate child, or to be entitled to lawful custody of the child, is not guilty unless the act is for an immoral or unlawful purpose. Vipin Menon v. State of Karnataka, 1992 Cr LJ 3737 (Kant), held that a father not divested of guardianship cannot be guilty of kidnapping his own minor child.

Two doctrinal points carry forward into examiners' question-papers. First, the offence is complete the moment the child is actually taken; it does not continue while the child is kept out of guardianship — the distinction matters for limitation under the general definitions and continuity rules. Second, the absence of mens rea about the child's age is no defence — anyone dealing with such a person does so at his peril, and bona fide belief that the person was older is irrelevant (Christian Olifier, (1866) 10 Cox 402, applied in Pravakar v. Ajaya Kumar Das, 1996 Cr LJ 2626 (Ori)).

Section 137(2) BNS prescribes the punishment — imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, with fine. The IPC text was identical (Section 363 IPC), and is now folded as a sub-section of Section 137 BNS.

Abduction — Section 138 BNS

Section 138 BNS is the verbatim re-enactment of Section 362 IPC. Whoever by force compels, or by deceitful means induces, any person to go from any place is said to abduct that person. There is no offence as bare abduction; abduction is an auxiliary act, criminal only when done with one of the contumacious intents specified in Section 140 BNS or Section 87 BNS. Force or fraud is essential — mere persuasion of an adult is not abduction. Subhash Krishnan v. State of Goa, (2012) 8 SCC 365, confirms that the gravamen lies in the use of force or deceit to compel or induce movement.

The classical kidnapping-versus-abduction comparison restated by the Orissa High Court in Biswanath Mallick v. State of Orissa, 1995 Cr LJ 1416 (Ori), still governs:

1. Kidnapping under Section 137(1)(b) BNS is committed only against a child or a person of unsound mind; abduction under Section 138 BNS is against a person of any age.
2. Kidnapping requires removal from lawful guardianship; abduction has reference exclusively to the person abducted.
3. In kidnapping the means used may be innocent; in abduction force, compulsion or deceit must be shown.
4. In kidnapping the consent of the person taken is immaterial; in abduction the free and voluntary consent of the person moved condones the act.
5. In kidnapping the offender's intent is irrelevant; in abduction it is the all-important factor.
6. Kidnapping from guardianship is a substantive offence; abduction is auxiliary, punishable only when paired with one of the intents in Section 140 BNS or Section 87 BNS.

Aggravated kidnapping or abduction — Section 140 BNS

Section 140 BNS folds four IPC provisions into a single section with four sub-sections, and is the workhorse of this entire chapter. Each sub-section specifies a contumacious purpose; once the purpose is proved, the punishment ratchets up sharply.

Section 140(1) BNS — kidnapping or abducting in order to murder

Earlier Section 364 IPC, this sub-section punishes kidnapping or abduction with the intent that the person may be murdered or so disposed of as to be put in danger of being murdered. The Supreme Court in Badshah v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 3 SCC 681, restated the ingredients and added an evidentiary rule of considerable practical reach: where abduction is proved and the victim is found murdered soon after, or is not seen again for years, the court can draw the presumption that the abductor caused the death. The accused must then explain what was done with the victim. Section 108 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (now Section 111 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023) supplies the seven-year disappearance presumption that the Court applied. Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab, 2001 Cr LJ 1734 (SC), and State of M.P. v. Lattora, (2003) 11 SCC 761, are the line of authority.

Section 140(2) BNS — kidnapping for ransom

Earlier Section 364A IPC, inserted by the 1993 amendment to deal with terrorist kidnappings for ransom, this sub-section attracts the death penalty or imprisonment for life. The Supreme Court in Malleshi v. State of Karnataka, (2004) 8 SCC 95, set out three ingredients: kidnapping, abduction or detention; keeping under custody; and the purpose being ransom — which means the demand has to be communicated. Sunder @ Sundararajan v. State, (2013) 3 SCC 215, held that the death penalty is contemplated even where the kidnapping for ransom does not result in death, because the threat of death itself attracts the higher punishment. Vikram Singh v. Union of India, 2015 Cr LJ 4500, upheld the constitutionality of the punishment scale.

Two distinctions are exam-relevant. First, the offence under Section 140(2) BNS requires both kidnapping and a ransom demand; Section 140(1) BNS requires only kidnapping with murderous intent. The ingredients are different and a charge under one cannot sustain a conviction under the other (Anil v. Administration of Daman & Diu, (2006) 13 SCC 36). Second, every fresh ransom call sets a fresh limitation period running, even after the victim's death — Vikas Chaudhary v. State of NCT of Delhi, AIR 2010 SC 3380.

Section 140(3) BNS — kidnapping for secret and wrongful confinement

Earlier Section 365 IPC, this sub-section punishes kidnapping or abduction with the intent that the victim be secretly and wrongfully confined. Punishment is up to seven years. Fiyaz Ahmad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1990 SC 2147, held that where a woman was abducted from her house and confined at one place until recovered by the police, conviction lay under this sub-section read with the concealment provision (now Section 142 BNS), but not under the marriage-compulsion section. The procedural counterpart for arrest in such kidnapping-and-confinement cases now sits in the wrongful confinement framework of Sections 126 to 127 BNS.

Section 140(4) BNS — kidnapping for grievous hurt, slavery or unnatural lust

Earlier Section 367 IPC, this sub-section punishes kidnapping or abduction with intent that the victim may be subjected to grievous hurt under Section 116 BNS, or to slavery, or to the unnatural lust of any person. The maximum punishment is ten years and fine. The slavery limb of this sub-section now overlaps with Section 145 BNS (habitual slave-dealing) and Section 143 BNS (trafficking), and prosecutors typically charge under all three where the facts disclose movement, exploitation and trade.

Trafficking of persons — Section 143 BNS

Section 143 BNS re-enacts the IPC's expanded Section 370 (as substituted by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013), with the lone change of replacing minor by child. Trafficking is committed when, for the purpose of exploitation, a person recruits, transports, harbours, transfers or receives another by using threats, force or any other form of coercion, by abduction, by fraud or deception, by abuse of power, or by inducement including payments to a person having control over the victim. Exploitation is widely defined to include physical exploitation, sexual exploitation, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude, and forced removal of organs.

Two doctrinal carry-overs are decisive in practice. First, the consent of the victim is immaterial — Explanation 2 says so in terms. Second, the punishment scale rises with the number of victims and the involvement of public servants. Trafficking of one person attracts seven to ten years; of more than one, ten years to life; of a child, ten years to life; of more than one child, fourteen years to life; a second-time conviction for child trafficking attracts imprisonment for the remainder of the convict's natural life; and where a public servant or police officer is involved, the same enhanced punishment applies.

Exploitation of a trafficked person — Section 144 BNS

Section 144 BNS rewrites Section 370A IPC by raising the punishment ceiling. Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that a child has been trafficked, engages such child for sexual exploitation is now punishable with rigorous imprisonment of not less than five years extending up to ten years (the IPC ceiling was seven). For exploitation of a trafficked adult, the range moves from three to seven years (the IPC ceiling was five). The shift signals a clear sentencing-policy choice: the legislature treats the user of trafficked labour or sex as nearly as culpable as the trafficker.

Slavery — Section 145 BNS

Section 145 BNS re-enacts Section 371 IPC verbatim. Whoever habitually imports, exports, removes, buys, sells, traffics or deals in slaves is punishable with imprisonment for life or imprisonment of either description up to ten years and fine. The provision targets the professional slave-trader, while Section 143 BNS picks up the casual or first-time offender. The word habitually is the gating element — a single transaction will not attract Section 145 BNS, though it may attract Sections 140(4) or 143 BNS.

Constitutional context bears mention. Article 23 of the Constitution prohibits traffic in human beings, begar and other similar forms of forced labour. The Supreme Court in People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 1473, gave the Article a wide reading: any payment of wages below the statutory minimum amounts to forced labour for purposes of Article 23. Sections 143 to 146 BNS are the criminal-law arm of that constitutional prohibition.

Unlawful compulsory labour — Section 146 BNS

Section 146 BNS re-enacts Section 374 IPC without textual change. Whoever unlawfully compels any person to labour against the will of that person is punishable with imprisonment of either description up to one year, or fine, or both. The provision was historically aimed at the abuses of begar imposed on ryots by great landholders. Two questions recur. First, when is debt-bondage caught? In Madan Mohan Biswas, (1892) 19 Cal 572, the Calcutta High Court held that allowing indebted labourers to work off debts on the master's premises did not attract Section 374 IPC — though it might attract the criminal-force provision. Second, hard labour imposed on convicts is lawful: State of Gujarat v. High Court of Gujarat, AIR 1998 SC 3164, confirmed that a sentence of rigorous imprisonment carries the obligation to labour.

Concealment, importation, and begging — Sections 139, 141 and 142 BNS

Three accessory provisions complete the chapter. Section 142 BNS (earlier Section 368 IPC) punishes anyone who, knowing that a person has been kidnapped or abducted, wrongfully conceals or confines that person — with the same punishment as the principal offence. The Supreme Court in Birbal Choudhary v. State of Bihar, AIR 2017 SC 4866, treated the concealer as on par with the kidnapper for sentencing purposes. The principal offender himself cannot be convicted under Section 142 BNS — only third parties who help conceal the victim (Fiyaz Ahmed v. State of Bihar, AIR 1990 SC 2147).

Section 141 BNS (earlier Section 366B IPC) punishes the importation of any girl under twenty-one or — the BNS innovation — any boy under eighteen, from any country outside India, with intent that the person may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse. The provision originated in India's obligations under the 1910 International Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Women and Children.

Section 139 BNS (earlier Section 363A IPC) punishes kidnapping or maiming a child for the purposes of begging — sub-section (1) extending punishment up to ten years for kidnapping, and sub-section (2) attracting imprisonment for life for maiming. The 1959 Statement of Objects and Reasons recorded the legislative concern: existing IPC provisions were inadequate to put down the evil of kidnapping children for exploitation through begging. The BNS now layers on rigorous imprisonment and the natural-life formulation, and drops the IPC's clause 4(b) of the begging definition.

Kidnapping or abducting woman to compel marriage — Section 87 BNS

Though numbered outside the 137–146 cluster, Section 87 BNS (earlier Section 366 IPC) belongs in any survey of liberty offences. It punishes kidnapping or abduction of a woman with intent that she be compelled to marry against her will, or be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, or be induced by criminal intimidation or abuse of authority for that purpose. Punishment is up to ten years and fine. The Supreme Court in Gabbu v. State of M.P., AIR 2006 SC 2461, insisted that mere abduction is not enough — the prosecution must prove the contumacious intent specified in the section. Moniram Hazarika v. State of Assam, (2004) 5 SCC 120, treated a promise of marriage made to a minor girl to entice her out of her guardian's home as enticement under the kidnapping provision; once the necessary intent is established, the offence is complete whether or not the accused succeeds.

The provision does not absorb the kidnapping definition. The Bombay High Court in Kailash Laxman Khamkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2010 Cr LJ 3255 (Bom), explained that procuration under Section 96 BNS (earlier Section 366A IPC) requires only inducement, while the marriage-compulsion provision additionally requires kidnapping or abduction. The two sections share inducement as a common ingredient; they part company on the kidnapping or abduction limb.

Cognizability, bailability and trial

Almost every offence in this cluster is cognizable and non-bailable, and triable by the Court of Session — the procedural classification follows the new First Schedule to the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). Section 137 BNS (kidnapping simpliciter) is non-bailable; Sections 140(1) to 140(4) BNS are non-bailable and Sessions-triable; Section 140(2) BNS (ransom) is exclusively triable by the Court of Session and carries the death penalty; Section 143 BNS (trafficking) and Section 145 BNS (slavery) are non-bailable. Compounding under Section 359 BNSS is unavailable for any provision in this chapter — the offences are treated as crimes against the state and cannot be settled inter-partes.

The standard of proof remains the criminal standard — beyond reasonable doubt. But the chapter carries one statutory presumption that often determines outcome at trial. Section 139(3) BNS reproduces the IPC's presumption that where any person other than the lawful guardian of a child employs or uses the child for begging, the court shall presume — unless the contrary is proved — that the person kidnapped or otherwise obtained custody of that child for the purpose of begging. The presumption is rebuttable but heavy.

Sentencing pattern and recent trends

The Supreme Court in Akram Khan v. State of W.B., AIR 2012 SC 308, observed that, in dealing with kidnapping for ransom, the legislature has provided a stringent sentence in response to the alarming rise in kidnappings of young children for ransom. Courts have refused to interfere with stiff sentences in such cases — Vinod v. State of Haryana, (2008) 2 SCC 246, sustained a sentence of life imprisonment with fine. For the simpliciter kidnapping under Section 137 BNS, sentences have been calibrated to factual gravity: Habil Mia v. State of Assam, 1997 Cr LJ 1866 (Gau), reduced six years' rigorous imprisonment under Section 366 IPC to two where the victim girl was not physically harmed and was subsequently married to the accused; State of M.P. v. Rameshwar, AIR 2005 SC 687, restored the trial-court sentence reduced to one year where the victim was sixteen and seduced under a promise of marriage.

Distinctions table — exam-angle

The following distinctions recur in every set of judiciary previous-year-papers on the chapter, and ought to be committed to memory in the new-law form.

1. Kidnapping vs abduction. Section 137(1)(b) BNS — only against a child or person of unsound mind, no force needed, consent of victim immaterial, intent irrelevant. Section 138 BNS — against a person of any age, force or fraud essential, victim's free consent condones, intent decisive when paired with Section 140 BNS or Section 87 BNS.
2. Section 140(1) vs Section 140(2) BNS. The first requires only intent to murder; the second requires kidnapping plus communicated ransom demand. The death penalty is available only under the second.
3. Section 137 BNS vs Section 64 BNS (rape). Kidnapping is not a minor offence in relation to rape; the two are not cognate. F. Nataraja v. State, 2010 Cr LJ 2180 (Kar), held that an accused cannot be convicted of kidnapping in the absence of a charge framed for it. Each offence needs its own charge.
4. Section 143 BNS vs Section 145 BNS. Trafficking is the casual or first-time offence; slavery is the habitual trade. The word habitually is the gate.
5. Section 142 BNS vs the principal offence. Concealment punishes only the third party; the principal kidnapper is sentenced under Section 137, 138 or 140 BNS, not under Section 142 BNS.

Where this chapter sits in the larger scheme

The liberty offences in Sections 137 to 146 BNS form one of the three concentric circles that the substantive criminal law draws around the human person. The innermost circle protects life — Sections 100 to 113 BNS — and is studied in the culpable-homicide and murder framework, including the five exceptions to murder under Section 101 BNS. The middle circle protects bodily integrity — Sections 114 to 136 BNS — including the criminal-force and assault provisions. The outermost circle protects liberty — and that is the territory of this chapter. A reader who keeps the three concentric circles in view will find that fact-patterns of any complexity decompose neatly into the doctrines worked out under each.

For deeper reading of the related doctrines, see the consolidated Indian Penal Code and BNS notes hub, which collects every chapter in the series and traces the new-law-first approach across the entire substantive criminal law. The chapters on abetment under Sections 45 to 60 BNS and criminal conspiracy under Section 61 BNS are particularly important, because most kidnapping prosecutions involve more than one accused acting in concert and the prosecution typically charges the accomplices on those theories of secondary liability.

Frequently asked questions

What is the difference between kidnapping under Section 137 BNS and abduction under Section 138 BNS?

Section 137 BNS applies only to a child (under eighteen, gender-neutral after the BNS) or a person of unsound mind, and is a substantive offence on its own. The means used can be perfectly innocent — even gentle persuasion attracts the section. The consent of the child is immaterial; only the lawful guardian's consent takes the case out. Section 138 BNS applies to a person of any age, but always requires force or deceit, and is auxiliary — it is criminal only when paired with one of the contumacious purposes in Section 140 BNS (murder, ransom, secret confinement, grievous hurt or slavery) or in Section 87 BNS (compulsion to marry).

After the BNS, does it matter whether the kidnapped child is a boy or a girl?

No, not for Section 137(1)(b) BNS itself. The IPC distinguished between a male under sixteen and a female under eighteen; Section 137(1)(b) BNS replaces both expressions with the single word child, defined under the BNS as a person below eighteen. The same gender-neutral substitution runs through Section 139 BNS (begging), Section 143 BNS (trafficking) and Section 144 BNS (exploitation). Section 141 BNS goes further by adding any boy under eighteen to the importation provision that earlier protected only girls. So after 1 July 2024 the statutory protections are uniform across sex, though some collateral provisions like Section 64 BNS (rape) continue to be sex-specific.

Can an accused be sentenced to death for kidnapping for ransom even if the victim is not killed?

Yes. Section 140(2) BNS, re-enacting Section 364A IPC, prescribes punishment with death or imprisonment for life. The Supreme Court in Sunder @ Sundararajan v. State, (2013) 3 SCC 215, held that the death penalty is available even where the kidnapping for ransom does not result in the victim's death, because the threat of death itself attracts the higher punishment. The constitutionality of the punishment scale was upheld in Vikram Singh v. Union of India, 2015 Cr LJ 4500. The prosecution must prove three ingredients — kidnapping or detention, custody, and a ransom demand actually communicated.

Is the consent of a minor relevant to a charge under Section 137(1)(b) BNS?

No. The Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Raja Ram, AIR 1973 SC 819, restated the rule that the consent of the minor who is taken or enticed is wholly immaterial — only the guardian's consent takes the case out of the section. Persuasion creating willingness in the minor is enough; force or fraud is not required. Consent of a minor close to eighteen is also irrelevant. The exception to the section is narrow — limited to a person who in good faith believes himself to be the father of an illegitimate child, or to be entitled to lawful custody, and only when the act is not for an immoral or unlawful purpose.

What is the difference between Section 143 BNS (trafficking) and Section 145 BNS (slavery)?

Section 143 BNS catches the recruiter, transporter, harbourer, transferor or receiver who acts for the purpose of exploitation. It applies to one-off transactions and graduates the punishment with the number and age of victims. Section 145 BNS, by contrast, requires the offender to act habitually — it targets the professional slave-trader who imports, exports, buys, sells, traffics or deals in slaves as a calling. A single act will not bring an accused under Section 145 BNS, but it will bring him under Section 143 BNS if exploitation can be shown. The two sections are therefore concentric — Section 145 BNS is a narrower, aggravated form of the same conduct.

Is the offence of kidnapping a continuing offence?

No. The Punjab & Haryana High Court in Chhajju Ram, AIR 1968 P&H 439, held that the offence of kidnapping from lawful guardianship is complete the moment the minor is actually taken from lawful guardianship; it is not an offence that continues so long as the minor is kept out of guardianship. The distance to which the minor is taken is immaterial. Two consequences follow. First, limitation runs from the date of taking, not from the date of recovery. Second, a person who only later harbours the kidnapped minor is not himself a kidnapper, though he may be liable under Section 142 BNS for wrongful concealment if he knew of the kidnapping.