General Definitions and Explanations (Section 2 BNS / Sections 6 to 52 IPC)

Section 2 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) is a single section in 39 sub-sections that consolidates the definitions previously scattered across Sections 8 to 52A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). Section 3 BNS — also a consolidation, drawing on Sections 6, 7, 27, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38 IPC — supplies the General Explanations: how to read the Code, when an act and an omission are equivalent, who is deemed to be in possession, and the doctrine of common intention. Together, the two sections operate as the glossary and the user-manual for every offence in the Sanhita. They build on the territorial framework established in our chapter on the extent and application of the BNS.

This chapter — part of our wider IPC and BNS notes series, with the broader transition story set out in the introduction chapter — walks through the definitions that matter most in practice and in the examination hall: act and omission, dishonestly and fraudulently, good faith, document, gender, movable property, public servant, voluntary act, wrongful gain and wrongful loss. It then turns to the General Explanations, with particular attention to the doctrine of common intention under Section 3(5) BNS (formerly Section 34 IPC), which is one of the most heavily-litigated provisions of the Code.

Why the BNS consolidates the definitions

The IPC's definitions section was a puzzle of cross-references. Section 8 defined gender; Section 9 defined number; Section 10 defined "man" and "woman" together; Section 11 defined "person"; Sections 21 and 22 dealt with public servant and movable property; Section 33 defined "act" and "omission" in a single sentence; Sections 39 and 52 defined "voluntarily" and "good faith" at opposite ends of the chapter. Section 52A, on harbouring, was inserted decades later. A practitioner reading Section 378 IPC — now Section 303 BNS, examined in our chapter on theft — had to flip through eleven definition sections to assemble the elements.

The BNS folds all of these into Section 2 BNS, in alphabetical order, with each defined term marked by a numbered sub-section. "Act" is Section 2(1) BNS; "animal" is Section 2(2); "child" is Section 2(3) — a new addition. The substantive content survives intact in nearly every case, with three classes of refinement: the bifurcation of Section 33 IPC ("act" and "omission") into two separate sub-sections, the introduction of new definitions where the IPC had none, and the modernisation of language ("denotes" replaced by "means"; "Court of Justice" replaced by "Court"; "British calendar" replaced by "Gregorian calendar").

Section 2(1) BNS — "act" and Section 2(25) BNS — "omission"

Section 33 IPC defined "act" and "omission" together: the word "act" denotes as well a series of acts as a single act; the word "omission" denotes as well a series of omissions as a single omission. The BNS bifurcates the definition. Section 2(1) BNS handles "act"; Section 2(25) BNS handles "omission". The substantive content is identical. The bifurcation reflects the BNS drafting style of treating each defined term as a discrete unit.

The doctrinal point is that the Code criminalises both acts and omissions, but it criminalises an omission only where the law imposes a duty to act. Section 3(4) BNS (formerly Section 32 IPC) provides that words referring to acts done extend also to illegal omissions. The duty to act may arise from statute, contract or relationship — a parent's duty to feed a child, a doctor's duty to a patient who has accepted treatment, a station-master's duty to operate the signal. An omission to perform such a duty, where it produces the prohibited consequence, is treated as an act for the purposes of the Code.

Section 2(7) BNS — "dishonestly"

Section 2(7) BNS reproduces the substance of Section 24 IPC: whoever does anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another is said to do that thing dishonestly. The BNS drops the prefatory phrase "whoever does" and the closing phrase "is said to do that thing dishonestly", but the test is unchanged.

The doctrinal content of "dishonestly" is settled. The Supreme Court held in Krishan Kumar v. UOI, AIR 1959 SC 1390, that "dishonestly" is not used in the Code in its popular sense; unless there is wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another, an act is not dishonest. Wrongful gain includes wrongful retention; wrongful loss includes being kept out of property as well as being wrongfully deprived of it. In Dr. Vimla v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1963 SC 1572, the Court held that deceit is not an ingredient of "dishonestly" — that is reserved for "fraudulently". "Dishonestly" involves a pecuniary or economic gain or loss; that is its distinguishing mark.

The Court applied the principle in Charanjit Singh Chadha v. Sudhir Mehra, AIR 2001 SC 3721. A person exercising a contractual right cannot be said to have a dishonest intention, because he does not intend to cause wrongful gain or wrongful loss; the gain to him and the loss to the other are by agreement. The same logic protects municipal officers who lawfully demolish an unauthorised structure under statutory power: their act is not done dishonestly within Section 2(7) BNS, and they cannot be charged with theft.

Section 2(9) BNS — "fraudulently"

Section 2(9) BNS reproduces Section 25 IPC with rephrasing: a person is said to do a thing fraudulently if he does that thing with intent to defraud, but not otherwise. The phraseology is changed; the essence is unchanged. The Code does not separately define "defraud", and its meaning has been established by Supreme Court interpretation.

The leading authority is Dr. Vimla. The Court there separated "dishonestly" and "fraudulently" along two axes. First, deceit is not an ingredient of "dishonestly" but is an essential ingredient of "fraudulently". Second, "dishonestly" involves pecuniary or economic gain or loss; "fraudulently" by construction excludes that element. Where the Code uses "fraudulently and dishonestly" in the same section, both ingredients must be made out. Where it uses one or the other, the chosen test alone applies.

The Court reaffirmed in Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751, that to defraud is not by itself an offence; only certain Code provisions make fraudulent acts punishable. Merely alleging or showing that a person acted fraudulently does not assume the commission of an offence; the fraudulent act must be specified as an offence under the Code or another law. The test for "fraudulently" is therefore a building block of the substantive offences of cheating under Section 318 BNS, of forgery, and of fraudulent dispositions of property.

Section 2(11) BNS — "good faith"

Section 2(11) BNS reproduces Section 52 IPC verbatim: nothing is said to be done or believed in good faith which is done or believed without due care and attention. The definition is negative — it tells you what good faith is not — and the burden of proof is on the person claiming the benefit of a Code provision that requires good faith. The Supreme Court has consistently held that "good faith" under Section 52 IPC, now Section 2(11) BNS, requires due care and attention; mere honesty of belief is insufficient.

The definition is doctrinally significant because several of the General Exceptions discussed in our chapter on the general exceptions of Sections 14 to 44 BNS require good faith — Section 21 BNS (act of judge acting judicially), Section 17 BNS (act done under mistake of fact believing oneself justified by law), Section 30 BNS (act done in good faith for benefit of a person without consent), and Section 31 BNS (communication made in good faith). The plea fails where the accused acted impulsively, without inquiry, or without applying the diligence that the situation called for.

Section 2(8) BNS — "document" expanded

Section 2(8) BNS consolidates Sections 29 and 29A IPC and broadens the definition. "Document" denotes any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks intended to be used as evidence of that matter — and includes electronic and digital records. The express incorporation of electronic and digital records is a substantive change. The IPC's Section 29 covered conventional documents; Section 29A, inserted in 2000 by the Information Technology Act, extended the meaning to electronic records as defined in the IT Act. The BNS folds both into a single sub-section and adds "digital records" to the language for clarity.

The change matters for the offences of forgery, criminal breach of trust, and cheating, all of which depend on the definition of "document". A digitally-signed contract, a WhatsApp message capable of being adduced as evidence, a bank ledger maintained electronically — all are documents within Section 2(8) BNS. The expanded definition tracks the parallel reform in the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, where electronic records are equated with primary evidence.

Section 2(10) BNS — "gender" with transgender added

Section 2(10) BNS reproduces the substance of Section 8 IPC: the pronoun "he" and its derivatives are used of any person, whether male or female. The Sanhita adds a third category — transgender — alongside male and female. The change is consequential. A person who is the victim of an offence framed in male-or-female terms — such as the previous Section 354 IPC on outraging modesty, where the victim could only be a woman — must now be tested against the broader categorisation under Section 2(10) BNS. The classification is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in National Legal Services Authority v. UOI, (2014) 5 SCC 438, recognising transgender persons as a third gender for the purposes of constitutional protection.

Section 2(21) BNS — "movable property" broadened

Section 22 IPC defined movable property to include "corporeal property of every description, except land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything which is attached to the earth". Section 2(21) BNS removes the word "corporeal", broadening the definition. The change is doctrinally important because incorporeal interests — choses in action, trade marks, copyright, debts — were excluded under the IPC. The BNS leaves the door open to a broader reading, although the substantive offences of theft and criminal misappropriation continue to require physical movement, which limits the practical reach of the change.

Section 2(28) BNS — "public servant" without juryman

Section 2(28) BNS reproduces Section 21 IPC with two changes. The terms "Military, Naval" are replaced by "Army, and Navy" — a stylistic update reflecting the modern naming of the armed forces. The category of "Juryman" is excluded — India abolished the jury system in 1959 after Nanavati, and the IPC reference had been a relic. The substantive list of public servants survives: judicial officers, persons authorised by Court to perform functions, election officers, members of arbitrating tribunals, persons holding any office paid out of public revenue, and so on. The definition feeds directly into the offences in our chapter on offences by or relating to public servants.

Section 2(33) BNS — "voluntarily"

Section 2(33) BNS reproduces Section 39 IPC verbatim: a person is said to cause an effect "voluntarily" when he causes it by means whereby he intended to cause it, or by means which, at the time of employing those means, he knew or had reason to believe to be likely to cause it. The definition is wider than ordinary English usage of "voluntary", because it covers consequences that the accused knew were likely. The Code uses "voluntarily" as a doctrinal hinge — for example, in Section 116 BNS (voluntarily causing hurt, formerly Section 321 IPC) — to expand criminal liability beyond pure intention to include foreseeable consequences. The expansion is structural; without it, the Code would have to enumerate "intentionally or with knowledge of likely consequences" in every section.

Sections 2(36) to 2(38) BNS — wrongful gain, wrongful loss

Section 23 IPC defined wrongful gain in clause 1, wrongful loss in clause 2, and "gaining wrongfully, losing wrongfully" in clause 3. The BNS preserves this structure across three sub-sections — Section 2(36) "wrongful gain", Section 2(37) "wrongful loss", and Section 2(38) "gaining wrongfully, losing wrongfully" — replacing "is" with "means" and otherwise leaving the content unchanged.

"Wrongful gain" is gain by unlawful means of property to which the person gaining is not legally entitled. "Wrongful loss" is loss by unlawful means of property to which the person losing is legally entitled. Both definitions feed directly into Section 2(7) BNS ("dishonestly"), and through that into theft, cheating, criminal misappropriation, criminal breach of trust, and a chain of property offences. The Supreme Court explained in K. N. Mehra v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1957 SC 369, that the gain or loss need not be a total acquisition or total deprivation — temporary retention or temporary keeping-out is enough. K. N. Mehra was a case of two cadets who took an aircraft without authority and crashed it; the Court held that even though the cadets did not intend to keep the aircraft permanently, the temporary deprivation was sufficient to make out the offence.

Section 2(39) BNS — incorporation of IT Act and BNSS definitions

Section 2(39) BNS broadens the rule in Section 29A IPC. For words and expressions used in the Sanhita but not defined in it, but defined in the Information Technology Act, 2000 or the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, those Acts' definitions apply. The change brings the Sanhita into conversation with the IT Act and the BNSS, ensuring definitional consistency across the criminal-law trinity. A "computer resource" appearing in Section 1(5)(c) BNS therefore has the meaning given in Section 2(1)(k) of the IT Act; a "police officer" appearing in any BNS section that does not define it has the meaning given in the BNSS.

Section 3 BNS — General Explanations

Section 3 BNS folds nine separate IPC sections into one. The most consequential is Section 3(5) BNS, which reproduces Section 34 IPC on common intention. Sections 3(1) and 3(2) BNS (formerly Sections 6 and 7 IPC) supply the rule that every Code provision is read subject to the General Exceptions and that an expression once explained retains its sense throughout the Code. Section 3(3) BNS (formerly Section 27 IPC, with "wife" replaced by "spouse") deals with property in the possession of a spouse, clerk or servant. Section 3(4) BNS (formerly Section 32 IPC) treats illegal omissions as acts. Sections 3(6) to 3(9) BNS reproduce Sections 35 to 38 IPC on cooperation, knowledge or intention as elements of an act, and persons concerned in a criminal act being guilty of different offences.

Section 3(5) BNS — common intention

Section 3(5) BNS reproduces Section 34 IPC verbatim: when a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone. The provision was added to the IPC in 1870 in response to Queen v. Gora Chand Gope, where the original 1860 wording had been held inadequate. The 1870 amendment introduced the words "in furtherance of the common intention" and that wording has survived unchanged into the BNS.

The leading authority remains Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor, AIR 1925 PC 1 — a locus classicus that the Supreme Court has cited repeatedly. The Privy Council there held that Section 34 has regard not to the offence as a whole but to the criminal act, and that all members of a party are liable for the criminal act done in furtherance of the common intention even where the precise role of each is not separately proved. The doctrinal essence is the simultaneous consensus of minds; a pre-planned conspiracy is not necessary, but a meeting of minds, however brief, is. The Court in Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab, (1977) 1 SCC 746, reaffirmed that the acts of the several persons need not be identical, but they must be actuated by one and the same common intention.

The provision is one of the most heavily-litigated in the Code. Section 3(5) BNS is not a substantive offence — it is a rule of constructive liability that fastens the criminal act of one person on every other who shared the common intention. The distinction between common intention under Section 3(5) BNS and common object under Section 190 BNS (formerly Section 149 IPC) is examined separately in our chapter on common intention vs common object.

What changed and what survives — a quick map

Three classes of change should be carried forward. First, the structural change: a single section in 39 sub-sections replaces sixteen separate IPC sections, and a second section in nine sub-sections collects the General Explanations. Second, the substantive additions: "child" defined for the first time (Section 2(3) BNS); "transgender" added to "gender" (Section 2(10) BNS); "electronic and digital records" added to "document" (Section 2(8) BNS); "Gregorian calendar" replacing "British calendar" in "month and year" (Section 2(20) BNS); "movable property" expanded by removing "corporeal" (Section 2(21) BNS). Third, the editorial refinements: "denotes" replaced by "means" in most definitions; "Court of Justice" replaced by "Court"; "wife" in Section 27 IPC replaced by "spouse" in Section 3(3) BNS; and in Section 2(13) BNS, the obsolete spousal-harbour exception of Section 52A IPC is dropped.

A section-by-section view of every change is collected in the IPC-to-BNS comparative table. For the practical workflow, two things matter. First, the case law on each definition survives the renumbering. Krishan Kumar on dishonestly, Dr. Vimla on the dishonestly–fraudulently distinction, K. N. Mehra on temporary wrongful loss, Barendra Kumar Ghosh on common intention — all remain authoritative under the BNS provisions. Second, a charge-sheet that cites the IPC section without its BNS equivalent is doctrinally defensible only for offences committed before 1 July 2024; for offences on or after that date, the BNS section must lead.

Strategic note for the aspirant

Three propositions to take into the examination hall. First, "dishonestly" requires wrongful gain or wrongful loss; it does not require deceit. "Fraudulently" requires intent to defraud, which has deceit at its core. The two are not synonyms. Second, "voluntarily" under Section 2(33) BNS is broader than ordinary English usage — it covers consequences that the accused knew or had reason to believe were likely. Third, common intention under Section 3(5) BNS is constructive liability, not substantive offence. It does not require pre-planned conspiracy, but it requires a meeting of minds, however brief, before or during the commission of the act.

The next chapter takes up the kinds of punishment under Sections 4 to 13 BNS, including imprisonment for life, fines and the new community-service sentence. After that, we turn to the general exceptions chapter — the doctrines that strip an act of its criminality even where every definition in this chapter is satisfied.

Frequently asked questions

What is the difference between 'dishonestly' and 'fraudulently' under the BNS?

Section 2(7) BNS defines 'dishonestly' as doing a thing with the intention of causing wrongful gain or wrongful loss. Section 2(9) BNS defines 'fraudulently' as doing a thing with intent to defraud. The Supreme Court drew the line in Dr. Vimla v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1963 SC 1572: deceit is not an ingredient of 'dishonestly' but is essential to 'fraudulently'; 'dishonestly' involves pecuniary or economic gain or loss, while 'fraudulently' by construction excludes that element. Where the Code uses both expressions in the same section, both ingredients must be made out.

Does Section 2(11) BNS require honesty of belief or also due care?

Both. Section 2(11) BNS reproduces Section 52 IPC verbatim: nothing is said to be done or believed in good faith which is done or believed without due care and attention. The definition is negative — it tells you what good faith is not — and the burden of proof is on the person claiming the benefit of any provision that requires it. Mere honesty of belief is insufficient; the situation must have called for inquiry, and the accused must have made it.

What changed in the definition of 'gender' from the IPC to the BNS?

Section 8 IPC recognised only male and female. Section 2(10) BNS adds 'transgender' as a third category, alongside male and female, consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in National Legal Services Authority v. UOI, (2014) 5 SCC 438. The change matters for offences whose victim or accused is gendered, and for the reading of pronouns throughout the Sanhita.

Is common intention under Section 3(5) BNS a substantive offence?

No. Section 3(5) BNS reproduces Section 34 IPC and operates as a rule of constructive liability — it fastens the criminal act of one person on every other person who shared the common intention. It is not itself a substantive offence and is always read with another section of the Sanhita that creates the offence. The leading authority remains Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor, AIR 1925 PC 1: the test is the simultaneous consensus of minds, not a pre-planned conspiracy, but a meeting of minds, however brief, is essential.

Does the BNS criminalise omissions as well as acts?

Yes, but only where the law imposes a duty to act. Section 2(1) BNS defines 'act' and Section 2(25) BNS defines 'omission' as separate sub-sections, replacing the unified Section 33 IPC. Section 3(4) BNS (formerly Section 32 IPC) provides that words referring to acts done extend also to illegal omissions. The duty to act may arise from statute, contract or relationship — a parent's duty to feed a child, a doctor's duty to a patient who has accepted treatment, a station-master's duty to operate the signal.

Does the IPC case law on these definitions still apply under the BNS?

Yes, with one qualification. Where the BNS reproduces the substance of an IPC definition without change — as it does for 'dishonestly', 'fraudulently', 'good faith', 'voluntarily', 'wrongful gain', 'wrongful loss' and 'common intention' — the IPC case law continues to apply, restated in BNS terms. Where the BNS has changed the substance — as it does by adding 'transgender' to 'gender', adding 'electronic and digital records' to 'document', and removing 'corporeal' from 'movable property' — the IPC case law on those points must be tested against the new statutory language.