The State Judiciary — High Court, Subordinate Courts

Articles 214 to 237 of the Constitution build the State Judiciary in two tiers — a High Court for each State at the apex and a District Judiciary inherited from the colonial bench beneath it. The chapter does three jobs at once. It guarantees the High Court a constitutional status as a court of record under Article 215. It vests in the High Court an extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 and a power of superintendence under Article 227 that together make it the principal civil-rights court of the State. And, through Articles 233 to 237, it insulates the recruitment and discipline of the subordinate judiciary from the executive by routing every appointment, posting and disciplinary recommendation through the High Court.

The architecture matters for the exam-aspirant. Read Article 226 in isolation and you have a writ section. Read it with Articles 215, 227, 235 and 233 and you have an institution — a court that is at once an original jurisdiction over the State, a supervisory authority over every tribunal in the territory, and the constitutional employer of the District Judiciary. This article sets out that institution provision by provision, and then collects the leading authorities that have shaped its working from Chandramohan v. State of U.P. (1966) to L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) and the NJAC judgment of 2015.

Article 214 and 215 — Constitution and status

Article 214 is one sentence. It says that there shall be a High Court for each State. Article 215 then declares that every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court, including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Two consequences follow. First, all High Courts have the same constitutional status — none is hierarchically superior to another, even though Parliament may, under Article 231, establish a common High Court for two or more States. Second, as a court of record the High Court has inherent and plenary powers, and prima facie no matter is deemed to be beyond its jurisdiction unless expressly shown to be so.

The contempt power under Article 215 is not derived from the Letters Patent or the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971; the Act regulates procedure but the power is constitutional. The Supreme Court has, however, held that contempt jurisdiction must be exercised with great restraint and only to uphold the majesty of law and the dignity of courts. Fair criticism made in good faith and in public interest does not amount to contempt. The High Court can also take suo motu cognisance of contempt of courts subordinate to it, but cannot initiate contempt of a superior court like the Supreme Court of India. The reach of the State Judiciary alongside the Supreme Court is best read with our chapter on the Union Judiciary and the Supreme Court, since the two share a single constitutional vocabulary of independence.

Article 216 to 219 — Composition, appointment, oath

Article 216 says that every High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such other Judges as the President may from time to time deem necessary to appoint. There is no fixed strength written into the Constitution. The Seventh Amendment in 1956 omitted the original proviso that fixed a maximum, since fixation is an executive function on the advice of the Council of Ministers and there is no judicially manageable standard for a court to direct how many Judges a High Court should have. A High Court is constituted by the appointment of its Chief Justice; failure to fill other vacancies does not affect the Court’s jurisdiction.

Article 217(1) governs appointment. Every Judge is appointed by the President by warrant, after the constitutional consultation, and holds office until sixty-two years of age. Article 217(2) prescribes the qualifications — ten years of judicial office, or ten years as an advocate of a High Court (or of two or more High Courts in succession). Removal is by the same address-and-impeachment route used for Supreme Court Judges, applied through Article 218 read with Article 124(4)–(5).

The interpretation of "consultation" in Article 217(1) is the spine of the appointments jurisprudence. The First Judges Case held that the opinion of the Chief Justice of India enjoyed no primacy and could be over-ridden by the executive. The Second Judges Case (1993) reversed that and read "consultation" as effective concurrence — primacy of the judiciary, with the Chief Justice of India representing the collegium. The Special Reference of 1998 (the Third Judges decision) refined the collegium to the Chief Justice of India plus the four senior-most puisne Judges of the Supreme Court for Supreme Court appointments, and the Chief Justice of India plus the two senior-most for High Court appointments, with views of senior Judges hailing from the concerned High Court to be obtained in writing.

The matter was reopened by the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, 2014, which inserted the National Judicial Appointments Commission. A Constitution Bench struck down both the Amendment and the NJAC Act, holding that inclusion of three non-judicial members against three judicial members and an undefined category of "eminent persons" affected the primacy of the judiciary in appointments and therefore violated independence of the judiciary, a basic feature of the Constitution. The collegium system was restored. The basic-feature reasoning is taken to its source in our note on the basic structure doctrine after Kesavananda Bharati.

Judicial review of an appointment is available only on a narrow ground — non-consultation in the manner mandated, or want of eligibility under Article 217(2). The merits of suitability are not justiciable. Even after warrants of appointment have been issued, the court can quash a warrant if the appointee lacks eligibility. Article 217(3), which makes the President’s decision on the disputed age of a Judge final after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, has been held to impliedly oust the writ jurisdiction under Articles 32 and 226 to question a Judge’s age. Article 218 simply applies clauses (4) and (5) of Article 124 to High Court Judges, importing the impeachment procedure. Article 219 makes the oath before the Governor mandatory before a Judge enters office; an additional Judge promoted to permanent does not need a fresh oath.

Article 220 to 224A — Practice bar, salary, transfer, additional and ad hoc Judges

Article 220, as substituted by the Seventh Amendment, bars a permanent Judge of a High Court from pleading or acting in any court in India after retirement, except the Supreme Court and any other High Court. The relaxation was deliberate — to make the bench more attractive to senior advocates by allowing post-retirement practice elsewhere. Article 221 governs salary and pension; the proviso bars variation of allowances, leave or pension to a Judge’s disadvantage after appointment. Salaries are taxable as "salaries" under the Income Tax Act, even though Judges are constitutional functionaries with no employer.

Article 222(1) empowers the President to transfer a Judge from one High Court to any other High Court. The Second Judges decision read "after consultation with the Chief Justice of India" as concurrence; transfer can be made only on the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India. No prior consent of the Judge is required, the power is exercisable more than once during a tenure, and transfer in accordance with the Chief Justice’s recommendation is not justiciable. Judicial review is available only where the recommendation has not been made in consultation with the four senior-most puisne Judges of the Supreme Court and the Chief Justices of the High Courts of departure and arrival, or where the President has acted contrary to that recommendation.

Article 223 deals with the appointment of an Acting Chief Justice — usually the senior-most puisne Judge — whose powers under the Article are unrestricted, though as a rule of prudence she should defer major decisions that can wait. Article 224 permits appointment of additional Judges for up to two years to clear arrears and acting Judges to fill temporary vacancies; an Additional Judge is not on probation, and the qualifications and mode of appointment are identical to those of a permanent Judge. Article 224A allows the Chief Justice of a High Court, with the previous consent of the President, to request a retired Judge of that or any other High Court to sit and act as an ad hoc Judge — a useful but under-used device for arrears clearance.

The remedies of an Additional Judge whose term expires without consideration for permanence are in principle available under Article 226 — non-consideration, want of consultation with the Chief Justice of India, or mala fide refusal are reviewable; quality of judgments or unpalatable decisions are not relevant grounds for non-extension. The treatment mirrors what we say about service of judicial officers in the chapter on services under the Union and States.

Article 225 — Existing jurisdiction preserved

Article 225 saves the jurisdiction, the law administered, and the rule-making power of every existing High Court as it stood immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, subject to constitutional provisions and any law of the appropriate Legislature. The pre-Constitution rule-making power has the force of law unless ultra vires the parent Government of India Acts. Letters Patent jurisdiction of the chartered High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras — including admiralty jurisdiction — is preserved through this Article. The proviso barring original jurisdiction in revenue matters was lifted by the original Constitution, briefly removed by the 42nd Amendment in connection with the new Article 323B, and re-introduced by the Janata-era reversals.

Article 226 — Power to issue writs

Article 226 confers an extraordinary jurisdiction on every High Court to issue, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, directions, orders or writs — including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari — for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III "and for any other purpose". The phrase "for any other purpose" is what separates Article 226 from the parallel power under Article 32 in the chapter on the right to constitutional remedies under Article 32; the catalogue of the five writs and their grounds is in our note on writs — habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, certiorari and quo warranto. The Part III rights that Article 226 most often vindicates are surveyed under our chapter on fundamental rights — concept, scheme, and suspension during emergency.

Scheme and territorial reach

Clause (1) confines the jurisdiction to the territories in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction. Clause (2), inserted by the Fifteenth Amendment, expands this — the writ may also issue where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises within the High Court’s territory, even if the seat of Government, authority or person against whom the writ runs lies outside. The 42nd Amendment had drastically curtailed Article 226; the 44th Amendment, 1978 substantially restored the 1949 text and added clause (3), which provides for vacation of an ex parte interim order within two weeks if the affected party makes an application with notice. Clause (4) preserves the parallel power of the Supreme Court under Article 32(2) — Article 226 is in addition to, and not in derogation of, that power. The amendment-history thread is taken further in our chapter on the amendment of the Constitution under Article 368.

Against whom — public function, statutory duty

The power runs against "any person or authority" including, in appropriate cases, any Government. "Person" includes companies, associations, unincorporated bodies, universities, statutory arbitrators, and even private persons where they discharge a public or statutory duty. The settled test is that a writ lies against a private body when it performs a public function — functions similar or closely related to those performable by the State in its sovereign capacity. The reach of the term "State" itself is mapped in the chapter on Article 12 — definition of State and the doctrine of eclipse. A purely contractual dispute against a private party for which the ordinary law affords a remedy is not a writ matter. A private unaided educational institution exercising a public function is amenable; a cooperative sugar factory registered under the Cooperative Societies Act has been held to be amenable; a private body discharging no public duty is not.

Discretion and self-imposed limits

The jurisdiction is discretionary and equitable. The Constitution places no fetter on it, but the High Courts have over time shaped a stable set of discretionary limits — alternative remedy, laches, locus standi, suppression of facts, and the rule against deciding seriously disputed questions of fact in summary proceedings.

1. Alternative remedy. Where an equally efficient and adequate remedy is available — by suit, statutory appeal, revision or arbitration — the High Court ordinarily directs the petitioner to that remedy first. The rule is one of discretion and not of jurisdiction; it does not bar a writ where the action is wholly without jurisdiction, where there is breach of natural justice, where the very vires of the statute is questioned, or where the alternative is illusory or futile.
2. Laches. Although no period of limitation is prescribed, inordinate delay disentitles the petitioner; laches has been applied even to public interest litigation. Whether delay defeats the petition is a judicial question; the court asks whether a parallel right has been created in the meantime, not whether time has merely run.
3. Locus standi. The petitioner must have an existing legal right or be prejudicially affected. The rule has been relaxed in public interest litigation, where any member of the public acting bona fide may move the court to redress public injury — but not a busybody acting from personal gain or political motivation.
4. Disputed questions of fact. A writ proceeding is not a substitute for a civil suit. Seriously disputed questions of fact are normally left to the ordinary forum, especially where an alternative remedy exists; but the High Court may take oral evidence in an appropriate case if material exists on record.

The power is one of judicial review, which the Supreme Court has repeatedly described as the heart and soul of the constitutional scheme. The court reviews the decision-making process — illegality, irrationality, procedural impropriety — and not the correctness of the decision itself. Even an order in violation of natural justice need not always be quashed if quashing would restore an earlier illegal order. A writ may be refused on humanitarian grounds, on parity considerations, or in deference to a statutory tribunal; equally, it must be granted where a fundamental right or a mandatory provision of the Constitution has been breached.

Article 227 — Superintendence over courts and tribunals

Article 227(1) gives every High Court superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout its territory. Clauses (2) and (3) authorise the High Court to call for returns, frame general rules and forms, and settle tables of fees. Clause (4) excludes courts and tribunals constituted under any law relating to the Armed Forces. The 42nd Amendment had stripped Article 227 of its tribunals reach; the 44th Amendment restored the pre-1976 position so that all tribunals other than military tribunals are again subject to High Court superintendence.

The power of superintendence is both administrative and judicial. As a power of judicial superintendence it is wider than Article 226 in one sense — it may be exercised suo motu and is not bound by the technicalities of the certiorari jurisdiction. It is narrower in another — it is to be exercised most sparingly, only to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority, and not as an appeal in disguise. Grave dereliction of duty, flagrant violation of law, jurisdictional error, breach of natural justice, perverse findings, errors apparent on the face of the record — these justify intervention. Mere errors of fact or law within jurisdiction do not.

In Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chandra Rai (2003) a two-Judge Bench held that judicial orders of a civil court are amenable to certiorari under Article 226. A three-Judge Bench in Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath (2015) overruled that proposition — judicial orders of a civil court are not amenable to certiorari under Article 226, but the High Court continues to exercise supervisory jurisdiction over civil courts in respect of such orders under Article 227. The distinction matters for letters-patent appeals — an intra-court appeal lies against an order under Article 226 but not against an order under Article 227, and the court must look at the substance, not the label, to decide which power was invoked.

The independence of the subordinate courts is itself part of the basic structure. The High Court’s power of superintendence does not authorise it to influence the subordinate judiciary to pass any order in a particular manner; it ensures that subordinate courts remain within the bounds of their authority, no more. The wider proposition that judicial independence is a basic feature is taken in the chapter on landmark cases on constitutional doctrines.

Article 228 — Withdrawal of constitutional cases

Article 228 makes the High Court the sole interpreter of the Constitution within the State. If the High Court is satisfied that a case pending in a subordinate court involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution the determination of which is necessary for the disposal of the case, it shall withdraw the case and either dispose of it itself, or determine the constitutional question and return the case for disposal in conformity with that determination. Three conditions must coexist — pendency of a suit or case, presence of a substantial constitutional question, and the necessity of that question for disposal. A point of law already settled by a Supreme Court decision is not "substantial". Article 228 has its own sphere; the power to transfer proceedings from a subordinate court to the High Court is in this Article alone, and not in Articles 226 or 227.

Article 228A — which had been inserted by the 42nd Amendment to require a special bench for state-law constitutional challenges — was repealed with retrospective effect by the 43rd Amendment in 1977.

Article 229 — Officers and servants of the High Court

Article 229 vests the appointment of officers and servants of a High Court in the Chief Justice (or such other Judge or officer as he may direct), subject to a proviso permitting the Governor by rule to require consultation with the State Public Service Commission for specified posts. Conditions of service of the staff are prescribed by rules made by the Chief Justice; rules touching salaries, allowances, leave or pension require the approval of the Governor. Administrative expenses of the High Court are charged on the Consolidated Fund of the State.

The object is to insulate not merely the Judges but also the High Court establishment from executive influence. The Chief Justice’s administrative power under Article 229 is wide but not arbitrary; it is subject to Articles 14 and 16 — the equality bench-marks set out in our chapter on the right to equality (Articles 14 to 18) — and to any law made by the Legislature. When the Chief Justice acts administratively he is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of any other Judge of the High Court — the rules he frames and orders made under them may be quashed under Article 226.

Article 230 and 231 — Union territories and common High Courts

Article 230, as recast by the Seventh Amendment in 1956, empowers Parliament by law to extend or exclude the jurisdiction of a High Court to or from any Union Territory — the territorial vocabulary is set out in our chapter on the Union and its territory under Articles 1 to 4. Where the High Court of a State exercises jurisdiction in relation to a Union Territory, the State Legislature cannot increase, restrict or abolish that jurisdiction, and the reference in Article 227 to the Governor is, for that Union Territory, read as a reference to the President.

Article 231 permits Parliament to establish a common High Court for two or more States and a Union Territory. References to the Governor in Article 217 are then read as references to the Governors of all the States concerned. Article 232 was omitted by the same Seventh Amendment. The Punjab and Haryana High Court, the Gauhati High Court and the High Court of Bombay (with its Goa, Daman and Diu and Dadra and Nagar Haveli benches) are familiar examples of Article 231 in operation.

Article 233 — Appointment of district judges

Article 233(1) vests the appointment, posting and promotion of district judges in the Governor in consultation with the High Court. Article 233(2) lays down the eligibility for direct recruitment from the Bar — the candidate must have been an advocate or pleader for not less than seven years, and must be recommended by the High Court. The whole scheme of Articles 233 to 235, the Supreme Court has held, is a complete code for recruitment to the District Judiciary, insulating it from executive interference and securing its independence. The Governor here acts on aid and advice in the manner taken in the chapter on the State Executive — Governor, Chief Minister, Council of Ministers.

Consultation with the High Court

Consultation under Article 233(1) cannot be an empty formality. The High Court here means the Full Court, not a Selection Committee of some Judges; an appointment made without consulting the High Court is invalid. The de facto doctrine, however, saves judgments pronounced by such a Judge before the invalidity is declared by a competent court.

The Governor must consult the High Court meaningfully and with effective interchange of viewpoints. He is not bound to accept the recommendation, nor required to give reasons for non-acceptance, but in the case of direct appointment from the Bar under Article 233(2), the Court has said the High Court’s recommendation must be accepted as a matter of rule — departure from it should be a rare event, because the Constitution relies on the collective wisdom of the High Court as a body.

Direct recruitment from the Bar — the Chandramohan rule

In Chandramohan v. State of U.P. (1966) the Supreme Court held that the source of recruitment to the post of district judge is restricted to two: members of the State judicial service under clause (1), and advocates or pleaders of seven years’ standing under clause (2). A member of any other Union or State service is not eligible — "service" in clause (2) means the judicial service. Rules opening the post to executive officers in other services were struck down as unconstitutional.

The expression "has been . . . an advocate" has been read to require seven years immediately preceding the application, not seven years scattered at any time in the past. "Advocate" includes a Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor on the rolls of the State Bar Council, and a Law Officer of a public corporation enrolled under the exception to Rule 49 of the Bar Council of India Rules; legal assistants in non-court institutions are excluded because they lack the courtroom exposure essential for judicial office. Article 233A, inserted by the 20th Amendment in 1966, validated certain past appointments and judgments that had been struck down for non-compliance with Articles 233 and 235.

Article 234 — Recruitment to the rest of the judicial service

Article 234 provides that appointments of persons other than district judges to the judicial service of a State shall be made by the Governor in accordance with rules framed by him after consultation with the State Public Service Commission and with the High Court. Two consultations are mandatory and substantive — the Public Service Commission for procedural and recruitment-process inputs, the High Court for primacy in matters of judicial competence. Rules framed without effective consultation with the High Court would be ultra vires Article 234. Reservation in the judicial service can be provided only after consultation with the High Court; the State Legislature cannot bypass Articles 233 and 234 by enacting a uniform statutory reservation scheme for all services including the judiciary. The constitutional reservation framework is mapped in the chapter on special provisions for SC, ST, OBC and Anglo-Indians.

An interview is the best mode of assessing suitability for judicial office — the written paper tests academic knowledge, the oral test brings out alertness, capacity for discussion, ability to control witnesses, and the temperament to diffuse situations. The qualifying standards for reserved candidates cannot be lowered further; in the absence of suitable reserved candidates the Public Service Commission may recommend general candidates to maintain efficiency.

Article 235 — Control over subordinate courts

Article 235 vests in the High Court the control over district courts and courts subordinate thereto, including the posting and promotion of, and the grant of leave to, persons holding any post inferior to that of district judge in the State judicial service — subject to any right of appeal under the conditions of service and the obligation to deal with judicial officers only in accordance with those conditions.

"Control" here is wide. It includes general superintendence, disciplinary control, transfer, confirmation and promotion, the determination whether an officer’s record is satisfactory, and the recommendation of major punishments — but the control is not unlimited. The High Court may impose minor punishments on its own; for dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, the High Court holds the disciplinary inquiry and recommends, and the Governor alone is competent to issue the order under Article 311(2). The High Court is the recommending authority for these major punishments and cannot itself impose them; the State, however, has no independent role and is least competent to advise the Governor on subordinate-judiciary discipline. The control under Article 235 is exclusive, not dual.

Premature retirement of a judicial officer is an exercise of both administrative and disciplinary control, made on assessment of the officer’s service record by the appropriate Committee of the High Court. The Supreme Court has uniformly increased the age of superannuation of subordinate judicial officers to sixty years in All India Judges Association v. Union of India (1992), with continuance after fifty-eight to be assessed by the High Court Committee on the basis of the officer’s past record. The recommendations of the Shetty Commission, accepted in successive All India Judges Association rulings, drive much of the modern service-conditions framework.

Articles 229 and 235 treat the "Chief Justice" and the "High Court" as two separate entities — the Chief Justice controls the High Court establishment; the High Court (as a body of Judges acting through its Administrative Committee or Full Court) controls the subordinate judiciary. A premature retirement order passed by the Governor on the recommendation of an Administrative Judge alone, and not on the recommendation of the Administrative Committee or the Full Court, is void and ineffective; ex post facto approval cannot cure the defect.

Article 236 and 237 — Definitions, application to magistrates

Article 236 defines "district judge" inclusively to mean judge of a city civil court, additional district judge, joint district judge, assistant district judge, chief judge of a small cause court, chief presidency magistrate, additional chief presidency magistrate, sessions judge, additional sessions judge and assistant sessions judge — and "judicial service" as a service consisting exclusively of persons intended to fill the post of district judge and other civil judicial posts inferior to that of district judge. Article 237 empowers the Governor by public notification to direct that the provisions of this Chapter, and any rules made thereunder, shall apply to any class or classes of magistrates as they apply to persons appointed to the judicial service.

Article 226 and the tribunals — L. Chandra Kumar

The relationship between the High Court’s writ jurisdiction and the administrative tribunals set up under Articles 323A and 323B was settled in two stages. In Sampath Kumar v. Union of India (1987) the Court accepted that judicial review of service matters could be transferred to specialised tribunals. In L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) a seven-Judge Bench held that the power of judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 is part of the basic structure; it cannot be excluded altogether. Tribunals set up under Article 323A are courts of first instance, but their decisions are subject to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court of the territory in which the tribunal sits before any appeal to the Supreme Court. The architecture of the tribunal system is taken in detail in our chapter on tribunals under Articles 323A and 323B.

The same logic applies to other quasi-judicial fora. The High Court may quash a tribunal order without jurisdiction, in violation of natural justice, or perverse on the face of the record. Where the alternative remedy of an appeal to the tribunal is available, the High Court will ordinarily relegate the petitioner to that remedy; but the existence of an alternative remedy does not bar relief in cases of jurisdictional error, breach of fundamental rights, or violation of mandatory constitutional provisions.

Article 226 versus Article 32 — a doctrinal map

Three differences anchor the comparison. First, Article 32 is itself a fundamental right, available only for the enforcement of Part III rights; Article 226 is a constitutional remedy, not a fundamental right, but is available both for Part III rights and "for any other purpose" — that is, for the enforcement of any legal right. Second, the territorial reach of the Supreme Court under Article 32 is the whole of India; the High Court’s reach under Article 226 is its own territory, with the cause-of-action extension in clause (2). Third, the doctrine of res judicata applies in different strengths — a Supreme Court decision under Article 32 binds; a High Court decision under Article 226 dismissed on merits operates as res judicata for a subsequent writ petition under Article 226 or Article 32, while dismissal in limine does not. The fuller comparison is in our note on Article 21 — protection of life and personal liberty, which the High Court most often enforces through Article 226.

The State Judiciary as institution — independence and basic structure

Read together, Articles 214 to 237 do more than create courts. They constitute the State Judiciary as the principal civil-rights forum of the State and as the constitutional employer of the District Judiciary. The Supreme Court has repeatedly described independence of the judiciary, including the independence of the subordinate judiciary, as part of the basic structure. The chapter on the State Executive shows how the Governor’s role in appointment and disciplinary matters is structurally constrained by the High Court’s primacy. The chapter on the State Legislature shows the limits of legislative competence in regulating recruitment to the judicial service. And our note on the Centre-State administrative relations under Articles 256 to 263 places the High Court within the federal scheme of executive accountability.

For an exam-aspirant, the most productive way to revise this chapter is to read the text of each article alongside the leading authority that has shaped its meaning — Article 217 with the Second Judges and the NJAC decisions, Article 222 with the same; Article 226 with L. Chandra Kumar and Radhey Shyam; Article 227 with the certiorari–superintendence distinction in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque (1955); Articles 233 to 235 with Chandramohan, Chandramouleshwar Prasad v. Patna High Court (1970), and the line of All India Judges Association rulings. For a sense of how these provisions interact with the Centre–State scheme of executive and legislative power, our chapter on the Constitution of India notes hub is the natural starting point.

Quick-reference table — Articles 214 to 237

Article	Subject
214	High Court for each State
215	Court of record; contempt power
216	Composition — Chief Justice and other Judges
217	Appointment, qualifications, age (62 years)
218	Application of Article 124(4)–(5) — removal
219	Oath before the Governor
220	Bar on practice after retirement (except SC and other HCs)
221	Salaries, allowances, pension
222	Transfer of a Judge
223	Acting Chief Justice
224 / 224A	Additional and acting Judges; ad hoc Judges
225	Existing jurisdiction preserved
226	Power to issue writs
227	Superintendence over courts and tribunals
228	Withdrawal of constitutional cases
229	Officers and servants — Chief Justice’s control
230 / 231	UTs; common High Courts
233	Appointment of district judges
234	Recruitment of others to the judicial service
235	Control over subordinate courts
236 / 237	Definitions; magistrates

What follows are the most common student questions on this chapter — about the Article 226 alternative-remedy rule, the difference between Articles 226 and 227, and the eligibility puzzle in Article 233(2).

Frequently asked questions

What is the difference between Article 226 and Article 32?

Article 32 is itself a fundamental right and runs only against violations of Part III; the Supreme Court issues writs under it throughout India. Article 226 is a constitutional remedy, not a fundamental right, but it is wider in two ways. First, it is available both for the enforcement of Part III rights and "for any other purpose" — so any legal right may be vindicated. Second, by clause (2) the High Court can issue a writ wherever the cause of action arises, even if the seat of the authority is outside its territory. Article 226(4) preserves the Supreme Court’s parallel jurisdiction under Article 32(2).

Is the alternative-remedy rule under Article 226 a bar to jurisdiction?

No. The Supreme Court has consistently said the rule is one of discretion, policy and convenience, not of jurisdiction. Where an equally efficacious statutory remedy exists, the High Court ordinarily directs the petitioner to use it first. But the existence of an alternative remedy does not preclude relief under Article 226 where the order is wholly without jurisdiction, where the very vires of the statute is challenged, where there is a breach of natural justice, where a fundamental right is infringed, or where the alternative is illusory or futile. The discretion is exercised case by case.

Can a writ under Article 226 be issued against a private person?

Yes, but only when the private person discharges a public function or a statutory duty. The settled test asks whether the function is similar or closely related to functions performable by the State in its sovereign capacity. So a private unaided educational institution exercising a public function, a cooperative society discharging a statutory duty, or a statutory arbitrator may be amenable. A private body acting in a purely private or contractual capacity, with no public duty imposed by statute, is not amenable; the remedy lies in the ordinary law.

What is the difference between Article 226 and Article 227?

Article 226 is original writ jurisdiction; Article 227 is supervisory jurisdiction. Article 226 may be invoked only on a party’s application; Article 227 may also be exercised suo motu. Article 226 issues writs, including certiorari to quash; Article 227 does not issue a writ, but the High Court may quash, vary or substitute the inferior order and give directions for further proceedings. After Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath (2015), judicial orders of a civil court are not amenable to certiorari under Article 226 — they are correctable only under the supervisory power of Article 227.

Who can be appointed a district judge under Article 233(2)?

Only a person who has been an advocate or pleader for not less than seven years and is recommended by the High Court. "Service" in clause (2) means the judicial service, so a member of any other Union or State service is not eligible (Chandramohan v. State of U.P., 1966). The seven years must be the period immediately preceding the application, not seven years scattered at any time in the past. "Advocate" includes a Public Prosecutor on the rolls of the State Bar Council and certain enrolled Law Officers, but not legal assistants in non-court institutions who lack courtroom exposure.

What does "control" mean in Article 235?

Control under Article 235 is exclusive, not dual. It covers general superintendence over subordinate courts, disciplinary control over presiding officers, transfer, confirmation, promotion, recommendation of punishments and assessment of an officer’s record. Minor punishments may be imposed by the High Court itself. For dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, the High Court holds the inquiry and recommends, and the Governor alone is competent to issue the order under Article 311(2). The State has no independent advisory role to the Governor in matters of subordinate-judiciary discipline; the recommendation must come from the Administrative Committee or Full Court of the High Court, not from a single Administrative Judge.

Did the NJAC judgment change anything in the High Court appointments process?

No. The Constitution Bench in 2015 declared the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, 2014 and the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 unconstitutional and void, and restored the collegium system as it existed prior to the Amendment. For High Court appointments, the collegium therefore continues to be the Chief Justice of India plus the two senior-most puisne Judges of the Supreme Court, with the recommendation initiated by the Chief Justice of the High Court in consultation with the two senior-most puisne Judges of that High Court. The court also directed the Government to finalise the Memorandum of Procedure in consultation with the Chief Justice of India.