Services Under the Union and States (Articles 308–323)

Part XIV of the Constitution — Articles 308 to 323 — is the constitutional charter of the public services. It does two things at once. It empowers the State as employer to organise its bureaucracy, fix recruitment rules and impose discipline; and it constrains the State as employer by anchoring tenure to constitutional procedure rather than to political will. The doctrine of pleasure in Article 310 sits in tension with the procedural safeguards of Article 311, and the autonomous Public Service Commissions of Articles 315 to 323 sit between the two as the constitutional gatekeeper of merit-based recruitment.

For the judicial-services aspirant, Part XIV is unusually rich exam territory and overlaps repeatedly with the wider scheme of fundamental rights in service jurisprudence. Article 311 alone has produced a dense body of Supreme Court doctrine on what counts as ‘dismissal’, ‘removal’, ‘reduction in rank’, what amounts to a reasonable opportunity, when an inquiry can be dispensed with, and how the second-show-cause notice was eliminated by the Forty-second Amendment. The Public Service Commissions raise a different cluster of questions — whether their advice is binding, what counts as ‘misbehaviour’ under Article 317, and how the consultation requirement under Article 320(3) interacts with the doctrine of pleasure. This chapter walks through the architecture article by article, anchored in Supreme Court authority.

Article 308 — Interpretation

Article 308 is a definitional clause. It explains that, for the purposes of Part XIV, the expression ‘State’ does not include the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The clause is a relic of the special constitutional position of J&K and has limited substantive operation today after the changes of 2019, but it survives on the page and should be remembered as the gatekeeper to the Part.

Article 309 — Recruitment and conditions of service

Article 309 is the legislative source of all service rules. It empowers Parliament to make laws regulating recruitment and conditions of service for Union services under Entry 70 of List I, and the State legislatures to do the same for State services under Entry 41 of List II — a division that maps onto the broader scheme of distribution of legislative powers. Until such legislation is enacted, the Proviso authorises the President (for Union services) or the Governor (for State services) to make rules — and rules so made hold the field until superseded by an Act.

Three propositions matter for the exam. First, ‘recruitment’ is a comprehensive term: appointment, selection, promotion, deputation and even appointment by transfer are methods of recruitment (Narayanan K. v. State of Karnataka, 1994). Second, the rule-making power under the Proviso is legislative, not executive — and rules made under it have statutory force, struck down only on the grounds that would invalidate any legislative measure such as violation of Articles 14, 16 or 19 (State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1961 SC 751). Third, although Article 309 is enabling and imposes no duty to legislate, once rules are framed they bind the Government, which must regulate its actions by them (A.K. Bhatnagar v. Union of India, 1991). The doctrine of equality of opportunity in employment under the State runs through every limb of Article 14 and Article 16 in service matters — discriminatory rules of recruitment, pay, promotion, seniority, transfer or termination are routinely tested against that touchstone.

The Court has stressed that the rule-making power cannot be fettered by contract (Union of India v. Arun Kumar Roy, AIR 1986). Government service is a matter of status, not contract; an employee cannot rely on a contractual term inconsistent with the service rules. Conversely, vested rights crystallised under existing rules cannot be taken away by retrospective amendment (R.S. Ajara v. State of Gujarat, 1997). And in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) (2006), a Constitution Bench held that when statutory rules under Article 309 are exhaustive, appointments must conform to them — backdoor regularisation of those not duly appointed under the constitutional scheme is impermissible.

Article 310 — The doctrine of pleasure

Article 310(1) declares that, except as expressly provided by the Constitution, every member of the defence services, civil services of the Union, all-India services, and every holder of any post connected with defence or any civil post under the Union holds office during the pleasure of the President; the corresponding pleasure for State services and posts vests in the Governor. The doctrine is borrowed from English common law but, unlike in the United Kingdom, it is constitutionally entrenched and cannot be displaced by ordinary legislation.

The leading articulation is in Parshottam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36, and the most cited application is Moti Ram Deka v. General Manager, N.E.F. Railway, AIR 1964 SC 600. The pleasure under Article 310(1) is subject to two qualifications: the express provisions of the Constitution itself (Articles 124, 148, 217, 218 and 324, which guarantee security of tenure to specific constitutional functionaries) and the procedural safeguards of Article 311. It cannot be fettered by ordinary legislation; it cannot be fettered by rules made under Article 309. Any rule that purports to make an employee irremovable, or that authorises dismissal by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority, or that dispenses with the requirement of a reasonable opportunity, is void as a fetter on the pleasure read with Article 311 (State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1961 SC 751).

The Supreme Court in Brij Mohan Lal v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 502, organised the doctrine into three categories. First, offices held strictly during the pleasure of the President or Governor with no statutory restriction on removal. Second, offices held during pleasure but subject to express restrictions against removal — the typical civil servant under Article 311 falls here. Third, offices held for a fixed term with immunity against removal except by impeachment or constitutional procedure — Supreme Court and High Court Judges, the CAG, the CEC. The third category is not subject to the doctrine of pleasure at all. Even for the first two, the doctrine in India is not absolute; it is ‘controlled by the Constitution’.

The pleasure need not be exercised by the President or Governor personally. It is an executive power exercisable on the advice of the Council of Ministers (Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 2192), or by the authority specified in the rules made under Article 309 (Moti Ram Deka). It is not subject to contractual fetters either: notwithstanding a contract, the Government may terminate service before the contractual period (Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1889), although Article 310(2) preserves a narrow class of contractual cases — outside the regular services — where compensation is payable on premature termination of a special-qualifications appointment.

Article 311 — Procedural safeguards for civil servants

Article 311 is the operative shield. It applies to members of the civil services of the Union, the all-India services, civil services of a State, and holders of civil posts under the Union or a State. Defence personnel are excluded, but police officers are not (Jagannath Prasad Sharma v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 1245). Employees of statutory corporations and of bodies that are ‘State’ under Article 12 do not, merely by that fact, hold a civil post under Article 311 — the ‘State’ under Article 12 is a different concept from a ‘civil post’ under Articles 310 and 311 (S.L. Agarwal v. General Manager, Hindustan Steel Ltd., AIR 1970 SC 1150).

Clause (1) — Authority subordinate to appointing authority

Article 311(1) prohibits dismissal or removal by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority. The clause does not require dismissal by the same authority who appointed; it is enough that the dismissing authority is not lower in rank or grade than the appointing authority (Mahesh Prasad v. State of U.P., AIR 1955 SC 70). ‘Subordinate’ refers to subordinate in rank, not in function (Sampuran Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 1407). Reduction in rank is not covered by clause (1) — only dismissal and removal are. The protection cannot be defeated by changes in administrative structure: the test is whether the dismissing authority is at least co-ordinate in rank with the authority who appointed the employee at the time of his appointment.

Clause (2) — Inquiry and reasonable opportunity

Article 311(2) is the procedural heart of the Article. It prohibits dismissal, removal or reduction in rank except after an inquiry in which the employee has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. The classic statement of what a reasonable opportunity means is in Khem Chand v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 300, where the Supreme Court enumerated the limbs of natural justice required at the inquiry: notice of charges, opportunity to deny the charges and establish innocence, opportunity to defend by cross-examining witnesses produced against him and examining witnesses in his support, and an opportunity to make representation against the proposed punishment.

The Forty-second Amendment of 1976 made a structural change. Before the amendment, the employee was entitled to a second opportunity — a notice to show cause against the proposed punishment after the inquiry but before the order. The amended Proviso to clause (2) eliminated that second show-cause stage: penalty may now be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced at the inquiry, and no separate opportunity to make representation against the proposed penalty is required. The leading authority on the post-amendment scheme is Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416, where a Constitution Bench held that the elimination of the second show-cause did not minimise the requirements of natural justice at the inquiry stage itself, because the word ‘inquiry’ is followed by the words ‘reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges’.

Three exceptions in the second proviso

The second proviso to Article 311(2) carves out three exceptional situations in which the inquiry can be dispensed with altogether. First, where the person is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct that has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. Second, where the disciplinary authority is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded in writing, that it is not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry. Third, where the President or Governor is satisfied that, in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to hold the inquiry. Clause (3) makes the second-exception decision ‘final’, but the Constitution Bench in Tulsiram Patel held that the satisfaction is justiciable and can be tested on grounds of mala fides, irrelevance and absence of material — finality cannot mean immunity from judicial review on those narrow grounds.

Dismissal, removal, reduction in rank — the threshold tests

Not every termination invokes Article 311(2). The protection attaches only when the termination amounts to dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. The leading distinction was drawn in Parshottam Lal Dhingra and developed through a long line of cases. Termination of a temporary or probationary employee in accordance with the terms of his appointment does not, by itself, amount to dismissal — even though it ends his employment. But where the order, although couched in innocent language, is in substance a punishment or carries a stigma, Article 311(2) is attracted. The test is the ‘form and substance’ test: courts look behind the form of the order to its real foundation. Reduction to a substantive lower rank from an officiating higher post is not always reduction in rank; reversion in accordance with the rules and on grounds unrelated to misconduct is not punishment.

Compulsory retirement is a related concept. The Supreme Court has held that it is a facet of the doctrine of pleasure in Article 310 (Allahabad Bank Officers’ Association v. Allahabad Bank, 1996), and that compulsory retirement on attaining the prescribed age, made bona fide in the public interest, is not punishment and does not attract Article 311(2). Where, however, the order has stigmatic content or is grounded on misconduct, the protection of Article 311(2) is engaged.

Article 14 read into Article 311

The fundamental rights apply to government servants. The pleasure under Article 310(1) is controlled by the fundamental rights — a proposition repeatedly affirmed since Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 1166. Service rules, recruitment criteria, pay scales, promotion norms, seniority lists and disciplinary procedures are all justiciable on the touchstones of Articles 14 and 16. Following Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597, the ‘reasonable opportunity’ in Article 311(2) is read with the broader requirements of fair procedure under Article 19, Article 14 and Article 21: the inquiry must be free of bias, the inquiry officer cannot be a person who has prejudged the charges, the rules of natural justice apply at every stage, and the post-decisional process — including any appeal under the rules — must itself be fair.

The applicability of Article 14 to service matters covers the full life-cycle of employment. D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 130, held that the classification of pensioners by the date of retirement was unconstitutional because it lacked a rational basis — ‘equal pension for equal service’ is implicit in Article 14. C.B. Muthamma v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 260, struck down a service rule that required a married woman to obtain permission to continue in the Indian Foreign Service. Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, (1985) 4 SCC 417, held that an excessive percentage of marks for the viva voce — typically more than thirty-three per cent in the generality of cases — would render the selection arbitrary.

Article 312 — All-India Services

Article 312 authorises Parliament to create one or more all-India services common to the Union and the States, on a resolution of the Council of States in Parliament supported by not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting that it is necessary or expedient in the national interest. The Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Police Service, deemed all-India services under Article 312(2), and the Indian Forest Service, created under Parliament’s power, are the operative all-India services today. The All India Services Act, 1951 and the rules made under it govern recruitment, pay, conduct, discipline and appeal — and they apply uniformly across States.

The constitutional architecture matters: officers of the all-India services serve the Union and the States and may be transferred between them. The disciplinary authority is the Union, and only the President can dismiss them, but the State Government in which an officer is posted may make inquiries against him under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 (Kapur Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 493). The all-India services architecture is the constitutional spine of centre-state administrative relations: the Union supplies senior officers to the States; the States employ them; both share disciplinary control under the rules.

Article 312(2) also expressly contemplated an All-India Judicial Service, but no such service has yet been created — it has been recommended by Law Commissions and the Supreme Court but the political will has not coalesced. Article 312A, inserted by the Twenty-eighth Amendment in 1972, deals with the variation of conditions of service of officers of the former Secretary of State’s services — the I.C.S. and I.P. — and has now substantially exhausted its operative content.

Article 313 — Continuance of existing laws

Article 313 is a transitional savings clause. It continues in force, until superseded under the Constitution, all laws relating to public service or any post that existed immediately before the Constitution and that continue to exist as an all-India service or as a service or post under the Union or a State, so far as they are consistent with the Constitution. The article is the bridge between the colonial service apparatus and the constitutional apparatus, and many existing rules of service continue under it where the appropriate Legislature has not yet legislated and the President or Governor has not yet made fresh rules under Article 309.

Article 314 — Repealed

Article 314 originally guaranteed certain pre-Constitution privileges to officers of the Secretary of State’s services who continued in service after the commencement of the Constitution. It was repealed by the Twenty-eighth Amendment in 1972 and replaced functionally by Article 312A. Aspirants should be aware that Article 314 is now an empty number on the page; older judgments referring to it survive but its protection no longer subsists.

Articles 315 to 323 — Public Service Commissions

The Public Service Commissions are the second pillar of Part XIV. The Constituent Assembly, drawing on the constitutional design surveyed in the historical background to the Constitution and having rejected the spoils system, designed an autonomous, expert and politically insulated body to recruit civil servants on merit. The text is in Articles 315 to 323; the architecture covers composition, removal, functions and reporting.

Article 315 — Constitution of Commissions

Article 315(1) requires a Public Service Commission for the Union and a Commission for each State. Two or more States may, on resolution of their Legislatures and an Act of Parliament, constitute a Joint State Public Service Commission. The Union Commission may, at the request of the Governor and with the President’s approval, serve the needs of a State. The constitutional purpose was articulated in Lila Dhar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1981 SC 1777: an autonomous body constituted of persons of high integrity and qualification, recruiting civil servants on merit through open competition.

Article 316 — Appointment and term

The Chairman and members of the Union Commission and any Joint Commission are appointed by the President; State Commission members are appointed by the Governor. The Proviso requires that, as nearly as may be, one-half of the members of every Commission shall be persons who at the date of their appointment have held office for at least ten years under the Government of India or of a State. The phrase ‘as nearly as may be’ is directory, not mandatory; the proportion may vary with attrition (Jai Shankar Prasad v. State of Bihar, 1993). Members hold office for six years or until age sixty-five (Union Commission) or sixty-two (State or Joint Commission), whichever is earlier; on expiry, they are ineligible for re-appointment to that office (Article 316(3)). The Supreme Court has stressed in State of Punjab v. Salil Sabhlok, (2013) 5 SCC 1, that although Article 316 does not specify qualifications, the State Government must select persons of integrity and competence — these qualities are implied relevant factors that constrain the discretion.

Article 317 — Removal and suspension

Article 317 is the most distinctive provision in the Commission architecture. The Chairman or any member of a Public Service Commission can be removed only by order of the President on the ground of misbehaviour, after the Supreme Court — on a reference made by the President — has held an inquiry under the procedure prescribed under Article 145 and reported that the member ought to be removed. The President may suspend the member during the pendency of the reference. Independent of clause (1), the President may remove a member by order if the member is adjudged insolvent, engages in any paid employment outside the duties of his office, or is, in the opinion of the President, unfit by reason of infirmity of mind or body. Clause (4) deems any concern or interest in any contract with the Government to be misbehaviour.

The procedure under clause (1) is sui generis. The Supreme Court’s inquiry is binding; the President has no discretion to decline to remove if the Court so recommends. The expression ‘misbehaviour’ is not exhaustively defined: it has been held to cover a member slapping the Chairperson (Reference under Article 317(1), AIR 1983 SC 996), tampering with mark-sheets and accepting bribes (Re: Megha Chandra Singh, M., 1994), and attempting to influence the result of a candidate (Re: Sher Singh, (1997) 3 SCC 216). Where the Chairman did not participate in selection but merely signed the recommendation list, the Supreme Court declined to find misbehaviour (R/O Dr. Ram Ashray Yadav, Chairman, Bihar PSC, 2000). The protection is deliberately stronger than the protection afforded to ordinary government servants under Article 311 — the Constitution wants the Commission insulated from political pressure.

Article 318 — Regulations on conditions of service

Article 318 empowers the President (for the Union and Joint Commissions) and the Governor (for State Commissions) to make regulations determining the number of members and their conditions of service, and the staff of the Commission and their conditions of service. The Proviso bars variation of any member’s conditions of service to his disadvantage after appointment.

Article 319 — Bar on subsequent employment

The independence of the Commission is policed at the back end too. Article 319 prohibits subsequent employment after office of a member or Chairman, with a graded scheme. The Chairman of the Union Commission is ineligible for further employment under the Government of India or any State Government. The Chairman of a State Commission is eligible for appointment as Chairman or member of the Union Commission, or Chairman of any other State Commission, but for no other government employment. Members other than the Chairman of the Union Commission are eligible for appointment as Chairman of the Union Commission or of any State Commission, but for nothing else; members other than the Chairman of a State Commission are eligible for appointment to specified higher Commission posts but for no other government employment. The object, the Court explained in Hargovind Pant v. Raghukul Tilak, AIR 1979 SC 1109, is to insulate Commission members from any allurement of post-Commission government employment. A ‘constitutional office’ — Governor, High Court Judge — is not ‘employment under the Government’ for this purpose, because there is no master-servant relationship.

Article 320 — Functions of the Commission

Article 320(1) imposes the duty to conduct examinations for appointment to the services of the Union and the State. Article 320(3) lists the matters on which the Commission shall be consulted: methods of recruitment to civil services and posts; principles to be followed in making appointments, promotions and transfers; the suitability of candidates for appointments, promotions or transfers; all disciplinary matters; claims for reimbursement of legal costs; and claims for pension in respect of injuries sustained in service. The Proviso to Article 320(3) authorises the President or Governor to make regulations specifying matters in which Commission consultation will not be necessary.

Two large doctrines flow from Article 320. First, the Commission’s function is purely advisory — its advice is not binding on the Government (D’Silva, A.N. v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 1130). Second, the consultation requirement under clause (3), although couched in mandatory language, is directory: failure to consult does not, by itself, invalidate the Government’s order (State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912). The provision confers no individual right on the government servant. The position is reaffirmed in Union of India v. T.V. Patel, (2007) 4 SCC 785: absence of consultation, or any irregularity in the consultation process, does not afford a delinquent government servant a cause of action. Article 311 is not controlled by Article 320.

Within those limits the Commission is constitutionally significant. The Commission cannot prescribe additional eligibility or suitability requirements over those in the rules, cannot fix minimum marks for the viva voce where the rules do not so prescribe (Durgacharan Misra v. State of Orissa, 1987), and cannot reopen its selection at the instance of the Government to lower the norms (State of U.P. v. Rafiquddin, AIR 1988 SC 162). Once a candidate is selected, no vested right to appointment arises (Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 47), but the Government must act fairly, not arbitrarily, and cannot accept part of a select list while rejecting the rest (Asha Kaul v. State of J. & K., (1993) 2 SCC 573). Article 320(4) excludes consultation in respect of reservations under Article 16(4) and Article 335.

Article 321 — Additional functions

Article 321 permits the appropriate Legislature to confer additional functions on the Commission — beyond Article 320 — relating to the services of the Union, the State, a local authority, a body corporate constituted by law, or a public institution. The Commission cannot assume any function not authorised by Articles 320 or 321 (Mira Chatterjee v. Public Service Commission, AIR 1958 Cal. 345); private arrangements between Government and Commission do not suffice.

Article 322 — Expenses charged on Consolidated Fund

Article 322 charges all expenses of a Commission, including salaries and pensions of members and staff, on the Consolidated Fund of India or of the State, as the case may be. The financial autonomy of the Commission is the structural counterpart of the procedural autonomy under Article 317.

Article 323 — Annual reports

Article 323 requires the Commission to present an annual report to the President or Governor on the work done. The Government must lay the report before the Legislature, together with a memorandum explaining, in the cases where the Commission’s advice was not accepted, the reasons for non-acceptance. The constitutional bargain is transparency: the Government may reject Commission advice, but the rejection must be reasoned and the reasons must be tabled before the Legislature. While the Government has unfettered discretion to disagree, it cannot act arbitrarily; the reasons must be available to the Court if the rejection is challenged (H. Mukherjee v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 495).

Service tribunals — the procedural offshoot

The Forty-second Amendment — one of the most consequential exercises of the Article 368 amendment power — also introduced Articles 323A and 323B, providing for administrative tribunals and tribunals for other matters. The Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, made under Article 323A, established the Central Administrative Tribunal and State Administrative Tribunals to adjudicate service disputes that were earlier within the jurisdiction of the High Courts. The relationship between Article 311 protection and tribunal adjudication, and the constitutional limits on tribunalisation, are dealt with separately under tribunals; for present purposes it is enough to note that an aggrieved civil servant’s primary remedy today is to the tribunal under Article 323A, with eventual access to the High Court and Supreme Court under the constitutional remedies in Article 32 and Article 226.

The doctrinal map — pleasure, procedure, autonomy

Pull the threads together. The State employs at pleasure (Article 310). The pleasure is bounded by procedure (Article 311). Recruitment is regulated by legislation, with rules under the Proviso filling the gap (Article 309). The all-India services bridge the Union and the States (Article 312). The Commissions police merit at the front end and disciplinary fairness at the back end (Articles 315 to 323). And every step is justiciable against the equality guarantee of Articles 14 and 16 and the fair-procedure guarantee of Article 21.

The architecture is not merely a structural arrangement. It is a constitutional choice. The framers, working from the colonial service apparatus, chose to entrench tenure in the Constitution rather than leave it to statute, to entrench the Commissions rather than leave them to executive ordinance, and to entrench equality rather than leave it to administrative goodwill. Each article in Part XIV is a piece of that choice. The exam-relevant tasks for the aspirant are: read each article in tandem with its leading authority; understand the second-show-cause history of Article 311(2); know the three exceptions in the second proviso and their limits; remember Tulsiram Patel, Khem Chand, Parshottam Lal Dhingra, Moti Ram Deka, Babu Ram Upadhya, and Ashok Kumar Yadav; trace the consultation requirement under Article 320(3) as directory not mandatory; and place the all-India services in the larger frame of the Union executive and the State executive.

The whole of Part XIV operates within the larger framework of the Constitution of India, and the doctrines worked out in service jurisprudence — pleasure, fair procedure, status not contract, the role of natural justice in disciplinary inquiries — feed back into the broader constitutional law of executive action. They are also the most heavily tested portion of Part XIV in judicial-services papers: questions on the scope of Article 311(2), the second proviso’s exceptions, the binding force of PSC advice, the ‘civil post’ threshold, and compulsory retirement recur every year. Mastering this chapter is therefore high-yield work for the aspirant who wants to win the constitutional-law section.

Frequently asked questions

What is the doctrine of pleasure under Article 310 and how is it different from the English position?

Article 310(1) declares that civil servants and defence personnel hold office during the pleasure of the President or Governor. The doctrine is borrowed from English common law but, unlike in England, it is constitutionally entrenched and cannot be displaced by ordinary legislation. It is, however, controlled by the express provisions of the Constitution itself — including the procedural safeguards of Article 311 — and by the fundamental rights. As the Supreme Court explained in Brij Mohan Lal v. Union of India (2012), the Indian doctrine has limitations and restrictions that the English version does not.

What did the Forty-second Amendment do to Article 311(2)?

The 1976 amendment eliminated the second show-cause notice. Before 1976, a delinquent civil servant was entitled to two opportunities — first to defend against the charges at the inquiry stage, and second to make representation against the proposed penalty after the inquiry but before the order. The amended Proviso to Article 311(2) provides that the penalty may be imposed on the basis of evidence adduced at the inquiry, with no separate post-inquiry opportunity. The Constitution Bench in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985) upheld the amendment, holding that it did not minimise the requirements of natural justice at the inquiry stage itself.

When can the disciplinary inquiry under Article 311(2) be dispensed with?

The second proviso to Article 311(2) permits dispensing with the inquiry in three situations: where the dismissal is on the ground of conduct that has led to a criminal conviction; where the disciplinary authority is satisfied, for reasons recorded in writing, that holding the inquiry is not reasonably practicable; or where the President or Governor is satisfied that, in the interest of the security of the State, holding the inquiry is not expedient. Although clause (3) makes the second-exception decision final, Tulsiram Patel held that the satisfaction is justiciable on grounds of mala fides, irrelevance and absence of material.

Is the Public Service Commission's advice binding on the Government under Article 320?

No. The Commission's function is advisory. The Supreme Court held in D'Silva, A.N. v. Union of India (1962) that Article 320(3) does not confer any right on the government servant, and consultation is directory, not mandatory — failure to consult does not by itself invalidate the Government's order. The position was reaffirmed in Union of India v. T.V. Patel (2007). The Government must, however, act fairly: under Article 323, where the Government rejects the Commission's recommendation, it must place the reasons for non-acceptance before the Legislature with the annual report.

How can a member of a Public Service Commission be removed under Article 317?

A Chairman or member can be removed only by order of the President on the ground of misbehaviour, after a reference to the Supreme Court and an inquiry under Article 145 — and only if the Court reports that the member ought to be removed. The President may also remove the member, without reference, on three administrative grounds in clause (3): adjudication of insolvency, engagement in paid employment outside the office, or unfitness due to infirmity of mind or body. Clause (4) deems concern or interest in any government contract to be misbehaviour. The protection is deliberately stronger than that under Article 311, to insulate the Commission from political pressure.

Who holds a 'civil post' for the purposes of Article 311?

A civil post means an office on the civil side of the administration, distinguished from a defence post. The test, settled in State of Assam v. Kanak Chandra Dutta (1967), is the master-servant relationship — selection by the employer, payment of remuneration, the right to control the method of work, and the power to suspend or remove. Article 311 covers members of all civil services, the all-India services and holders of civil posts under the Union or a State. It excludes defence personnel but includes police officers (Jagannath Prasad Sharma v. State of U.P., 1961). Employees of statutory corporations and of companies — even if 'State' under Article 12 — do not, merely by that fact, hold a civil post under Article 311.