Execution, Suspension, Remission and Commutation of Sentences

Sections 453 to 477 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — previously Sections 413 to 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — collect the entire post-judgment lifecycle of a sentence: how it is executed, when its execution may be suspended, and when it may be remitted, commuted, or pardoned by the executive. The chapter answers four operational questions in sequence — how is the sentence carried out, what are the limits on the executing court’s discretion, when may the sentence be cut short, and on whose order? It runs parallel to the constitutional clemency power under Articles 72 and 161, and it now codifies for the first time, in Section 472 BNSS, the mercy-petition procedure for death-sentence convicts.

The BNSS retains the substantive architecture, makes one structural addition — Section 472 BNSS on mercy petitions in death-sentence cases is wholly new — and revises specific provisions: the heading of Section 456 BNSS is changed from “Postponement” to “Commutation of sentence of death on pregnant woman”, the proviso on civil-jail Insolvency Act references is dropped from Section 457, “but no such payment has been made” is added in Section 461(1), “or bail bond” is added in Section 464, and Section 474 carries five new commutation clauses while excluding four CrPC-era clauses. The case law — Triveniben v. State of Gujarat, Sher Singh v. State of Punjab, Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, Akhtar v. Asst. Collector, Bachan Singh, Maru Ram — carries forward unchanged.

Statutory anchor and scheme

The chapter divides into four blocks.

1. Death sentences — Sections 453 to 456 BNSS (previously Sections 413 to 416 CrPC). Execution of the order of confirmation, execution of a death sentence passed by the High Court in appeal or revision, postponement of execution where appeal lies to the Supreme Court, and commutation of a death sentence on a pregnant woman.
2. Imprisonment — Sections 457 to 460 BNSS (previously Sections 417 to 420 CrPC). Place of imprisonment, execution of imprisonment sentence, direction of warrant, lodging of warrant.
3. Levy of fine and general execution — Sections 461 to 471 BNSS (previously Sections 421 to 431 CrPC). Warrant for levy of fine, suspension of imprisonment for default, who may issue a warrant, escaped convicts, concurrent and consecutive sentences, set-off of detention undergone.
4. Suspension, remission, commutation — Sections 472 to 477 BNSS (previously Section 432 to 435 CrPC, plus the new Section 472). The executive’s power to suspend or remit, the power to commute, the structural restrictions on remission, and the concurrent powers of Central and State Governments. Section 472 BNSS is wholly new and codifies the mercy-petition procedure in death-sentence cases.

The chapter sits at the end of the trial process. The death sentence whose execution it governs comes through the death-sentence confirmation chapter; the imprisonment sentence comes through the judgment form and contents chapter; appeals against the sentence run through the criminal appeal regime. The full procedural map is in the Code of Criminal Procedure and BNSS notes.

Sections 453 to 455 BNSS — execution of death sentence

Section 453 BNSS (previously Section 413 CrPC) is the trigger for execution of a confirmed death sentence. When the Court of Session receives the order of confirmation or other order from the High Court under the capital-confirmation regime, it shall cause the order to be carried into effect by issuing a warrant or taking such other steps as may be necessary. Section 454 BNSS (previously Section 414 CrPC) covers the parallel situation where the death sentence is passed by the High Court itself in appeal or revision, rather than by way of confirmation; the Court of Session, on receiving the order, issues the warrant of execution.

Section 455 BNSS (previously Section 415 CrPC) is the constitutional safeguard. Where a person is sentenced to death by the High Court, and an appeal lies to the Supreme Court under Article 134(1)(a) or (b) of the Constitution, the High Court shall order execution to be postponed until the period for appeal expires or, if appeal is preferred, until disposal. Sub-section (2) extends the postponement to applications for certificate under Article 132 or 134(1)(c). Sub-section (3) extends it to special-leave petitions under Article 136 — the High Court shall postpone execution for such period as it considers sufficient to enable the convict to file the petition. The provision was inserted on the Law Commission’s recommendation to ensure that constitutional appeals are not rendered infructuous by “unfortunately prompt execution”.

Section 456 BNSS — pregnant woman commutation

Section 456 BNSS (previously Section 416 CrPC) addresses the case where a woman sentenced to death is found to be pregnant. The CrPC heading was “Postponement of capital sentence on pregnant woman”; the BNSS recasts it as “Commutation of sentence of death on pregnant woman” — a substantive textual change that aligns the heading with the operative provision. In either form, the High Court shall commute the sentence to imprisonment for life. The provision is mandatory: postponement is no longer an option under the BNSS heading; the only outcome is commutation.

Delay in execution of death sentence — the Article 21 overlay

The Code is silent on the consequences of inordinate delay between confirmation and execution; the Supreme Court has filled the gap. The Constitution Bench in Triveniben v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1989 SC 142 settled the propositions:

1. “Procedure established by law” in Article 21 means a procedure which is just, fair, and reasonable. Any circumstance that renders the sentence harsh, unjust, or unfair offends Article 21.
2. Undue long delay in the execution of the sentence of death after its confirmation, for which the accused himself is not responsible, renders the sentence harsh and unjust as it causes additional torture and inhuman treatment.
3. Inordinate delay in the disposal of a mercy petition under Article 72 or 161 entitles the convict to approach the Supreme Court under Article 32 for commutation to life imprisonment, on grounds of Article 14 and 21 violation.
4. What is “undue delay” depends on the circumstances of each case; no fixed period can be laid down.
5. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to reopen the merits of conviction in a delay-based Article 32 petition; the only question is whether the delay subsequent to the final judicial verdict is undue, and the convict has not contributed to it through review or repeated mercy petitions.
6. If the delay is found undue, the Court will quash the death sentence and substitute imprisonment for life.

Sher Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 465 (which reversed T.V. Vatheeswaran v. State of T.N., AIR 1983 SC 361 on the question of fixed two-year delay rule) framed the harshness test; Madhu Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 2299 applied it to inordinate delay in disposal of mercy petitions; and Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, (2014) 3 SCC 1 reduced the doctrine to operational guidelines — physical and mental health reports before hanging, post-mortem reports, abolition of solitary confinement, and time-bound mercy disposal. The constitutional architecture overlays the statutory execution procedure: a death sentence may be lawfully passed, but its execution must conform to constitutional procedure.

Sections 458 to 460 BNSS — execution of imprisonment

Section 458 BNSS (previously Section 418 CrPC) is the operative imprisonment-execution section. Where the accused is sentenced to imprisonment for life or for a term, the court shall forthwith forward a warrant to the jail or other place of confinement and, unless the accused is already confined there, forward the accused with the warrant. The proviso lets the court dispense with a written warrant where the sentence is “till the rising of the court”. Sub-section (2) covers the case where the accused is not present in court at sentencing — the court shall issue a warrant for arrest, and the sentence commences on the date of arrest.

The Supreme Court in Govt. of A.P. v. Anne Venkateswara Rao, AIR 1977 SC 1096 read “or other place” in Section 458(1) to include preventive-detention places — the warrant must be forwarded to the detention-authority, which has to produce the accused in court. Imprisonment commences from the time of pronouncement of sentence, unless the order specifies a future date (Ram v. State, (1986) CrLJ 617). The word “forthwith” in sub-section (1) makes the time between despatch of warrant and actual delivery to the jailor part of the sentence already being served (Bhanja v. Somnath, AIR 1969 Or 268).

Section 457 BNSS (previously Section 417 CrPC) lets the State Government direct where any person liable to be imprisoned shall be confined; the BNSS drops the Provincial Insolvency Act reference that the CrPC carried as a transitional artefact. Sections 459 and 460 BNSS (previously Sections 419 and 420 CrPC) are the warrant-direction and warrant-lodgement rules — the warrant is directed to the officer-in-charge of the place of confinement, and is lodged with the jailor when the prisoner is confined in jail.

Sections 461 to 463 BNSS — levy of fine

Section 461 BNSS (previously Section 421 CrPC) is the fine-execution gateway. When an offender has been sentenced to pay a fine, the court may take action by (a) issuing a warrant for the levy of the amount by attachment and sale of any movable property of the offender, or (b) issuing a warrant to the District Collector authorising him to realise the amount as arrears of land revenue from movable or immovable property. The proviso bars the court from issuing such a warrant where the sentence directs imprisonment in default of fine and the offender has undergone the whole of such default-imprisonment — unless special reasons are recorded in writing, or the sentence includes a compensation order under Section 395 BNSS (previously Section 357 CrPC).

The BNSS adds “but no such payment has been made” in sub-section (1) — a clarifying addition that disambiguates the proviso’s trigger: the bar on issuing the recovery warrant after default-imprisonment applies only where the fine itself remains unpaid. The Supreme Court in Paras v. State, AIR 1969 All 116 held that the “special reasons” must be relevant to why the fine could not be recovered before service of the default-sentence — for instance, that the authorities did not know of the offender’s property, or that the property was inherited later, or that there was insufficient time before default-imprisonment.

Section 462 BNSS (previously Section 422 CrPC) lets the warrant under Section 461(1)(a) be executed within the local jurisdiction of the issuing court, or, when endorsed by the District Magistrate of another jurisdiction, in that other jurisdiction. The District Magistrate’s endorsement function is judicial, not ministerial; the District Magistrate may examine the legality of the warrant before endorsing it (Subramaniam v. Commr. of Police, AIR 1964 Mad 185). Section 463 BNSS (previously Section 423 CrPC) covers cross-border execution where the warrant is issued by a court in territory to which the Code does not extend — the Collector treats it as if issued under Section 461(1)(b).

Section 464 BNSS — suspension of fine-default imprisonment

Section 464 BNSS (previously Section 424 CrPC) lets the court, where the offender has been sentenced to fine only and to default-imprisonment, suspend the sentence of imprisonment if the fine is not paid forthwith. The court may order the fine to be paid in instalments — full payment within thirty days, or in two or three instalments at intervals not exceeding thirty days each. The offender executes a bond conditioned for appearance on the payment dates; if the fine or any instalment is not paid, the court may direct imprisonment to be carried out at once. The BNSS replaces “with or without sureties” with “or bail bond” — aligning the language with the broader BNSS bail-bond regime treated in the bail-bond regime.

Section 466 BNSS — sentence on escaped convict

Section 466 BNSS (previously Section 426 CrPC) deals with the execution of a sentence on a convict who has escaped from earlier custody. Where the new sentence is one of death, life imprisonment, or fine, it takes effect immediately. Where the new sentence is imprisonment for a term, it takes effect immediately if it is severer in kind than the sentence the convict was undergoing at the time of escape; if not severer, it takes effect only after the convict has served the unexpired portion of his earlier sentence. Sub-section (3) declares that rigorous imprisonment is severer in kind than simple imprisonment.

Section 467 BNSS — concurrent and consecutive sentences

Section 467 BNSS (previously Section 427 CrPC) is the multi-sentence section. When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, the new sentence shall commence on expiration of the previous sentence — that is, sentences run consecutively by default — unless the court directs concurrent running. The proviso covers a special case: where a person sentenced under Section 141 BNSS (previously Section 122 CrPC) for default in furnishing security is, while undergoing that sentence, sentenced for an earlier-committed offence, the latter sentence commences immediately. Sub-section (2) provides that where a person already undergoing life imprisonment is sentenced again to a term or life imprisonment, the new sentence runs concurrently with the previous one.

The Supreme Court in Akhtar v. Asst. Collector, AIR 1988 SC 2143 framed the doctrine on concurrent versus consecutive sentences: where one transaction constitutes offences under two enactments, sentences should be concurrent; where the same facts constitute different offences arising from separate transactions, sentences should be consecutive. The accused had been sentenced to seven years under the Gold Control Act, 1968, and four years under the Customs Act, 1962, on the same gold-possession; the Court held the consecutive sentence justified because the two offences were distinct in their statutory architecture.

Section 467 read with Section 414 BNSS (previously Section 362 CrPC), discussed in the judgment chapter, raises a procedural question: when can the concurrence direction be issued? The better view is that the direction must form part of the subsequent judgment itself; once judgment is pronounced, the trial court cannot subsequently add a concurrence direction except by way of clerical-error correction (Bhadkaran v. State, (1978) CrLJ 738). The High Court’s power under Section 528 BNSS may, in exceptional cases, be invoked to direct concurrent running where the trial court did not (Sher Singh v. State of M.P., (1989) CrLJ 632 MP FB), but the Supreme Court in M.R. Kudva v. State of A.P., AIR 2007 SC 568 cautioned that where appeals up to the Supreme Court have been dismissed without invoking Section 427, a subsequent inherent-power application is not maintainable.

Section 468 BNSS — set-off of detention undergone

Section 468 BNSS (previously Section 428 CrPC) is the set-off section. Where an accused person has, on conviction, been sentenced to imprisonment for a term (other than imprisonment in default of payment of fine), the period of detention — if any — undergone by the accused during investigation, inquiry, or trial of the same case, and before the date of conviction, shall be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on him. The convict thus serves only the balance of the sentence after subtracting the pre-conviction custody. The provision gives statutory effect to the principle that detention before judgment, even if necessary, should not be added to the post-judgment punishment.

Section 472 BNSS — Mercy Petition (newly added)

Section 472 BNSS is wholly new and has no CrPC counterpart. It codifies the mercy-petition procedure in death-sentence cases. Under Article 72 of the Constitution, the President has the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites, and remissions; under Article 161, the Governor has a parallel State-level power. The procedure for filing and disposal of mercy petitions has, until the BNSS, been governed by executive instructions and Supreme Court guidelines (most authoritatively, Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, (2014) 3 SCC 1). Section 472 BNSS gives the procedure statutory form: it sets out who may file, when, the time limits for State and Central Government action, and the consequences of inaction.

The structural effect of Section 472 BNSS is to harden the procedural safeguards announced in Shatrughan Chauhan into a code: (a) the convict (or any of his close relatives) may file a mercy petition within thirty days of the disposal of the appeal or review; (b) the State Government must forward the petition to the Central Government with its recommendation within sixty days; (c) the Central Government must place the petition before the President within sixty days; (d) inordinate delay in disposal at any stage may be ground for commutation under the Triveniben doctrine. The provision does not restrict the constitutional power of pardon under Articles 72 and 161 — it codifies the procedure.

Sections 473 to 477 BNSS — suspension, remission, commutation

Section 473 BNSS (previously Section 432 CrPC) is the executive’s general power to suspend or remit. The appropriate Government may, at any time, without conditions or upon any conditions accepted by the convict, suspend the execution of the sentence or remit the whole or any part of the punishment. The BNSS excludes the word “male” from sub-section (5), removing a gender-specific limit that had become obsolete.

Section 474 BNSS (previously Section 433 CrPC) is the commutation power. The appropriate Government may, without the convict’s consent, commute (a) a sentence of death to any other punishment provided by the BNS; (b) a sentence of imprisonment for life to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years or fine; (c) a sentence of rigorous imprisonment to simple imprisonment for any term to which the convict might have been sentenced; (d) a sentence of simple imprisonment to fine. The BNSS adds five new clauses to Section 474 and excludes four CrPC-era clauses — the BNSS commutation menu is wider and reflects modern sentencing options including community service.

Section 475 BNSS (previously Section 433A CrPC) is the structural restriction. Where a person is sentenced to imprisonment for life for an offence for which death is one of the punishments provided by law, or where a death sentence imposed on the convict has been commuted under Section 474 BNSS to imprisonment for life, such person shall not be released from prison unless he has served at least fourteen years of imprisonment. The provision was upheld by the Supreme Court in Maru Ram v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 2147 as constitutional, on the ground that it qualifies the executive remission power but does not affect the constitutional pardoning power under Articles 72 and 161.

Sections 476 and 477 BNSS (previously Sections 434 and 435 CrPC) deal with the Central Government’s concurrent power in death-sentence cases and the requirement of consultation between Central and State Governments in cases investigated by Central agencies. The BNSS replaces “consultation” with “concurrence” in Section 477 — a textual hardening of the federal coordination requirement. The Delhi Special Police Establishment reference is dropped, but the substantive concurrent jurisdiction over Central-Act investigations is preserved.

Constitutional clemency — Articles 72 and 161

The statutory regime under Sections 473 to 477 BNSS runs parallel to the constitutional clemency power. Article 72 confers on the President the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites, or remissions of punishment, or to suspend, remit, or commute the sentence of any person convicted of an offence (a) where the punishment was by court-martial; (b) where the offence is against any law relating to a matter to which the Union’s executive power extends; (c) in all cases where the sentence is one of death. Article 161 confers a parallel power on the Governor in respect of offences against laws to which the State’s executive power extends.

The constitutional power is wider than the statutory power and is not bound by the fourteen-year rule of Section 475 BNSS or the consent and condition rules of Section 473. The Supreme Court in Kehar Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 653 held that the President’s power under Article 72 is exercised on the advice of the Council of Ministers; it is justiciable to the limited extent of examining whether the power was exercised on relevant material and within the constitutional framework. Maru Ram read the statutory and constitutional powers as complementary — the statutory regime regulates routine commutation and remission; the constitutional power is reserved for cases of grace.

BNSS comparison — what changed

The architecture is largely unchanged. The textual changes are:

1. Section 456 BNSS — heading changed from “Postponement” to “Commutation of sentence of death on pregnant woman”.
2. Section 457 BNSS — the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 reference dropped from sub-section (3).
3. Section 461 BNSS — “but no such payment has been made” added in sub-section (1) — clarifies the proviso’s trigger.
4. Section 464 BNSS — “or bail bond” added; “with or without sureties” excluded.
5. Section 472 BNSS — wholly new section on Mercy Petition in death-sentence cases.
6. Section 473 BNSS — the word “male” excluded from sub-section (5).
7. Section 474 BNSS — five new commutation clauses added; four CrPC-era clauses excluded.
8. Section 477 BNSS — “concurrence” replaces “consultation”; Delhi Special Police Establishment reference removed.

The case law on Sections 413 to 435 CrPC carries forward to Sections 453 to 477 BNSS. Triveniben, Sher Singh, Madhu Mehta, Shatrughan Chauhan, Bachan Singh, Maru Ram, Kehar Singh, Akhtar, Paras, Subramaniam — all good law. The main BNSS innovation, Section 472, is itself a codification of Shatrughan Chauhan’s mercy-petition guidelines.

Exam-angle takeaways

Five points exam-setters use without fail.

1. BNSS innovation: Section 472 codifies mercy petitions. The first statutory framework for mercy-petition procedure in death-sentence cases — thirty days for the convict to file, sixty days for the State Government, sixty days for the Central Government. Has no CrPC counterpart and is a probable BNSS-versus-CrPC banker.
2. Triveniben doctrine on undue delay. Inordinate delay in execution of death sentence after final judicial verdict, where the convict is not responsible, attracts Article 21 commutation. The judicial period up to final verdict is excluded from the delay calculation.
3. Section 467 default rule is consecutive, not concurrent. Subsequent sentences run consecutively unless the court directs otherwise. The direction must be in the subsequent judgment itself; once judgment is pronounced, only the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction can supply a concurrence direction (M.R. Kudva; Sher Singh v. State of M.P.).
4. Section 468 set-off is automatic. Pre-conviction detention is set off against the post-conviction term, except where the imprisonment is in default of fine. The convict serves only the balance.
5. Section 475 BNSS fourteen-year floor. Where life imprisonment is for an offence carrying death as alternative punishment, or where a commuted death sentence is involved, the convict must serve at least fourteen years before remission is possible (Maru Ram v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 2147). The constitutional clemency power under Articles 72 and 161 is not bound by this floor.

The execution chapter is the operational endpoint of the criminal process. A long-form mains answer should walk through the four-block architecture — death execution, imprisonment execution, fine execution, suspension and clemency — flag the Section 472 BNSS innovation, and finish with the constitutional clemency power and the Triveniben Article 21 overlay. A prelims MCQ will pivot on the Section 467 default rule, the Section 468 set-off, the Section 475 fourteen-year floor, the Section 472 timelines, or the difference between Article 72 and Section 473. The companion chapters — the capital confirmation chapter that supplies the confirmed sentence, the bail and bonds chapter that supplies the post-conviction bail jurisdiction, and the inherent powers of the High Court chapter that supplies the residual concurrence-direction jurisdiction — complete the post-trial map of a sentence’s lifecycle.

Frequently asked questions

What is the new Section 472 BNSS on mercy petitions, and does it have a CrPC counterpart?

Section 472 BNSS is a wholly new provision with no CrPC counterpart. It codifies the mercy-petition procedure in death-sentence cases that, until the BNSS, was governed only by executive instructions and Supreme Court guidelines (most authoritatively, Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, (2014) 3 SCC 1). The BNSS gives the procedure statutory form: the convict (or any of his close relatives) may file a mercy petition within thirty days of disposal of appeal or review; the State Government must forward the petition with its recommendation to the Central Government within sixty days; the Central Government must place it before the President within sixty days. Inordinate delay at any stage may attract commutation under the Triveniben v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1989 SC 142 doctrine. Section 472 does not restrict the constitutional power of pardon under Articles 72 and 161 — it codifies the procedure for the statutory layer.

Does inordinate delay in executing a death sentence violate Article 21?

Yes, in some cases. The Constitution Bench in Triveniben v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1989 SC 142 settled the rule: undue long delay in the execution of a death sentence after its confirmation, for which the accused is not responsible, renders the sentence harsh and unjust as it amounts to additional torture and inhuman treatment, violating Article 21. Sher Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 465 framed the harshness test. Madhu Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 2299 applied it to delay in disposal of mercy petitions. Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, (2014) 3 SCC 1 reduced the doctrine to operational guidelines. The remedy is commutation of death to life imprisonment under Article 32. The judicial period up to the final verdict is excluded from the delay calculation; only delay after the final judicial verdict, and not contributed to by the convict through review or repeated mercy petitions, counts.

What is the default rule under Section 467 BNSS — concurrent or consecutive sentences?

Consecutive. Section 467(1) BNSS (previously Section 427(1) CrPC) declares that when a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction, the subsequent sentence shall commence at the expiration of the previous sentence — that is, sentences run consecutively by default — unless the court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with the previous one. The Supreme Court in Akhtar v. Asst. Collector, AIR 1988 SC 2143 framed the doctrinal test: where one transaction constitutes offences under two enactments, sentences should be concurrent; where the same facts constitute different offences arising from separate transactions, sentences should be consecutive. The concurrence direction must form part of the subsequent judgment itself; once judgment is pronounced, the trial court cannot subsequently add a concurrence direction except by way of clerical-error correction (Bhadkaran v. State, (1978) CrLJ 738). Sub-section (2) is the exception — where a life-imprisonment convict is sentenced again to a term or life, the new sentence runs concurrently.

What is the fourteen-year floor under Section 475 BNSS?

Section 475 BNSS (previously Section 433A CrPC) declares that where a person is sentenced to imprisonment for life for an offence for which death is one of the punishments provided by law, or where a death sentence imposed on the convict has been commuted under Section 474 BNSS to imprisonment for life, such person shall not be released from prison unless he has served at least fourteen years of imprisonment. The provision was upheld by the Supreme Court in Maru Ram v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 2147 as constitutional. It qualifies the executive remission power under Section 473 BNSS but does not affect the constitutional pardoning power under Articles 72 and 161 — the President and Governor may, in exercise of constitutional clemency, release a convict before the fourteen-year floor. The provision applies prospectively to persons convicted after its commencement, and reflects the legislative judgment that gravely-punishable offences require a minimum period of incarceration before executive grace can intervene.

How does Section 468 BNSS set-off operate against pre-conviction detention?

Section 468 BNSS (previously Section 428 CrPC) provides that where an accused person has, on conviction, been sentenced to imprisonment for a term — not being imprisonment in default of payment of fine — the period of detention, if any, undergone by the accused during the investigation, inquiry, or trial of the same case, and before the date of conviction, shall be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on him. The convict thus serves only the balance of the sentence after subtracting pre-conviction custody. The provision gives statutory effect to the principle that detention before judgment, even if necessary, should not be added to post-judgment punishment. Three limits apply: (i) the detention must be in the same case (cross-detention from another case does not count); (ii) the post-conviction sentence must be imprisonment for a term, not life imprisonment or default-imprisonment; (iii) the set-off operates automatically — it does not require a specific direction in the judgment, though courts often record it for clarity.