Competition
Act, 2002
Twenty-two chapter notes covering India’s competition law framework — the prohibition on anti-competitive agreements (Section 3), the prohibition on abuse of dominant position (Section 4), the combination regulation framework (Sections 5 and 6), the Competition Commission of India’s powers, the Director General’s investigation, and the appellate framework before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). Conduct first, market definition second, CCI power third.
Competition law — protecting the market, not the competitor.
The Competition Act 2002 replaced the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1969. The Act’s core prohibition is on conduct that causes, or is likely to cause, appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC) in the relevant market in India. The Act covers three principal categories: anti-competitive agreements (Section 3 — cartels, vertical agreements), abuse of dominant position (Section 4 — predatory pricing, exclusive dealing, refusal to deal), and combinations (Sections 5 and 6 — mergers and acquisitions above specified thresholds requiring CCI approval).
These notes anchor every chapter to its Competition Act section. The most-tested provisions are Section 3(1) (anti-competitive agreements), Section 3(3) (horizontal per se violations), Section 3(4) (vertical agreements — rule of reason), Section 4 (abuse of dominant position), Section 5 (combination thresholds), Section 6 (regulation of combinations), Section 26 (Director General’s investigation), Section 27 (CCI orders), and Section 53A (appeal to NCLAT).
Each chapter is designed to be read in twelve to fifteen minutes and to leave the reader with the section, the relevant market definition, the AAEC test, the CCI’s remedial power, and the leading authority.
How to read these notes
Define the relevant market.
Every competition law chapter begins with the relevant market definition — the relevant product market (what products are substitutable from the consumer’s perspective) and the relevant geographic market (the geographic area where conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous). The relevant market is the denominator for assessing market share, dominance, and the AAEC.
Apply the AAEC test.
Every competition question applies the AAEC test. For Section 3(3) horizontal agreements (price-fixing, bid-rigging, market allocation), the AAEC is presumed — the burden shifts to the parties to rebut. For Section 3(4) vertical agreements (exclusive dealing, resale price maintenance, tie-in), the AAEC must be proved. For Section 4 abuse, the AAEC must be established through the Section 19(3) factors.
Test on the leading case.
If you can restate the holding of CCI v. Steel Authority of India Ltd, Bharti Airtel Ltd v. CCI, or Excel Crop Care Ltd v. CCI in two sentences, you understand the chapter. If not, return to the statutory section and rebuild from there.
All 22 chapters, in 3 groups
Sequenced through the natural structure of the subject — every chapter sits in a doctrinal cluster.Anti-Competitive Agreements — Section 3
Sections 3(1)–3(5) — the cartel and vertical agreement regime
Section 3(1) the general prohibition on agreements causing AAEC. Section 3(3) per se prohibition on horizontal agreements — price fixing, bid rigging, market allocation, production restriction. The cartel presumption and the limited Section 3(3) proviso. Section 3(4) rule-of-reason approach for vertical agreements — exclusive supply agreements, exclusive distribution agreements, tie-in arrangements, resale price maintenance, refusal to deal. Section 3(5) exceptions — IPR protection, export agreements.
Introduction — Evolution from MRTP to Competition Act
CCI · 02Definitions — Enterprise, Relevant Market, Cartel
CCI · 03Anti-Competitive Agreements (Section 3)
CCI · 04Horizontal Agreements — Cartels and Per Se Rule
CCI · 05Vertical Agreements — Rule of Reason
CCI · 06Abuse of Dominant Position (Section 4)
CCI · 07Determining Dominance — Relevant Market Analysis
Abuse of Dominance & Combinations
Sections 4–6 — unilateral and merger control
Section 4 abuse of dominant position — Section 4(1) prohibition and Section 4(2) the six specific abuses (unfair pricing, predatory pricing, limiting production, denying market access, tying, leveraging dominance). Section 19(4) factors for determining dominant position including market share, countervailing buying power, entry barriers. Section 5 combination thresholds — asset and turnover thresholds for mandatory notification. Section 6 regulation of combinations — the thirty-day automatic approval window, the CCI’s investigation and approval process.
Combinations — Mergers and Acquisitions (Sections 5 to 6)
CCI · 09Notifiable Combinations Thresholds
CCI · 10Procedure for Notification — Form I and Form II
CCI · 11Green Channel Approval
CCI · 12Competition Commission of India — Establishment
CCI · 13Director General — Investigation (Sections 16 to 17)
CCI · 14Inquiry into Anti-Competitive Agreements (Section 19)
CCI Powers, Investigation & NCLAT Appeal
Sections 18–53A + reference
The Competition Commission of India — composition, Section 18 powers, Section 19 Director General’s investigation on complaint or suo motu. Section 26 DG’s investigation process. Section 27 CCI orders on finding of contravention — cease-and-desist, penalty (up to ten per cent of average turnover for three years), structural remedies including divestiture. Section 48 penalty on individuals. Section 53A appeal to NCLAT and further to the Supreme Court. The landmark CCI and Supreme Court decisions including Excel Crop Care on Leniency and Bharti Airtel on market definition.