Alimony Pendente Lite, Permanent Alimony and Maintenance (Sections 24, 25)

Sections 24 and 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 together carry the financial scaffolding of every matrimonial proceeding. Section 24 operates while a petition is pending — it secures the indigent spouse with interim maintenance and the cost of contesting. Section 25 operates when the court is in a position to dispose of the cause — it secures the indigent spouse with a gross sum or a periodical sum, payable at the time of passing the decree or at any time subsequent thereto. The two provisions are gender-neutral after the 1976 amendment; either husband or wife may invoke them. The two provisions are also doctrinally distinct: Section 24 is summary and tied to the pendency of the proceeding; Section 25 is an independent matrimonial relief that survives the proceeding and is variable on a material change of circumstances.

For exam purposes the chapter sits at the intersection of three other regimes — the wife's separate-residence-and-maintenance right under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, the criminal-court remedy under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the cognate provisions for custody and education of children under Section 26 of the HMA itself. The reader who treats Section 24 and Section 25 in isolation misses the most heavily examined questions on the chapter: the overlap rules, the adjustability of awards, and the grounds on which a Section 25 order can be varied, altered or rescinded.

Statutory anchor — Sections 24 and 25, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

Section 24 is the source of alimony pendente lite and the expenses of the proceeding. The provision opens with the words "in any proceeding under this Act" — an expression broad enough to cover petitions for restitution, judicial separation, nullity, divorce, and divorce by mutual consent under Section 13B. Two ingredients must converge: a pending proceeding under the Act, and an applicant — petitioner or respondent in that proceeding — who has no independent income sufficient for support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding. Where these ingredients are satisfied the court is empowered to direct the respondent to pay the petitioner the expenses of the proceeding and a monthly sum during the proceeding, having regard to the petitioner's own income and the income of the respondent.

Section 25, in contrast, is the source of permanent alimony and maintenance. Its operative phrase is "at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto" — a temporal expression that allows the court either to embed the alimony order in the decree itself or to entertain an application long after the decree has been passed. The order may take the form of a gross sum, a monthly sum, or a periodical sum, and may be secured by a charge on the immovable property of the respondent. The court's discretion is structured by four enumerated factors: the respondent's own income and other property, the income and other property of the applicant, the conduct of the parties, and other circumstances of the case. Sub-section (2) preserves the court's power to vary, alter or rescind the order on a material change of circumstances. Sub-section (3) directs the court to vary, alter or rescind on proof that the party in whose favour the order has been made has remarried, that the wife has not remained chaste, or that the husband has had sexual intercourse with any woman outside wedlock.

Section 24 — ingredients of an order for alimony pendente lite

The first ingredient is a pending matrimonial proceeding under the Act. The proceeding need not be one for divorce — it may be for nullity, judicial separation, restitution, or even a declaration that the marriage is void under Section 11 or voidable under Section 12. In Saju Sasidharan v. Dhanya I (2013) DMC 6A (DB) (Ker), the Kerala High Court held that an order of alimony pendente lite may be passed in any proceeding under the matrimonial statutes. Even pendency of an application for setting aside an ex parte decree, or an application for restoration of a suit dismissed for default, qualifies as a proceeding for the purpose of Section 24 (Rishidev Anand v. Debinder Kaur AIR 1985 Del 40).

The second ingredient is the inability of the applicant to maintain herself or himself out of independent income. The phrase "no independent income sufficient for her or his support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding" was parsed in Krishnapriya Mahapatra v. Birakishore Mahapatra AIR 1987 Ori 65 — the income must be such as would be sufficient for a normal person for sustenance and to meet the cost of the proceeding. The fact that the applicant is supported by parents, a brother, a son who is a chartered accountant, or works as a domestic maid-servant has been held insufficient to displace the obligation: Mandeep Sharma v. Kiran Sharma AIR 2002 J&K 90; L.R. Rajendran v. Gajalakshmi AIR 1985 Mad 195; Shyamlal v. Angooribai (1993) 2 DMC 183 (MP); Rattan Bala v. Prahlad Swaroop Aggarwala AIR 2002 NOC 147 (Del). What matters is the applicant's own independent income.

1. Any proceeding under the Act — petition for restitution under Section 9, for judicial separation under Section 10, for nullity under Sections 11 or 12, or for divorce under Section 13 or 13B.
2. Application by either party — the provision is gender-neutral after the 1976 amendment. A husband who is able-bodied but unemployed will rarely succeed (Kanchan v. Kalendra AIR 1992 Bom 493), but the door is not closed.
3. No independent income sufficient — for the applicant's own support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding.
4. Court's order — directing the respondent to pay the expenses of the proceeding and a monthly sum during the proceeding, having regard to the petitioner's own income and the income of the respondent.

Litigation expenses

Litigation expenses are claimable in addition to interim maintenance. The expression has been read to include every court visit, the cost of travel between residence and court, train fare, and even the cost of a companion to escort a young wife (Lila Devi v. Tarlok 80 Punj LR 744; Tarani Kumar v. District Judge, Mathura (1983) All LJ 1012; Sadhana Deepak Naik v. Deepak Laxman Naik (1993) 1 DMC 112 (Bom); Dharamichand v. Sobha Devi AIR 1987 Raj 159). Expenses of pursuing a transfer petition under the Code of Civil Procedure are excluded (Rachna Sharma v. Ramchandra Sharma AIR 1984 All 302). Where the wife is entitled to free legal aid under the Legal Services Authorities Act 1987 and refuses it, she is not entitled to litigation expenses (Ramesh Babu v. Usha AIR 2003 Mad 281).

Children — implied inclusion

The Act does not expressly mention children in Section 24, but the requirement of a child living with the indigent spouse forms part of the requirement of the spouse herself. In Jasbir Kaur v. District Judge, Dehradun AIR 1997 SC 3397 the Supreme Court held that where the child is with the mother, the requirement of the child is included in the requirement of the mother. The Jammu & Kashmir High Court in Madan Singh v. Asha Devi AIR 2009 J&K 1 took the view that the matrimonial court is competent to award interim maintenance to minor children. The cost of a wife's delivery of a child (Vibha Saroo v. Nigmendra (1983) 1 DMC 30) and the cost of a daughter's marriage (Kokilaben v. Harshadbhai (1986) 2 DMC 210 (Guj)) have both been awarded under the heading. The Section 26 power on custody, maintenance and education of children sits alongside the Section 24 inquiry, and in practice both orders are passed in the same proceeding.

Independent income — the scope of the inquiry

The Section 24 inquiry is into income, not into the totality of property. Hema v. S. Lakshmana Bhat AIR 1986 Ker 130 and Gita Chatterjee v. Probhat Kumar AIR 1988 Cal 83 hold that immovable property yielding no income is irrelevant. Where the wife is a junior advocate or a qualified dental doctor not drawing a salary, the court will probe whether the income is in fact sufficient (Sangeeta Sharma v. Rajiv Sharma (1994) 2 Civ LJ 921 (Del); Amol Bhardwaj v. Neeti Bhardwaj AIR 2008 (NOC) 516 (P&H)). The husband's bare assertion that the wife earns more than he does will not discharge his burden — the onus rests on him to produce her salary particulars (A. Venkatesan v. S. Kalpana AIR 2009 Mad 85).

Where the husband conceals his true income, an adverse inference may be drawn against him (Jasbir Kaur v. District Judge, Dehradun AIR 1997 SC 3397). The court may resort to an estimate based on lifestyle, ownership of a car, capacity to support a household, or refusal to file income-tax returns (L. Yuvaraj v. Kirubaarani Devi AIR 2009 Mad 138). The presumption of a capacity to earn applies equally to husband and wife (Kuldip Kaur v. Karam Singh (2000) 2 DMC 691). A husband cannot escape liability by becoming a sadhu (Hardev Singh v. State of UP (1995) 2 DMC 624 (All)) or by tendering resignation (Yashpal Singh Thakur v. Anjana Rajput AIR 2001 MP 67) or by voluntarily incapacitating himself from earning (Pilli Rajkumar v. Pilli Siva Kumari AIR 2010 (NOC) 898 (AP)).

Conduct of the spouse — irrelevant for Section 24

The conduct of the party claiming interim maintenance is not material at the Section 24 stage. Lallubhai v. Nirmalaben AIR 1972 Guj 174 is a clear authority: alleged adultery, cruelty, or refusal to live with the husband cannot be tried summarily, and the court should not prejudge the issue. Even where the husband seeks a decree of restitution and offers to keep the wife, her reluctance to return is no answer (Maikiat Singh v. Darshan Singh (1990) 2 DMC 81 (P&H); Munnibai v. Jagdish Rathore (1998) 2 DMC 647). The Punjab & Haryana High Court in Gurmeet Kaur v. Gur Raj Singh AIR 1989 Punj 223 went so far as to hold that refusing alimony pendente lite to pressurise the wife into reconciliation is unwarranted.

Procedure — summary, on affidavits

An application under Section 24 is disposed of summarily on affidavits (Bhalu v. Hemo AIR 1969 Ori 236; Vinay Kumar v. Purnima Devi AIR 1973 Raj 32). The court may not postpone adjudication until the disposal of the main petition, even where the legality of the marriage is itself in issue (Sou. Nirmala v. Gangadhar (1985) 1 DMC 172). Failure to record the husband's income before fixing maintenance vitiates the order (Pushpa @ Pooja v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 2005 All 187). An oral request cannot be entertained — a written application is necessary. The order may be made operative from the date of the institution of the original proceeding, not necessarily from the date of the application (Hema v. Lakshmana Bhat AIR 1986 Ker 130; Karnala Rani v. Raj Kumar (1971) 73 Punj LR 912).

Quantum of alimony pendente lite — guiding factors

There is no fixed formula. Parchuri Rajya Lakshmi v. Parchuri Viswa Sankara Prasad AIR 1995 AP 147 disowns the existence of any rigid rule, and Santosh v. District Judge AIR 2005 All 240 holds that the figure must be fixed having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case, including inflation and the cost of living. The familiar working rules are these: an adult member of the family is generally treated as two units and a minor as one; the figure tends to fall between one-third and one-fifth of the income of the earning spouse (Soma Chowdhury v. Pradip Kumar Chowdhury AIR 2009 Cal 63). Granting half the husband's salary as interim maintenance is excessive (Rajendra Kumar Mishra v. Sushila Devi (1994) 2 DMC 23 (MP)) — the rule pulls toward the doctrinal proportionality recognised across the Section 13 divorce regime; fixing maintenance above the amount prayed for is improper (Mansaram Sharma v. Saraswati AIR 1979 Ori 55). The order must not work as a penalty against the paying spouse (Veera Gowda v. Susheelamma (1977) 1 Kant LJ 288).

The court may also have regard to the social status and the standard of living to which the wife was accustomed. V. Usha Rani v. K.L.N. Rao AIR 2001 P&H 371 holds that "support" does not mean bare subsistence — the claimant spouse must be able to live in more or less the same comfort as the other spouse. The Supreme Court in Komalam Amma v. Kumara Pillai Raghavan Pillai AIR 2009 SC 636 held that maintenance must take into account the basic need for a roof over the head. In Rajesh Burmann v. Mitul Chatterjee (Burman) AIR 2009 SC 651 the Court allowed reimbursement of medical expenses during pendency. In Vinny Parmvir Parmar v. Parmvir Parmar AIR 2011 SC 2748 the Court enhanced an Air-India senior commander's wife's alimony from Rs 20,000 to Rs 40,000 a month, reasoning from his future employment prospects despite his second marriage and parental responsibilities.

Section 25 — permanent alimony and maintenance

Section 25 sub-section (1) reads: "Any court exercising jurisdiction under this Act may, at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto, on application made to it for the purpose by either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, order that the respondent shall pay to the applicant for her or his maintenance and support such gross sum or such monthly or periodical sum for a term not exceeding the life of the applicant as, having regard to the respondent's own income and other property, if any, the income and other property of the applicant, the conduct of the parties and other circumstances of the case, it may seem to the court to be just, and any such payment may be secured, if necessary, by a charge on the immovable property of the respondent."

Two clauses define the temporal reach: "at the time of passing any decree" and "at any time subsequent thereto". The expression has been narrowly read in Karilal Purshottam v. Lilavati Gokaldas AIR 1961 Guj 202 — "any decree" means any decree covered by the Hindu Marriage Act, and the court has no jurisdiction to grant permanent alimony where the petition is dismissed. Shantaram v. Hirabai AIR 1962 Bom 27 refuses jurisdiction where the husband withdraws the petition. Polavarapu Sri Devi v. Polavarapu Gangaraju AIR 2010 (NOC) 631 (AP) treats an order of dismissal as not being a decree, and so closes the door on a Section 25 application after such dismissal. Conversely, Devinder Singh v. Jaspal Kaur AIR 1999 P&H 229 holds that a decree declaring the marriage null and void is a decree for the purposes of Section 25 — the wife of a void marriage may therefore claim permanent alimony, an outcome that connects directly to the law on registration of marriages under Section 8 and the evidentiary value of registration in proving the existence of the marriage.

Eligibility — who may apply

Either spouse may apply, but the spouse must be incapable of maintaining herself or himself. Rajneesh Rajpurohit v. Savita AIR 2008 Raj 119 holds that a wife who is a law graduate and in government service is not eligible. Mandeep Sandeep v. Sandeep Vinayak Gode AIR 2005 Bom 180 disentitles a wife who earns more than the husband. But meagre income from sewing, knitting, or work with a Mahila Samakhya does not disentitle her (Bhim Dutt v. Vimla Devi AIR 2007 (NOC) 459 (Utr) (DB)). An agreement by which the wife relinquishes her right to claim maintenance is opposed to public policy and cannot be pleaded as a bar to a later claim for enhanced maintenance (P. Archana v. Varada Siva Rama Krishna AIR 2008 AP 216).

An erring wife is not blanket-disentitled. Rani Bai v. Chandrashekhar Verma AIR 2011 Chh 93 held that even a wife guilty of cruelty is entitled to permanent alimony if she is unable to maintain herself; Sunil Kumar Sharma v. Meera Sharma AIR 2011 All 29 took the same view in a case of desertion. The husband must positively prove unchastity — bare allegations are not enough (T.G. Gopalakrishnan v. G. Rajammal AIR 2008 Mad 267). However, where the wife refuses to comply with a decree of restitution of conjugal rights despite the decree, the Bombay High Court in Manju Kamali Mehra v. Kamal Pushkar Mehra AIR 2010 Bom 44 has held that maintenance ought not to be granted, lest the order encourage the wife to ignore the decree.

Quantum factors under Section 25(1)

The four enumerated factors govern the quantum:

1. The respondent's own income and other property — including not only salary but income from joint Hindu family business and assets acquired from family business (Neelam Malhotra v. Rajinder Malhotra AIR 1994 Del 234).
2. The income and other property of the applicant — sufficient independent income disqualifies, but past financial status of the husband may be taken into account (Jyotsna Sofat v. G.S. AIR 2011 Del 112).
3. The conduct of the parties — relevant at the Section 25 stage, although the threshold for blanket disentitlement is high; mere desertion or cruelty is not enough.
4. Other circumstances of the case — including the standard of living, the duration of the marriage, the existence of children, and the parties' future prospects.

The Supreme Court in Suvarnalata v. Mohan Anandrao Deshmukh AIR 2010 SC 1586 held that an estimate may be made by the family court from the list of assets indicated by the wife. The recurring rule of thumb is that the wife is entitled to one-third of the husband's income for her maintenance, inclusive of food, clothing, residence, education, and medical expenses (Sou. Sushma @ Sulochana v. Kanumalia (1998) 1 DMC 564) — but this is a guideline, not a straitjacket. Ram Lal v. Surinder Kaur (1995) 1 Civ LJ 204 (Punj) granted Rs 300 as permanent alimony where the pensioner husband earned Rs 840 a month. U. Sree v. U. Srinivas I (2013) DMC 91 (SC), AIR 2013 SC 415 fixed permanent alimony at Rs 50 lakhs for a wife and minor son where the husband had earned name and fame in classical music. Parimal v. Veena AIR 2011 SC 1150 fixed Rs 10 lakhs as permanent alimony where the husband had remarried after an ex parte divorce and had two major sons. K. Srinivasa Rao v. D.A. Deepa AIR 2013 SC 2176 awarded Rs 15 lakhs on irretrievable breakdown after long separation and vexatious litigation.

Form of the order

The order may be a gross sum, a monthly sum, or a periodical sum, for a term not exceeding the life of the applicant. The court may secure the payment by a charge on the immovable property of the respondent. The decree of permanent alimony is not extinguished on the death of the husband — it is executable against the estate in the hands of the heirs (Nagamma v. Ningamma AIR 1999 Kant 432; Aruna Basu Malik v. Dorothy Mitra AIR 1983 SC 91). A suit for declaration of a decree for permanent alimony in favour of a divorced wife for charge on the estate of the deceased husband may be converted into an execution application by way of ex debito justitiae (Nandarani v. Indian Airlines AIR 1983 SC 1201).

Interplay with Section 18 HAMA and Section 125 CrPC

The matrimonial-court remedy under Sections 24 and 25 sits alongside two other remedies for an indigent Hindu wife. The first is the civil remedy under Section 18 of the HAMA — the Hindu wife's separate-residence-and-maintenance right that is not contingent on a matrimonial proceeding. The second is the criminal-court remedy under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, available regardless of religion or pendency of any civil suit.

The three remedies are not mutually exclusive at the threshold. Nanak Chand v. Chandra Kishore AIR 1970 SC 446 held that there is no inconsistency between the HAMA and Section 125 CrPC — a Hindu woman may elect to proceed under either, or simultaneously under both. But once an award has been made under one law, she may not seek an additional award under the other on the same facts (Lingappa Goundan v. Esudasan (1903) 27 Mad 13; Bansidhar Mohanty v. Jyoshnarani Mohanty AIR 2002 Ori 182). Where she has obtained Rs 450 a month under Section 125 CrPC and Rs 800 a month under Section 18 HAMA, the two have been allowed to stand together (Citabala Naik v. Kanchani Patel AIR 2003 Ori 27).

Adjustability of awards

The Supreme Court in Sudeep Chaudhary v. Radha Chaudhury AIR 1999 SC 536 has held that the amount awarded under Section 125 CrPC is adjustable against the amount awarded as alimony to the wife in matrimonial proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act. The two remedies do not visit double payment on the husband — the criminal-court award can be set off against the matrimonial-court award. The proposition cuts in both directions in practice: where interim maintenance has already been granted under Section 24, an additional order of the same kind under Section 125 CrPC is not proper (Vijaykumar Gundappa Shetkar v. Sau. Bhagywati Vijaykumar Shetkar AIR 2009 (NOC) 2156 (Bom)). Conversely, rejection of an application under Section 125 CrPC has no bearing on a Section 24 application — the standards and the inquiry are distinct (Khanabai Kasnabhai Parmar v. Beenaben AIR 2010 Guj 79). A pre-existing order of maintenance by a criminal court does not oust the jurisdiction of the matrimonial court to grant alimony pendente lite (Sushila Viresh Chhadra v. Viresh Nagshi Chhadra AIR 1996 Bom 94).

Continued operation of Section 18 HAMA after divorce

Whether a divorced wife may sustain a Section 18 HAMA application has divided the High Courts. Manisha v. Sandeep AIR 2005 Bom 180 (and earlier Panditrao v. Gayabai AIR 2001 Bom 445) hold that once divorce is granted, an application under Section 18 cannot be maintained — the foundation of the right is the subsistence of the marital tie. The Gujarat High Court in Vihalal Mangaldas v. Maiben AIR 1995 Guj 88 took the contrary view, reading "Hindu wife" in Section 18 to include a divorced wife. The settled position in most courts now is that the divorced wife's remedy lies under Section 25 of the HMA, not Section 18 of the HAMA.

Variation, alteration and rescission — Section 25(2) and 25(3)

Sub-section (2) preserves the court's power to vary, alter or rescind an order on a material change of circumstances. The expression has been read broadly. K. Srinivasa Kumar v. K. Shravani AIR 2006 AP 365 holds that the court may vary the quantum on a change in either party's circumstances. Where the wife at the time of award was unable to maintain herself but later acquired landed property and the husband's income deteriorated, the order has been cancelled (Polavarapu Sri Devi v. Polavarapu Gangaraju AIR 2010 (NOC) 631 (AP)). Resumption of cohabitation may also justify alteration — Ansuya v. Rajaiah AIR 1971 AP 296 went so far as to nullify a maintenance decree on resumption of cohabitation, although Dattu v. Tarabai AIR 1985 takes the more nuanced view that resumption alone does not render the decree unenforceable.

Sub-section (3) directs the court to vary, alter or rescind an order on three specific grounds: remarriage of the recipient party, unchastity of the wife, or the husband's intercourse outside wedlock. The Patna High Court in Narendra Kumar v. Sujata Devi AIR 2011 Pat 135 placed the onus of proving remarriage on the husband — bare assertion is not sufficient to stop payment. The position parallels the broader rule on irretrievable breakdown: courts insist on positive proof of the changed factual matrix before they re-open a settled financial order. Sunita Singh v. Raj Bahadur Singh AIR 1999 All 69 set aside a maintenance award where there was a clear finding of illicit relations against the wife. Meenu Chopra v. Deepak Chopra AIR 2002 Del 131 held that the wife's unchastity disentitles her under sub-section (3); the husband's intercourse outside wedlock disentitles him under the same sub-section. Conduct that is short of these specific grounds will not by itself extinguish the right — Rani Bai v. Chandrashekhar Verma AIR 2011 Chh 93, again, holds that even cruelty by the wife is not a blanket disqualifier.

Termination of the main proceeding — what happens to the order?

The two provisions diverge on what termination of the matrimonial proceeding does to the financial order. A Section 24 order is interim and tied to the proceeding — once the main proceeding is terminated, no fresh interim maintenance can be granted (Chitra Lekha v. Ranjit Rai AIR 1977 Del 176; Malaya Das v. Basudev Das (1997) 2 Cal HN 88). The right to receive sums already directed continues — "during the proceeding" describes only the period of operation, not the right itself (Parchuri Rajya Lakshmi v. Parchuri Viswa Sankar Prasad AIR 1995 AP 147; Donti Reddi Chinna Vankat Reddy v. Donti Reddy Vijaya Lakshmi (1990) 1 Andh WR 374).

Withdrawal of the main petition raises a different question. The Supreme Court in Chand Dhawan v. Jawaharlal Dhawan (1993) 3 SCC 406 held that the liability of a husband to maintain the wife subsists even where the main petition for divorce is withdrawn. The order of alimony pendente lite does end with the proceeding, but the right to receive payment for the period up to the withdrawal — and the costs of the litigation — survive (Pratapbhai Trivedi v. Priyavadu (1993) 1 Civ LJ 570 (Guj)). The husband cannot abandon the proceeding to defeat the wife's accrued right (Vinod Kumar Kejriwal v. Usha Vinod Kejriwal AIR 1993 Bom 160; Bhanwarlal v. Kamla (1983) Raj LW 314). A Section 25 order, by contrast, presupposes a decree — it does not exist while the proceeding is alive in the manner that a Section 24 order does. The Section 25 order survives the death of the husband and binds his estate (Nagamma v. Ningamma; Aruna Basu Malik v. Dorothy Mitra) — a dimension that overlaps with the wife's stridhan and women's property rights against the husband's heirs.

Appealability and procedural safeguards

An order under Section 24 is interlocutory and not appealable under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act 1984 (Uttam Nandi v. Momi Nandi AIR 2008 Gau 177; J.P. Manjunath v. A.R. Susheela AIR 2011 (NOC) 29 (Kant)). The remedy is a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. There is, however, contrary authority in Rahul Samrat Tandon v. Neeru Tandon AIR 2010 Utr 67, where an order fixing maintenance pendente lite in divorce proceedings was treated as a final order and held appealable. An order fixing maintenance pendente lite must be a speaking order — one that records the parties' rival versions on quantum and the income of the husband, failing which the order is liable to be set aside (Salish Bindra v. Surjit Singh Bindra AIR 1977 Punj 383; Shakuntala v. Amar Nath (1977) 79 Punj LR 405).

Where the husband refuses to comply with a Section 24 order, his defence may be struck off (Meera v. Yogesh Kumar AIR 2010 (NOC) 1100 (P&H); Santosh Sehgal v. Murari Lal Sehgal AIR 2007 Del 210). He cannot ask the wife to file a written statement or proceed to ex parte hearing while he is in default (Dinesh Kumar v. Santosh Devi AIR 2007 All 30; Arti Singh v. Kunwar Pal Singh AIR 1977 Del 76). The matrimonial court has the power to make the order operative from the date of institution of the original proceeding (Hema v. Lakshmana Bhat AIR 1986 Ker 130) or from the date of service of summons (G. Das v. Pradyumn Kumar Das (1986) 2 DMC 189).

Leading authorities — quick reference

The chapter has accumulated a settled body of authority over six decades of HMA litigation. The Supreme Court's interventions on quantum — Komalam Amma v. Kumara Pillai Raghavan Pillai AIR 2009 SC 636 (residence as part of maintenance), Rajesh Burmann v. Mitul Chatterjee (Burman) AIR 2009 SC 651 (medical expenses during pendency), Vinny Parmvir Parmar v. Parmvir Parmar AIR 2011 SC 2748 (enhancement on future-prospects reasoning), U. Sree v. U. Srinivas AIR 2013 SC 415 (Rs 50 lakhs to a musician's wife), Parimal v. Veena AIR 2011 SC 1150 (Rs 10 lakhs gross sum), and K. Srinivasa Rao v. D.A. Deepa AIR 2013 SC 2176 (Rs 15 lakhs on irretrievable breakdown) — together establish that the Court will not allow technical economic asymmetries to defeat a wife's reasonable claim. Chand Dhawan v. Jawaharlal Dhawan (1993) 3 SCC 406 is the foundational authority on the survival of the maintenance right beyond withdrawal of the main petition. Sudeep Chaudhary v. Radha Chaudhury AIR 1999 SC 536 is the leading authority on adjustability between Section 125 CrPC and matrimonial-court awards.

For the High Court positions on procedure, the recurring authorities are Pushpa @ Pooja v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 2005 All 187 (speaking order on income), Saju Sasidharan v. Dhanya I (2013) DMC 6A (DB) (Ker) (any matrimonial proceeding qualifies), and Jasbir Kaur v. District Judge, Dehradun AIR 1997 SC 3397 (children's needs subsumed in mother's; adverse inference for income concealment). On unchastity and disqualification under Section 25(3), the leading authorities are Meenu Chopra v. Deepak Chopra AIR 2002 Del 131 and Sunita Singh v. Raj Bahadur Singh AIR 1999 All 69. The exam-ready reader will hold these in mind alongside the landmark Hindu Law cases set covered separately.

How Sections 24 and 25 are tested

The question patterns at the state-judiciary and CLAT-PG levels are stable. Three distinctions recur. First, the Section 24 / Section 25 distinction itself — the temporal trigger ("during the proceeding" versus "at the time of passing the decree or thereafter"), the form of the order (monthly only versus gross or periodical), and the survival of the order on termination. Second, the Section 24 / Section 18 HAMA / Section 125 CrPC overlap — including the Sudeep Chaudhary set-off rule. Third, the Section 25 / Section 11 cross-reference — whether a wife of a void marriage may claim permanent alimony. The answers are: yes under Section 25, no under Section 18 HAMA. For students working through the introductory sources of Hindu law and reaching the chapter via the wider Hindu Law notes, the connection to the Section 26 power on custody and education of children and the Section 13(2) special grounds for the wife is worth pursuing — courts often pass concurrent orders under the cognate sections in a single judgment.

Mock-test angles to expect: a problem asking whether a husband can claim alimony pendente lite from a wife who is a working professional (yes, but rarely successfully); a problem on whether a void-marriage wife can claim permanent alimony under Section 25 (yes, since the declaration of nullity is itself a decree); a problem on adjustment between concurrent Section 125 CrPC and Section 24 HMA orders (the matrimonial-court award absorbs the criminal-court award as Sudeep Chaudhary directs); and a problem on the consequence of a husband's non-payment under Section 24 (defence struck off, no ex parte decree of divorce in his favour). Each of these tracks one of the lines above — none requires more than a careful reading of the section itself.

Frequently asked questions

What is the difference between Section 24 and Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act?

Section 24 grants alimony pendente lite and litigation expenses while a matrimonial proceeding is pending; the order operates only during the proceeding and lapses once the proceeding terminates. Section 25 grants permanent alimony at the time of passing the decree or any time subsequent thereto; the order may take the form of a gross sum, a monthly sum, or a periodical sum, and may be secured by a charge on the immovable property of the respondent. Section 24 is summary and tied to the pendency; Section 25 is an independent matrimonial relief that survives the proceeding and can be varied on a material change of circumstances under sub-section (2).

Can a husband claim alimony pendente lite from his wife under Section 24?

Yes, after the 1976 amendment Section 24 is gender-neutral and either spouse may apply. But the threshold is the same for both — the applicant must have no independent income sufficient for support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding. An able-bodied husband who has voluntarily incapacitated himself from earning will fail (Kanchan v. Kalendra AIR 1992 Bom 493; Gobind Singh v. Vidya AIR 1999 Raj 304). Where, however, the husband is unable to earn for legitimate reasons and the wife earns well, the application will lie.

Can a wife of a void marriage claim permanent alimony under Section 25?

Yes. The expression 'any decree' in Section 25 includes a decree declaring the marriage null and void under Section 11 (Devinder Singh v. Jaspal Kaur AIR 1999 P&H 229). The wife who has obtained or is the subject of such a decree may apply for permanent alimony at the time of the decree or any time subsequent thereto. The position under Section 18 HAMA is different — there, a woman party to a void marriage is not entitled to maintenance because she is not a 'wife' for the purposes of HAMA (Krishnakant Malashankar Vyas v. Reena Krishna Vyas AIR 1999 Bom 127; Mangla v. Dhondiba AIR 2010 Bom 122).

Is a Section 125 CrPC maintenance award adjustable against a Section 24 HMA award?

Yes. The Supreme Court in Sudeep Chaudhary v. Radha Chaudhury AIR 1999 SC 536 held that the amount awarded under Section 125 CrPC is adjustable against the amount awarded as alimony to the wife in matrimonial proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act. The underlying logic is that both regimes seek the same end — securing the indigent wife — and double payment ought not to be visited on the husband. Conversely, where Section 24 maintenance has already been granted, an additional order under Section 125 CrPC is not proper (Vijaykumar Gundappa Shetkar v. Sau. Bhagywati Vijaykumar Shetkar AIR 2009 (NOC) 2156 (Bom)).

Can a Section 25 order be varied or rescinded after it has been passed?

Yes. Sub-section (2) allows variation, alteration or rescission on a material change in circumstances of either party — a downturn in the husband's income, an improvement in the wife's, or resumption of cohabitation may all qualify (K. Srinivasa Kumar v. K. Shravani AIR 2006 AP 365; Polavarapu Sri Devi v. Polavarapu Gangaraju AIR 2010 (NOC) 631 (AP)). Sub-section (3) directs variation on three specific grounds: remarriage of the recipient party, unchastity of the wife, or the husband's intercourse with any woman outside wedlock. The party seeking variation must positively prove the ground; bare assertion of remarriage is not sufficient (Narendra Kumar v. Sujata Devi AIR 2011 Pat 135).