Judgment and Decree (Section 33; Order XX)

Section 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 supplies the core proposition: the court, after the case has been heard, shall pronounce judgment, and on such judgment a decree shall follow. Two distinct procedural steps — judgment and decree — flow from a single hearing. Order XX, comprising twenty rules in the original Code with several rules added by the 1976 and 1999 Amendments, supplies the architecture: when a judgment may be pronounced, what it must contain, how a decree is drawn up, when it bears its date, what particular contents are required for decrees in different classes of suits, and how non-compliance is treated by the appellate court.

This chapter sets out the statutory anchor under Section 33 and the Order XX architecture, the timing rule for pronouncement under Rule 1 (with the 1976 and 2002 amendments and the Commercial Courts Act gloss), the successor-judge power under Rule 2, the once-signed-no-alteration discipline under Rule 3, the contents of judgment under Rules 4 and 5, the framing of the decree under Rules 6 to 8, the special rules for particular kinds of decrees under Rules 9 to 20, and the leading Supreme Court authorities — Surendra Singh, Vinod Kumar Singh, Forasol, K.V. Rami Reddy, and Bhola Nath.

Statutory anchor and scheme

Order XX follows the regime on the hearing of the suit and examination of witnesses, and presupposes the discipline on settlement of issues under Order XIV — the issues framed at the earlier stage become the points for determination at judgment under Rule 4(2). Once the evidence has closed and arguments have been heard, the court turns to judgment. Section 33 makes the sequence mandatory — judgment first, decree after; one cannot precede the other. Section 2(9) defines "judgment" as the statement given by the judge of the grounds of a decree or order; Section 2(2) defines "decree" as the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit; Section 2(14) defines "order" as the formal expression of any decision of a civil court which is not a decree.

The scheme reflects a clean separation. The judgment is the reasoned statement; the decree is the formal expression that follows. The judgment may be appealed only when reduced to a decree — limitation runs from the date of pronouncement of the judgment, not from the date of the formal decree being drawn up, as the architecture of Section 2(2) read with Order XX Rule 7 makes clear. The architecture sits within the broader managerial premise of the Code, examined in our chapter on the Code of Civil Procedure as a whole.

Rule 1 — when judgment is pronounced

Rule 1(1), substituted by the 1976 Amendment, requires the court, after hearing the case, to pronounce judgment in open court — either at once or as soon thereafter as may be practicable. Where judgment is to be pronounced on a future day, the court shall fix a day for that purpose, of which due notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders. The proviso, in its post-2002 form, makes the timing obligatory: every endeavour shall be made to pronounce judgment within thirty days from the conclusion of hearing; where this is not practicable for exceptional and extraordinary reasons recorded by the court, the future day shall not ordinarily be beyond sixty days. Sub-rule (2) permits the court, where a written judgment is to be pronounced, to read out only the findings on each issue and the final order. Sub-rule (3) permits pronouncement by dictation in open court to a shorthand writer where the judge is specially empowered by the High Court.

The Commercial Courts Act, 2015 substitutes Rule 1 for commercial disputes of specified value: the Commercial Court, Commercial Appellate Court, Commercial Division or Commercial Appellate Division shall, within ninety days of the conclusion of arguments, pronounce judgment, and copies shall be issued to all parties through electronic mail or otherwise. The ninety-day cap is the most stringent timing rule in the Code and reflects the broader policy choice to expedite commercial litigation.

The Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of UP, AIR 1954 SC 194, supplied the foundational doctrinal proposition. What constitutes a judgment is the final and formal declaration in open court of the operative decision of the case. Until that stage is reached, the judge can change his opinion. A judgment not pronounced in court does not operate as a judgment — it operates only as minutes or memoranda made by the judge who wrote it, even if the document is signed. The Allahabad High Court in Sanwarmal v. Lalu Ram, AIR 1969 All 96, applied the same rule. The Madras High Court in Nagiah v. Seshamma, ILR 1921 Mad 633, held that the posting of a notice on the notice board of the court announcing the result is not sufficient compliance with Rule 1 — pronouncement is a judicial act and must be performed in open court.

Pronouncement, notice, and oral declarations

The notice requirement under Rule 1(1) is mandatory. The Lahore High Court in Kharak v. Lachman, ILR 1925 Lah 471, held that a judgment delivered without notice to the parties is not a judgment pronounced within the meaning of the rule. Where, however, notice has been given of the date on which judgment will be delivered and the party is not present, he is not entitled to a fresh notice of the further date or dates to which delivery may be adjourned, as the Allahabad High Court in Thakur Singh v. Bhairam Lal, AIR 1956 All 188, held. The court is not bound to communicate the result of a case to absent parties.

The Supreme Court in K.V. Rami Reddy v. Prema, AIR 2008 SC 2680, made an important point on oral declarations. The declaration of a final result orally, before the concise statement of the case, points for determination, the decision and reasons have been finalised, is improper. A judge's declaration of his intention as to what the judgment is going to be, or of what the final result is going to embody, is not a judgment until he has crystallised his intention into a formal shape and pronounced it in open court as the final expression of his mind. The point matters for trial practice: a judge who orally indicates his view at the end of arguments has not "pronounced" judgment within the meaning of Rule 1; until the formal pronouncement, he retains discretion to alter his view.

Rule 2 — successor judge pronounces predecessor's judgment

Rule 2 empowers a judge to pronounce a judgment written, but not pronounced, by his predecessor. The 1976 Amendment substituted the word "may" with "shall" — the rule is now mandatory. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in Venkatesu v. Suryanarayana, AIR 1958 AP 656, anticipated this position even before the amendment; the Allahabad view in Lachman Prasad v. Ram Kishan, ILR 33 All 458 (1911), which had treated the matter as discretionary, is no longer good law. The Patna High Court in Pratap Kishore v. Gyanendranath, AIR 1951 Pat 408, held that "predecessor" includes any officer who tried the case — whether still in office, or transferred, or on leave. A judge who delivers a judgment written by his predecessor does not, by any fiction of law, become its author so as to be barred from hearing an appeal against it.

Rule 3 — judgment to be signed and not altered

Rule 3 requires the judgment to be dated and signed by the judge in open court at the time of pronouncing it. Once signed, the judgment shall not afterwards be altered or added to, save as provided by Section 152 (clerical or arithmetical mistakes) or on review under Section 114. The rule supplies the doctrinal anchor for the wider regime on amendment of judgments, decrees and orders under Sections 152, 153 and 153A.

The position before signing is qualified. The Supreme Court in Vinod Kumar Singh v. Banaras Hindu University, (1988) 1 SCC 80, held that a judgment becomes the operative pronouncement of the court the moment it is delivered, irrespective of whether it is signed or not. The court has the power to recast a judgment delivered but not signed under very exceptional circumstances; such power should be exercised judicially, sparingly, and for adequate reasons. After the judgment is both pronounced and signed, alterations or additions are not permissible except under Section 152, Section 114 (review), or in very exceptional cases under Section 151 inherent powers. The Allahabad High Court in Sangam Lal v. Rent Control Officer, AIR 1966 All 221, took the same view: a judgment delivered in open court but not signed and sealed can be altered.

The Supreme Court in Surendra Singh further held that any defect in complying with the rules as to authentication does not affect the judgment's validity once it is pronounced. The Calcutta decision in Fort Gloster Jute Manufacturing Co. v. Chandra, ILR 47 Cal 224 (1919), supplied the procedural complement: where a judgment is not pronounced, dated or signed in conformity with the requirements of the Code, it constitutes a mere irregularity within the meaning of Section 99 and affords no ground for reversal in appeal of the decree based on it.

Rule 4 — contents of judgment

Rule 4(1) supplies the form for Small Cause Court judgments: they need contain no more than the points for determination and the decision thereon. Rule 4(2) supplies the standard form for all other courts: the judgment shall contain a concise statement of the case, the points for determination, the decision thereon, and the reasons for such decision. The four ingredients are doctrinally inseparable; their omission renders the judgment defective.

The Supreme Court in Director (Studies) v. Vaibhav Singh Chauhan, (2009) 1 SCC 59, held that judges should not inject personal views into the judgment. In a case relating to malpractices and unfair means by an examinee, the High Court single judge had observed in an interim order that "if we care to think back to our student days, one would invariably recollect preparation of such kind of slips for refreshing the mind immediately before an examination, with no further intent to use it as an unfair or illegitimate manner." The Supreme Court held that such observations are irrelevant. The decision in A.M. Mathur v. Pramod Kumar Gupta, AIR 1990 SC 1737, supplied the related discipline: the language of the judgment must be sober and dignified; no disparaging or defamatory remarks must be made either against a party or against any other person.

The Supreme Court in Chintaman Namdev Patil v. Sukhdev Namdev Patil, (2016) AIR SCW 6116, made clear that it is obligatory on the High Court — particularly in second appeals — to set out the case of the parties, the findings of the trial court and the first appellate court, the arguments of the parties on the questions of law framed, and then to answer the questions in the light of applicable law by giving reasons. Rule 4(2) and Rule 5 of Order XX, read with Order XLI Rule 31, supply this requirement. Even an ex parte decree must satisfy the requirements of Rule 4, as the Punjab and Haryana High Court in CIT v. Surendra Singh Pahwa, AIR 1995 P&H 25, held.

Rule 5 — finding on each issue

Rule 5 requires that, in suits in which issues have been framed, the court shall state its finding or decision, with reasons therefor, on each separate issue — unless the finding upon any one or more of the issues is sufficient for the decision of the suit. The proviso is doctrinally significant: the court may dispose of the suit on a single dispositive issue without recording findings on the others, provided that the dispositive issue suffices for disposal.

The good practice, however, is to record findings on all material issues even where one suffices. The Bombay High Court in Fomento Resorts and Hotels Ltd v. Gustavo Ranato Da Cruz Pinto, AIR 1985 Bom 374, observed that when several contentions, factual and legal, are urged and there is scope for appeal, it is desirable to dispose of all the points and not rest the decision on a single point — to avoid delay and protraction of litigation should the appellate court take a different view of the dispositive issue. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Neemabai v. Gyanbai, AIR 1993 MP 109, applied the discipline even to ex parte proceedings: the court should record a finding on each issue, at least in appealable cases.

Rule 5A — informing parties of appeal forum

Rule 5A, inserted in 1976, supplies a small but doctrinally important addition. Except where both parties are represented by pleaders, the court shall, when it pronounces its judgment in a case subject to appeal, inform the parties present in court as to the court to which an appeal lies and the period of limitation for the filing of such appeal, and place on record the information given. The rule is a parens patriae provision — designed to ensure that an unrepresented litigant is not disadvantaged by ignorance of the appellate forum or limitation. The intersection with the broader limitation framework in CPC is important: the limitation does not start running merely because the rule has not been complied with, but the court's compliance is a procedural safeguard for unrepresented parties.

Rule 6 — contents of decree

Rule 6(1) requires the decree to agree with the judgment. It shall contain the number of the suit, the names and descriptions of the parties, their registered addresses, and particulars of the claim, and shall specify clearly the relief granted or other determination of the suit. Sub-rule (2) requires the decree to state the amount of costs incurred and by whom, or out of what property, and in what proportions, the costs are to be paid. Sub-rule (3) permits the court to direct that the costs payable by one party to the other be set off against any sum admitted or found due from the former to the latter.

The Calcutta High Court in Joytara v. Mahomed, ILR 7 Cal 526 (1882), supplied the foundational drafting rule: decrees should be drawn up in such a way as to make them self-contained and capable of execution without referring to any other document. The Patna High Court in Ram Narain v. Ramji Prasad, AIR 1956 Pat 461, held that a decree which merely states that the suit is decreed in part does not comply with the requirements of the rule — the part decreed must be specified. Where a decree or any part of a decree is passed by consent of parties, that fact must appear on the face of the decree, as the Allahabad High Court in Zahir-ul-Said v. Lachhmi Narayan, ILR 53 All 419 (1931), held. The decree must also correctly express what is really decided and intended by the court — the position established in Bishnu Charan v. Dhani Biswal, AIR 1977 Ori 152.

The Supreme Court in Forasol v. ONGC, AIR 1984 SC 241, addressed the drawing-up of decrees for amounts payable in foreign currency. The proper date for fixing the rate of exchange is the date of the decree. The court must select a date which puts the plaintiff in the same position in which he would have been had the defendant discharged his obligation when due — bearing in mind that exchange rates fluctuate over time. The competing dates — the date of breach, the date of judgment, the date of payment — were considered and rejected; the date of decree was held to be the just balance.

Rule 6A — preparation of decree within 15 days

Rule 6A, inserted by the 1999 Amendment effective 1 July 2002, requires that every endeavour shall be made to ensure that the decree is drawn up as expeditiously as possible and, in any case, within fifteen days from the date on which the judgment is pronounced. Sub-rule (2) makes a significant procedural concession: an appeal may be preferred against the decree without filing a copy of the decree, and in such a case the copy of the judgment made available to the party by the court shall, for the purposes of Order XLI Rule 1, be treated as the decree. As soon as the decree is drawn, the judgment ceases to have the effect of a decree for the purposes of execution or for any other purpose.

The Supreme Court in Bhola Nath v. Madan Mohan, AIR 1988 SC 793, emphasised the practical effect of the architecture: limitation does not run until a decree is drawn up. The provisions of Rule 6A have been enacted only to ensure that the delay in the preparation of a formal decree does not stand in the way of a successful decree-holder going ahead with execution or with appeal. The position was reaffirmed in subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court holding that a decree becomes enforceable immediately on the pronouncement of judgment, as a deemed decree comes into existence; the delay in drawing up the formal decree does not render it unenforceable from the date of judgment. Rule 6B requires copies of the judgment to be made available to the parties immediately after pronouncement, on payment of charges as specified in the rules made by the High Court.

Rule 7 — date of decree

Rule 7 supplies the date rule: the decree shall bear the date of the day on which the judgment was pronounced. When the judge has satisfied himself that the decree has been drawn up in accordance with the judgment, he shall sign the decree. The date is doctrinally significant — it is the date from which limitation for appeal and for execution begins to run, even though the decree is reduced to writing and signed later. The Patna High Court in Ram Chandra Mardaray Deo v. Bhalu Patnaik, AIR 1950 Pat 358, supplied the locus: the period of limitation for an appeal from a judgment runs from the date on which the judgment is pronounced, not from the date on which the decree is written and signed.

Rule 8 supplies the residual procedure where a judge has vacated office after pronouncing judgment but without signing the decree: a decree drawn up in accordance with such judgment may be signed by his successor or, if the court has ceased to exist, by the judge of any court to which such court was subordinate.

Rules 9 to 11 — special decrees: immovable, movable, instalments

Rule 9 governs decrees for the recovery of immovable property: the decree shall contain a description of such property sufficient to identify the same; where the property can be identified by boundaries or by numbers in a record of settlement or survey, the decree shall specify such boundaries or numbers. Where there is a discrepancy between two descriptions, the leading description prevails, as the Allahabad High Court in Mundar Lal Sahu v. Jiwan Ram Marwari, ILR 1944 All 226, held. A decree for possession of land carries with it possession of the account books and other papers relating to the management of the land — the position established in the early Bombay decision in Bhavani v. Devrao, ILR 11 Bom 485 (1887).

Rule 10 governs decrees for delivery of movable property: where the suit is for movable property and the decree is for delivery of such property, the decree shall also state the amount of money to be paid as an alternative if delivery cannot be had. The value as on the date of institution of the suit should be determined and stated in the decree; it should not be left to be determined in execution, as the Patna High Court in Gopal v. Jagadish Singh, AIR 1951 Pat 33, held. The decree-holder cannot at his option fall back on the money portion without first attempting delivery; nor can the judgment-debtor at his option choose to deliver the property or pay money. The Supreme Court in Forasol v. ONGC, (1984) 4 SCC 137, qualified the rule for foreign-currency decrees: the court has jurisdiction to pass a decree for an alternative sum equivalent in Indian rupees where a foreigner is entitled to receive money in foreign currency.

Rule 11 permits the court, where a decree is for the payment of money, to direct payment by instalments — for sufficient reason recorded in the decree, after hearing such parties as appeared at the last hearing before judgment, and notwithstanding anything contained in the contract under which the money is payable. Sub-rule (2) permits a post-decree application by the judgment-debtor for payment by instalments, with the consent of the decree-holder. The interest entitlement on the decretal sum is governed separately by Section 34, examined in our chapter on interest on decree. The Supreme Court in Central Bank of India v. P.R. Garments Industries Pvt Ltd, AIR 1986 SC 1996, held that in commercial transactions with public financial institutions where money is advanced on personal security, instalments are ruled out — granting them would frustrate the very object of taking security. Instalments cannot be ordered in a mortgage decree, as held by the Madras High Court in N. Shantilal v. A. Sankarasubba Mudaliar, AIR 1979 Mad 136.

Rules 12 to 18 — possession, mesne profits, partnership, partition

Rule 12 supplies the architecture for decrees in suits for possession of immovable property and for rent or mesne profits, integrating with the substantive regime under Sections 15 to 21 on place of suing for immovable-property suits. The court may pass a decree for the possession of the property, for the rents accrued prior to institution, and for an inquiry into mesne profits from institution to the date of decree or the date of delivery, whichever is earlier. The mesne-profits inquiry is the procedural bridge between the substantive right and the quantification of damages.

Rule 12A governs decrees for specific performance of contracts for the sale or lease of immovable property: the decree shall specify the period within which the money is to be paid by the purchaser or lessee. Rule 13 governs administration suits — a preliminary decree for an account of the estate of the deceased and an inquiry into debts and legacies follows the establishment of the right. Rule 14 governs decrees in pre-emption suits. Rule 15 governs decrees for dissolution of partnership or for the taking of partnership accounts. Rule 16 governs accounts between principal and agent. Rule 17 supplies special directions as to accounts. Rule 18 governs partition: where a preliminary decree directs the partition of property, the decree may, if necessary, declare the rights of the parties interested and direct partition or separation to be made by the Collector or by a Commissioner — partition of revenue-paying lands is by the Collector under Section 54.

Rules 19 and 20 — set-off and certified copies

Rule 19, read with the substantive regime on parties under Order I, governs decrees in suits where set-off or counter-claim is allowed: where the defendant has been allowed a set-off or counter-claim against the claim of the plaintiff, the decree shall state what amount is due to the plaintiff and what amount is due to the defendant, and shall be for the recovery of any sum which appears to be due to either party. Rule 20 requires certified copies of the judgment and decree to be furnished to the parties on application and on payment of the prescribed charges. The provisions integrate with the broader regime on written statement, set-off and counter-claim under Order VIII.

Distinguishing judgment from decree from order

The three statutory definitions — judgment under Section 2(9), decree under Section 2(2), order under Section 2(14) — supply the doctrinal foundation. The judgment is the reasoned statement; the decree is the formal expression of an adjudication that conclusively determines the rights of the parties on all or any of the matters in controversy. An order is the formal expression of any decision of a civil court that is not a decree. The distinctions are appellate-significant: a first appeal lies from a decree under Section 96; appeals from orders are limited to those specified in Section 104 read with Order XLIII.

The Allahabad High Court in Rameshwar Dayal v. Banda, AIR 1993 All 122, held that a Small Cause Court decision which has not even stated the points for determination and given findings thereon is not a "judgment" within the meaning of Section 2(9); the consequence is that it is not a decree under Section 2(2) and no appeal lies from it. The Supreme Court in Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd v. Janapada Sabha, AIR 1964 SC 1013, held that an order deciding a preliminary issue in the case is a judgment within the meaning of Order XX Rule 4 — a position important for the appealability of preliminary-issue orders.

Non-compliance and natural justice

Where a judgment is delivered in violation of natural justice, it is liable to be set aside even though formally pronounced. The Allahabad High Court in Nirankar Nath v. Fifth Additional District Judge, Moradabad, AIR 1984 All 207, held that where a date was fixed for further arguments and the appellant sought adjournment because his senior counsel was unavailable, the prayer was refused, and the court pronounced a judgment that had been already prepared, the procedure was in violation of natural justice — the appellant had been denied a reasonable opportunity of hearing. The doctrine sits alongside the broader framework on adjournments under Order XVII: even where the three-adjournment cap has been reached, a refusal that visibly prejudices the right of hearing may be set aside on natural-justice grounds.

The Supreme Court in Chawali v. State of UP, (2015) 11 SCC 600, reaffirmed the doctrinal limit on alteration after pronouncement: a judgment pronounced in open court should be acted upon, unless there is some exceptional feature; if there be any such, the same should appear from the record. The court's power to recast a judgment pronounced but not signed exists, but is to be exercised judicially, sparingly, and for adequate reasons.

MCQ angle — the recurring distinctions

Three propositions recur in prelims with high frequency. First, the timing rule under Rule 1: judgment must ordinarily be pronounced within thirty days of the conclusion of hearing; sixty days is the outer limit, available only on exceptional and extraordinary reasons recorded in writing; for commercial disputes of specified value, the cap is ninety days. Second, the once-signed-no-alteration rule under Rule 3: a judgment pronounced and signed cannot be altered except under Section 152 (clerical errors), Section 114 (review), or in very exceptional cases under Section 151. Before signing, the court has limited power to alter — to be exercised sparingly. Third, the date-of-decree rule under Rule 7: the decree bears the date on which the judgment was pronounced, even though it is signed and drawn up later — limitation for appeal and for execution runs from the date of pronouncement.

Two further distinctions are worth carrying forward. The Rule 6A architecture, post-2002, allows an appeal to be preferred without a copy of the decree — the certified copy of the judgment furnished by the court suffices. And the Rule 5 discipline — finding on each issue, with reasons — applies even to ex parte judgments; courts have repeatedly held that the absence of contest does not relieve the court of the duty to record reasons.

Practical takeaways for the trial-court practitioner

Three practical points. First, when a judgment is reserved, watch the thirty-day mark: a judgment delivered beyond thirty days without recorded reasons is procedurally defective, though the defect is a mere irregularity under Section 99 and does not by itself void the decree. Second, when seeking amendment of a decree, identify whether the change falls within Section 152 (clerical or arithmetical mistake) or whether review under Section 114 is required; the once-signed rule is strict, and an amendment outside Section 152 or review will not be entertained. Third, when preferring an appeal, do not wait for the formal decree to be drawn up — Rule 6A(2) allows the appeal to be preferred on the certified copy of the judgment, and limitation runs from the date of pronouncement under Rule 7.

Order XX is the procedural close of the trial. The next chapter, on execution of decrees — general principles under Sections 36 to 74, takes up what happens after the decree is drawn up — the procedural infrastructure for converting an adjudication into actual realisation of the decree-holder's rights.

Frequently asked questions

Within what time must a judgment be pronounced under Order XX Rule 1?

Ordinarily within thirty days of the conclusion of hearing. The 1999 Amendment, brought into force on 1 July 2002, made it obligatory to pronounce judgment either at once or within thirty days; where this is not practicable for exceptional and extraordinary reasons recorded in writing, the future day shall not ordinarily be beyond sixty days. Due notice of the day fixed must be given to the parties or their pleaders. The Commercial Courts Act, 2015 substitutes a ninety-day cap for commercial disputes of specified value.

Can a judgment, once pronounced, be altered before it is signed?

Yes, but only under very exceptional circumstances. The Supreme Court in Vinod Kumar Singh v. Banaras Hindu University, (1988) 1 SCC 80, held that a judgment becomes the operative pronouncement of the court the moment it is delivered, irrespective of whether it is signed or not. The court has the power to recast a judgment delivered but not signed under exceptional circumstances; such power should be exercised judicially, sparingly, and for adequate reasons. After signing, alterations are permissible only under Section 152 (clerical or arithmetical mistakes), Section 114 (review), or in very exceptional cases under Section 151.

From which date does limitation run for appeal — pronouncement of judgment or drawing up of decree?

From the date of pronouncement of the judgment. Order XX Rule 7 provides that the decree shall bear the date of the day on which the judgment was pronounced, even though the formal decree is signed and drawn up later. The Patna High Court in Ram Chandra Mardaray Deo v. Bhalu Patnaik, AIR 1950 Pat 358, held that the period of limitation for an appeal runs from the date of pronouncement, not from the date the decree is written and signed. Rule 6A(2) allows an appeal to be preferred without a copy of the decree — the certified copy of the judgment furnished by the court suffices.

What must a judgment under Order XX Rule 4 contain?

Four ingredients: a concise statement of the case, the points for determination, the decision thereon, and the reasons for such decision. The four are doctrinally inseparable. Small Cause Court judgments need contain only the points for determination and the decision under sub-rule (1). The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Neemabai v. Gyanbai, AIR 1993 MP 109, held that even ex parte judgments must comply with Rule 4; the absence of contest does not relieve the court of the duty to record reasons. Judgments must also be characterised by sober and dignified language — A.M. Mathur v. Pramod Kumar Gupta, AIR 1990 SC 1737.

What is the date for fixing the rate of exchange in a decree for foreign currency?

The date of the decree. The Supreme Court in Forasol v. ONGC, AIR 1984 SC 241, held that in an action to recover an amount payable in foreign currency, the proper date for fixing the rate of exchange is the date of the decree. The court must select a date which puts the plaintiff in the same position in which he would have been had the defendant discharged his obligation when due — bearing in mind that exchange rates fluctuate. The competing dates — date of breach, date of judgment, date of payment — were considered and rejected; the date of decree was held to be the just balance.

Can a decree be passed for instalments in commercial transactions or mortgage suits?

Generally no. The Supreme Court in Central Bank of India v. P.R. Garments Industries Pvt Ltd, AIR 1986 SC 1996, held that in commercial transactions with public financial institutions where money is advanced on personal security including personal guarantee, the granting of decretal amount in instalments is ruled out — that would frustrate the very object of taking security. The Madras High Court in N. Shantilal v. A. Sankarasubba Mudaliar, AIR 1979 Mad 136, held that instalments cannot be ordered in a mortgage decree. Rule 11 also requires sufficient reason to be recorded in the decree, and the discretion must not be exercised so as to amount to a virtual denial of the decree-holder's rights.